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Abstract 
This thesis draws on an ethnographic research in Ghana to question 
mainstream views on decentralisation that local level institutions can be consciously 
crafted to enlist the participation of marginal actors in governance thereby leading to 
efficiency and equity in development. The research explores the everyday practice of 
local governance in Ntonaboma, a resettlement community in the Eastern region of 
Ghana by using participant observation and interviews.  
Evidence from the study reveals that first decentralisation is not a technical or 
managerial exercise but rather a societal practice taking place among heterogeneous 
actors with diverse interest and values. Secondly, the interactions occurring among 
these diverse actors are mediated through the interplay of a variety of institutions at 
the local level. Thirdly, the complex and dynamic character of decentralisation at the 
community level make the specificities of context very relevant in understanding the 
transformative potentials of decentralisation especially how it impacts on people and 
their social organisation.  
The study places emphasis on the application of agency, institutions and 
authority in local governance approaches. Evidence from the study suggests that 
institutionalised decentralisation inadequately provides possibilities for ordinary 
people to transform the nature of their interactions within the community. The thesis 
raises further questions about the simplistic and instrumental use of institutions in 
local governance approaches. The study notes that institutions are not static and do 
not determine outcomes but are informed by the prevailing conditions at the 
community level. Thus, the actions of actors and specificities of the locality do shape 
institutions. The study emphasises the role of existing institutions and socially 
embedded principles in village governance. It thus suggests that, the process of 
decentralisation is a political process mediated through diverse institutions and with 
varied outcomes for different individuals. 
The study concludes by exploring implications for local governance and 
decentralisation to making local governance pro-poor. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
    This thesis questions the transformative potential of decentralised 
local governance1 at both the organisational and the ‗citizen participant‘2 
levels in the context of complex village realities. The focus is on 
understanding the reality of institutionalised decentralisation and specifically, 
whether the implementation of local government structures in a locality could 
facilitate individual agency, effective governance and the equal redistribution 
of power among various stakeholders with diverse interest and values. 
    In many developing countries the discourse on decentralisation 
between the 1970s and the present has shifted from government reforms to 
local level governance. The changes are partly due to the failings of earlier 
decentralisation approaches that placed emphasis on transferring the roles 
and functions of hierarchical government structures to lower administrative 
structures of government, and partly due to the emergence of new thinking 
about ‗good governance‘, poverty reduction and sustainable development. 
The renewed concern to acknowledge rights, power, difference and rising 
levels of poverty during the 1990s in most developing countries especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa resulted in the widening of the concept of governance to 
embrace participation in the political and economic activities of the state 
                                                          
1
 I use local governance to mean a contested field that encompasses ―the totality of  
processes which contribute to the development of a specific area as well as the norms  
necessary for mediating a harmonious integration of actions‖ of multiple actors with different  
status (Webster, 1998: 31).  
 
2
 Jenny Pearce (2010: 12) uses citizen participant to mean the ―private but responsible  
citizen, striving to balance public good with self interest‖.    
2 
 
through institutional mechanisms (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; Ribot, 
2002b; World Bank, 2000).  
  Most developing countries, including Ghana, have launched 
decentralisation reforms for the purpose of improving service delivery, local 
development and management. The approach to decentralisation in Ghana 
since the 1990s, however, has been implemented mostly as a managerial 
reform as a result of pressure from external donors ostensibly to fix the 
economic decline in the 1980s (Crawford, 2009; Aryee, 2008). This is 
evident in the way the policy prescriptions for decentralisation as outlined 
technically in the Local Government Law (Law 207) and subsequently 
amended into the Local Government Act (Act 462) 1993 place much 
emphasis on getting the ‗institutions right‘ to strengthen local government. In 
Ghana, decentralisation has not only redistributed power but also created 
new forms of local government with some degree of political, administrative 
and fiscal autonomy, often with democratically elected and appointed 
members. The aim of decentralisation reforms in Ghana as stated in the 
1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Local Government Act 462, 1993 was to 
make development inclusive and sustainable with poverty reduction as the 
main priority. For example, Article [240 (2) e] of the Ghanaian Constitution 
recommends that people are to be given the opportunity to participate in the 
structures of local government.  
  Even though there is a clear mandate, architecture and functions for 
the district assemblies in Ghana, the relationship between the district 
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assemblies and the local communities3 are not adequately explained in the 
policy framework that guides the approach to decentralisation and local 
government. Furthermore, the conditions and processes through which the 
decentralisation and local government reforms are to enhance efficiency, 
improve social equity or reduce poverty at the sub-district levels were not 
better defined (Aryee, 2008; Crawford, 2009; Crook, 2003). 
   The inadequate consideration given to the impact of the outcomes of 
decentralisation reforms on people especially in targeting and including the 
poor has led to an ongoing debate about the transformative potential of the 
concept in reality. Critics generally question the claim that decentralisation 
leads to more direct citizen involvement in governance, promote social 
equity and eventually lead to enhanced poverty reduction (Crawford, 2008; 
Larson and Ribot, 2004; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Blair, 2000). Drawing 
on empirical evidence they argue that the outcomes of decentralisation in 
reality have not met initial expectations. Their evidence suggests that, the 
actual practice of decentralisation as a local governance mechanism impacts 
differently on people because it involves actors who are economically and 
socially differentiated, with diverse interest and values and whose actions 
are shaped differently by the broader structural contexts. The main concern 
raised in their arguments is that decentralisation is a complex and contested 
process but it is often implemented based on policy guidelines without due 
consideration to the heterogeneity of the local context (Geiser and Rist, 
2009; Taylor, 2007; Jones, 2003).  
                                                          
3 Local communities is used to refer to the sub-district structures of the local government  
system such as the urban councils, town councils, area councils and unit committees. 
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   This study contributes to such debates by exploring how local 
government structures engage citizens at the community level. The intention 
is to understand the everyday practice of decentralisation and local 
government, how it is enacted within the specificities of a particular context, 
the mechanisms and processes involved, and how the ensuing outcomes 
impact differently on people.  
   This thesis uses an ethnographic approach to explore the everyday 
practice of local governance in Ntonaboma, a resettlement community in the 
Eastern region of Ghana. It provides a meaningful understanding of the 
complex reality of unit committees4 in village governance and the actions 
and strategies of social actors. The resettlement history of Ntonaboma 
coupled with the conflation of four villages into a single local government unit 
for administrative purposes provide a starting point for understanding the 
role that context plays in both the practice and outcomes of decentralisation.  
   The study claims that exceedingly placing emphasis on local 
government‘s mandates, architecture and functions to promote the 
participation of marginal actors in local governance evades structural 
inequalities, power relations and the diverse motivations that shape 
individual participation in local governance. I argue further in this study that, 
at the community level the institutions that shape interactions are diverse 
with different shades of ‗formality‘ and ‗visibility‘ and that these complex 
institutions interplay to shape the outcomes of decentralisation. This thesis 
demonstrates that, including the recursive relationship between agency and 
                                                          
4
 The lowest political-administrative unit within Ghana‘s decentralisation framework or local  
government structure. 
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structure, and the dynamic relationship between individuals and institutions 
in the debate on decentralisation would bring insights relevant to making 
local government structures match the needs and expectations of their 
community members. 
   In order to launch a discussion on how decentralisation is actually 
practiced and to unravel the everyday realities of the concept, this chapter 
presents the introduction and the structure map of the study. 
 
 1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
   Chapter two provides insights into the theories that shape 
decentralisation and local governance. The focus of the chapter is to review 
the relevant literature to identify gaps in the conceptual underpinning of 
institutional approaches to decentralisation. Tracing the diverse concepts 
and theories underpinning decentralisation, the chapter highlights the 
simplistic assumptions of decentralisation that narrowly focus on standard 
managerial procedures to attain efficiency and effectiveness in governance. 
The chapter draws on the gaps identified in the mainstream views on  the 
institutional approach to decentralisation to argue that, rather than simply 
focusing on technically getting the incentives and institutions right for local 
governance, decentralisation could offer hope to the poor if the gaze is 
widened to embrace issues of participation, social relations, power and the 
‗political‘5. The chapter advocates for an alternative approach to 
decentralisation that places emphasis on understanding the recursive 
                                                          
5 I have used ―political‖ to mean the various social practices that manifest in struggles over  
resources and power (Hickey, 2006: 5). 
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relationship between agency and structure in the contextual practice of 
decentralisation to illuminate the various structural factors that shape 
participation in local governance. 
   Chapter three brings into perspective the research questions and 
objectives that guided the thesis. It presents the philosophical orientation of 
the study and discusses the methods of sampling employed for the study. 
The chapter discusses the multiple methods used in data collection, how 
data generated for the study was analysed and the ethical issues raised in 
the study. It presents an evaluation of the data gathering exercise and 
discusses how my subjective position as a researcher was reflexively 
managed within the research process. 
   Chapter four presents the major structural reforms aimed at 
transforming local government in colonial and post-colonial Ghana. The 
chapter highlights the dialectics of decentralisation from both the colonial 
and post-colonial period. A historical overview of local government reforms in 
Ghana is discussed. The chapter traces the attempts by both colonial and 
post-colonial governments to institutionalise formal mechanisms for 
devolving governance to social actors. The ambiguities and complexities 
inherent in the institutionalisation of decentralisation within the current 
decentralisation framework are highlighted, showing how attempts have 
been made by successive governments to devolve power to communities‘ 
while still holding onto power at the centre. By placing the attempts at 
institutionalising decentralisation in Ghana within a historical perspective, 
this chapter provides a framework and context for understanding 
mechanisms for the inclusion and exclusion of social actors in formal 
7 
 
collective institutions at the local level. Such a perspective provides an 
understanding of how social and cultural practices shape governance and 
either complement or clash with the new local government institutions. The 
chapter also highlights the undesirable consequences of governance 
reforms driven by external imperatives which inadequately understand the 
existing social relationships, norms, values, and expectations that can have 
a longstanding influence on the actions of individuals. 
   Chapter Five interrogates the construction of human agency in local 
governance approaches by placing the dynamics of institutionalised 
decentralisation in the context of people‘s social life. In this chapter, I argue 
for a rethinking of the optimistic conception of individual purposive action 
based on the possibilities of boundaries to human action and choice in social 
life. I argue that, individual participation in local governance is exercised 
through social arrangements which obviate the abstract notions of agency in 
institutionalised decentralisation theory and policy. Specifically, the chapter 
argues that institutional approaches to decentralisation instrumentally utilise 
agency in a simplified and optimistic manner that glosses over important 
structural constraints that individuals encounter in their attempt to take action 
in daily mundane activities. I argue that both individuals‘ and the agency they 
exercise should not be conceptualised in an abstract manner devoid of 
social and routinised relationships, differentiation, interests, subjective 
values and livelihood concerns if the outcomes of such actions and 
strategies are to effectively promote social equity and have an impact on 
their lives. The differentiation of capacity to access and shape new local 
governance spaces and the complex motivations shaping participation in the 
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decentralised governance process are examined. The chapter demonstrates 
that individuals may not consciously act to change the relationships in which 
they are embedded as espoused in representative forms of local 
government. 
   Chapter Six questions the ‗functional and instrumental‘ nature of 
local government structures prevalent in Ghana‘s decentralisation policy and 
practice. The transformative potential of institutionalised decentralisation 
suggests the possibility of consciously crafting local level institutions through 
the application of ‗design principles‘ that reinforce the technocratic nature of 
much institutionalised decentralisation. The chapter critically examines the 
interplay between bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions at the 
local level and how this interaction challenges or complements the activities 
of local government structures in practice. The chapter illuminates the many 
ways in which the day-to-day processes of village governance were shaped 
and mediated by diverse overlapping institutional arrangement including 
those borrowed from existing institutions. These socially embedded and 
bureaucratic institutions at the local level, the Chapter argues, are 
interlocked and worked together to promote cooperation and enhance 
peaceful coexistence. The Chapter draws on the spontaneous nature of 
community management activities to argue that institutions for governance at 
the community level are flexible and adapted to solve a lot of community and 
individual problems.  
   Chapter Seven highlights the complexity of authority structures and 
the political nature of village level governance. The key argument in this 
Chapter is that authority is not static or legitimised by legal instruments alone 
9 
 
but rather it is negotiated in daily practice, reflecting the ‗processual‘ and 
‗political‘ nature of the concept. The chapter delves deeper into the practice 
of decentralisation and the day-to-day process of exercising authority by 
individuals to illuminate the complex registers of authority. The chapter also 
highlights the various ways in which authority is enacted and validated in 
practice among varied authority structures within the same context. The 
chapter illustrates how individuals, in their attempt to cognitively anchor new 
institutional arrangements, draw on legitimising symbols of authority. A key 
argument in the chapter is that interactions are organised around different 
structures of authority resulting in different claims to legitimacy at the local 
level. The chapter draws on the complexity of authority to highlight its shifting 
nature in the daily lives of social actors within a particular locality. 
   The last chapter presents the findings of the study, conclusions and 
recommendations for policy. The chapter weaves together issues emerging 
from the discussion to conclude institutional solutions to decentralisation are 
oversimplified and de-contextualised. The chapter argues that integrating 
social analysis into the practice of institutionalised decentralisation would 
reveal the wider interrelated issues that both constrain and enable individual 
participation, especially the social relations and configurations that shape 
access and participation in new institutional governance spaces. 
10 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUALISING INSTITUTIONALISED DECENTRALISATION 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter explores the literature to identify the various concepts 
that have shaped decentralisation thinking and practice in development 
since the 1990s to the present. Since these key concepts underlying 
decentralisation are highly varied in terms of the goals to be achieved, the 
chapter draws on various core notions and concepts to tease out the link 
between decentralisation, participation and governance. The key concepts of 
participation, empowerment and transformation inherent in the normative 
expectations of decentralisation drive the discussion in this chapter. 
Specifically, the chapter provides a thumbnail sketch of decentralisation to 
illuminate how decentralisation theory and policy inadequately apply the 
concepts of agency, institutions and authority in development practice.  
  To gain further insights on the process of how the mechanisms for 
decentralisation play out in practice, the chapter further explores the varied 
theories and perspectives that underpin contemporary thinking and practice 
about the concept. Drawing on the limitations of the efficiency and equity 
perspectives on decentralisation, I argue that the democratic decentralisation 
approach inadequately offer transformational possibilities both on the part of 
the poor and their social organisation due to the uncritical understanding of 
the link between agency, institutions and structure.  
 The inadequate conceptualisation of human agency, power relations 
and context specificities in democratic decentralisation approach leads me to 
11 
 
draw insights from social theory and the emerging post-instututional 
perspective to provide a better understanding of decentralisation practice. I 
argue further in this chapter that the actions of the individuals and their 
participation in local government structures are mediated through social 
relations and other diverse institutional arrangements which are shaped by 
context.  
 The chapter finally reviews literature on participatory governance 
using the metaphor of space to illuminate the effects of power relations on 
the political agency of people. Finally, based on the gaps indentified in the 
literature, the chapter offers an alternative perspective to decentralisation 
that will complement the practice of institutional decentralisation in reality. 
Specifically, the next section provides a historical background on 
decentralisation to reveal how the concept has changed over time before 
highlighting the different schools of thought that shape debates around the 
concept in theory and in practice. 
 
 2.2 The temporal dynamics of decentralisation 
 This section discusses the various thoughts that have shaped 
debates about decentralisation in development literature over time. The 
ambiguity around the discourse and the practice of decentralisation requires 
an understanding of the temporal dynamics of the concept in both theory and 
practice. The essence in discussing the temporal dynamics of 
decentralisation is to reveal the particular implications that such changes in 
the approach to decentralisation have on the thinking and practice of local 
governance and development.  
12 
 
             Decentralisation in the early years of its introduction in mainstream 
development in the 1970s was more often associated with inefficiency of 
government (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2009; World Bank, 2000; 1999). 
Earlier decentralisation reforms were conceived narrowly as the 
disaggregation of the central states power and authority to sub national units 
of administration, local governments, or other agents of the state. Such a 
conception portrayed the state as both inefficient and as the same 
government (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983).  Hence, many decentralisation 
reforms during this period presented the concept as the remedy to the 
inefficiencies of the central state (World Bank, 1993). For example, the 
World Bank in 1992, sought to use decentralisation as a mechanism to 
strengthen public sector management, promote rules and institutions to 
provide a predictable and transparent framework for public and private 
business, and promote accountability for economic and financial 
performance (ibid). 
 Decentralisation was also advocated as a way of reducing the role of 
the central state in general, so as to make government more responsive and 
efficient (Smoke, 2003; World Bank, 1999; Mahwood, 1993). Countries that 
implemented decentralisation reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on 
deconcentrating hierarchical government structures and bureaucracies to 
sun-national units as a result of the many failures of the central state. The 
policy and practice of decentralisation during this period was to accelerate 
development, break bureaucratic bottlenecks arising from centralised 
government planning and management, and participate more effectively in a 
more globalising economy (Smoke, 2003).  
13 
 
  Latter forms of decentralisation policies, beginning in the mid-1980s, 
widened the concept to include political power sharing, democratisation, and 
market liberalisation as a result of the concerns arising over the 
ineffectiveness of the central state to promote economic and social 
improvement. Later, during the early 1990s, the discourse around 
decentralisation widened to embrace not only government but also other 
societal institutions, including the private sector and civil associations. 
Decentralisation reforms were primarily driven by international development 
agencies, which associated decentralisation with rolling back of the state, the 
extension of bureaucratic control, and the marketisation of social services 
(World Bank, 1997; 1993). Debates on the policy and practice of 
decentralisation within this period shifted from the proper allocation of 
responsibilities within government to how strongly the state should intervene 
in economic activities, and the appropriate roles of government, the private 
sector, and civil society in the development process.  
 However, in the late 1990s, thinking about decentralisation focused 
on the broader perspectives of governance due to the recognition of the 
complex institutions shaping people‘s lives (World Bank, 2001). The 
concepts and practices of decentralisation now placed emphasis not only on 
the transfer of authority within government but also on the sharing of power, 
authority, and responsibilities among broader governance institutions. Latter 
forms of decentralisation policy in late 1990s placed more emphasis on local 
forms of democratic governance that widened spaces for citizen involvement 
that were also shaped by the ideals of ‗the good governance agenda‘ to 
reduce poverty. Three primary forms of decentralisation namely, devolution, 
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deconcentration and delegation were pursued by most countries that had 
decentralised although other forms of decentralisation in the form of 
privatisation and partnership were also found in the discourse of 
decentralisation (Work, 2002; Rondinelli, 1983). However, this study places 
more emphasis on devolution as a form of decentralisation that transfers 
power and authority to elected local governments that are both independent 
of central government control and democratically elected (Crawford, 2008; 
Ribot, 2002a). Devolution may also be about local government elections and 
the control of public life by elected politicians (Ribot, 2004; Blair, 2000). 
 The form and content of decentralisation approaches implemented in 
mainstream development have mostly been shaped by prevailing debates in 
development policy and practice. Contemporary critical thoughts about 
decentralisation centre on mechanisms to improve citizens‘ engagement, 
and governance processes, and on further strengthening decentralised 
institutions. Within much of the debates, decentralisation is presented as a 
statist project of social transformation (Corbridge, 2008). The debates focus 
on establishing the appropriate strategy for addressing concerns about the 
inefficient state and, its relations to citizens, or society in general. Based on 
such ―structural-functional‖ assumptions of state-citizen relations, two main 
schools of thought are mostly evident within the decentralisation literature. 
The theoretical positions are reflected in either the ‗free-market economists‘ 
or those who are both ‗anti-state‘ and ‗anti-market‘ (Bardhan, 2002).  
 In general, both schools of thought concentrate on the appropriate 
mechanisms to promote more direct citizen engagement in the processes of 
governance and the role of the state in addressing the needs of society. 
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While the ‗free-market economists‘ draw more on technocratic principles to 
address the inefficiencies of the central state, the latter group advocates for 
a representative democracy that is supplemented with a vibrant and 
participatory civil society (Bardhan, 2002; Heller, 2001).  
 The technocratic view is informed by the idea that experts have the 
ability to either design robust local level institutions or fix the deficiencies of 
inefficient institutions in order to enable the state govern society (World 
Bank, 2001). Viewed From this perspective, decentralisation is thought of as 
a technocratic activity due to its adherence to bureaucratic principles of 
public administration, fiscal and instrumental rational planning to achieve 
structural transformation. This view stresses the importance of getting local 
government ‗institutions right‘ for development outcomes to be efficient, 
accountable and responsive (Ribot, 2004). Central to the technocratic 
approach is the tendency to initiate governance reforms from above and to 
insulate decision-makers from politics (World Bank, 2001). The state‘s 
organisations and staff are expected to act impersonally to achieve 
functional ends through the application of instrumental rational techniques 
(Corbridge, 2008). To achieve these functional objectives of the state, 
certain technical procedures framed in the discourse of ―good governance‖ 
are adopted in order for state institutions to function more efficiently, address 
the needs of society and finally transform it. The priority of the technocratic 
school is to get the institutions right to foster ‗good governance‘. 
 Critics argue that the technocratic approach inadequately considers 
context specificities, over simplifies complex reality and downplay local 
politics (Corbridge, 2008; Slater, 2002).  
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 The other extreme position on decentralisation, what Bardhan (2002) 
terms ―anarchocommunitarians‖ (AC), are in opposition to the dominant role 
accorded to the state and the market in mainstream development thinking 
and practice. A lot of emphasis is placed on civil society and all forms of 
association rather than on the institutions of the state. The AC view advocate 
for the deepening of democracy by placing emphasis on formal 
representative institutions supplemented by an active civil society. The main 
thrust of this approach to decentralisation is the rejection of the overly 
centralised and elite-controlled character of the state and the market in 
favour of empowering local actors with their forms of organisations 
(Houtzager et al. 2003). These theorists advocate for local actors including 
the marginalised and oppressed to be mobilised, preferably through the 
activities of ‗social movements‘ to challenge the hegemonic state and its 
associated elites. One of their arguments is that, local actors have the 
capacity to know and express their interest to shape the outcome of 
development through active mobilisation (ibid). 
 The two approaches discussed above converge around the 
mainstream view that state-society relations in general can be fixed and 
transformed through mechanisms of decentralisation (Bardhan, 2002). Both 
approaches emphasise some form of ‗modernism‘ that, suggests that state-
society‘s relation can be transformed either through conscious design of the 
institutions of the state or through the mobilisation and the subsequent 
empowerment of the poor and marginalized around their local forms of 
organisation to manage their affairs (Slater, 2002; Scott, 1998). However, 
comparing the two approaches, the AC conceptualise people as being 
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defined through relations with others and embedded in community, whiles 
the technocratic view sees people as self interested autonomous. Heller 
(2001: 136) writes that, ―the technocratic vision understands but reifies 
institutions at the expense of mobilisation, whiles the ACs understand and 
reify mobilisation at the expense of institutions‖. 
 This thesis takes the view that the state should decentralise power 
and authority to lower levels institutions and also consider the socio-politcal 
perspectives that will make local government responsive. However, the 
belief of the technocratic approach that, participation in governance can be 
engineered through appropriate institutional designs is rejected. This is 
because formal local government structures, which are created by the state, 
tend to neglect the differentiated nature of the community and the structural 
factors that shape community participation. Similarly, the claim by the AC 
that, increase associationalism and democracy from below can increase 
participation is also inadequate, because the various structural and 
contextual factors that shape individual participation in governance at the 
local level are not considered.  
 Rather, this thesis advocates for a middle ground that incorporates in 
a more dynamic manner both the institutional and sociopolitical parameters 
of decentralisation that, creatively manage a delicate equilibrium between 
representation and participation, and between technocracy and democracy 
reflected respectively in both the technocratic and the AC approaches to 
decentralisation (Heller, 2001). Thinking around this position integrates both 
the subjective nature of social actors and the classical notion of citizenship in 
a more relational and contingent perspective (Geiser and Rist, 2009). This 
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position is also informed by the fact that, decentralisation is primarily not only 
a managerial issue of improving governance procedures, but it is a political 
process that involves the negotiation and redefinition of the institutional 
arrangements that govern the relationship between the state and its people. 
Hence the process of decentralisation is shaped by interest and agency of 
the various actors and institutions. Also increase associationalism and 
democracy from below may not sustain participation, transparency and 
accountability but reinforce the dominant position of dominant local elites 
foster the relations of patronage and perpetuate existing power relations 
(Heller, 2001).   
 This thesis argues that it is important for the state to develop and 
simplify techniques in order to implement its development programmes, for 
monitoring and evaluation purposes, but how do such rational techniques 
permit the incorporation of complex, illegible local practices that local people 
want and need to run their lives (Corbridge, 2008; Slater, 2002). Therefore, 
considering the occurrence of the practice of decentralisation in ordinary 
social arenas at the community level, this thesis advocate that 
decentralisation policy and practice must move beyond the functionalist 
perspective of ‗state-society‘ relations. The mechanisms for decentralisation 
should envisage neither the state nor society as positioned outside each 
other but, in reality they are but closely knit with one another (Corbridge, 
2008; Midgal, 2001). Furthermore, both the state and society should not be 
conceived as distinct monolithic entities, immune from power and politics, 
but rather as complex and diverse, consisting of various actors and 
institutions. Perhaps, decentralisation could be seen more as a ―social 
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interface‖6 where various entities with different interest and agency behave 
politically to pursue their interest (Long, 2001: 243).  
 Following on from the inadequate conception of state-society 
relationship in the decentralisation discourse is the problematic conception of 
individuals and their relations to the state (Corbridge, 2008). Decentralisation 
policy focuses on incentives for behavioural change (Ribot, 2002a). The 
justification for such an argument is made around the assumption that 
mechanisms for decentralisation provides the incentives for state officials of 
the bureaucracy to work with local representatives, whiles local people are 
supposed to actively participate in the affairs of their locality and 
subsequently hold their representatives accountable (ibid). Also democratic 
decentralisation policy documents lean towards representative democracy 
that claims that strengthening and empowering local governments will make 
government more efficient and increase accountability and participation. Yet, 
the actual practice of decentralisation and local government reinforces the 
position of local elites and fails to transform existing structural factors that 
shape participation in local governance (Blair, 2000). Rather than relying on 
an idealised notion of decentralisation, the next section interrogates the core 
concepts that shape decentralisation thinking and practice in mainstream 
development. 
  
  
                                                          
6 Long (2001 :243) uses the concept of social interface to mean ―... a critical point of  
intersection between different life worlds, social fields or levels of social organisation, where  
social discontinuities based upon discrepancies in values, interests, knowledge and power  
are most likely to be located (ibid). 
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2.3 Questioning institutionalised decentralisation 
 This section problematises the diverse ‗core notions‘ and concepts that 
underpin the institutional approach to decentralisation in mainstream 
development thinking. In questioning the approach to institutional 
decentralisation, emphasis will be placed on the conceptions of human 
agency, institutions and social structure to understand how these concepts 
play out in the practice of decentralisation at the community level.  Much 
effort will be made to understand how the design and implementation of 
appropriate institutional framework for local government leads to improved 
efficiency, equity and effective governance at the local level. 
 Decentralisation has become identified with the promotion of 
efficiency and the enhancement of public services, as well as with support 
for more transparent and accountable forms of government (Larson and 
Ribot, 2004; World Resource Institute, 2003). Decentralising power and 
authority to local governments is likely to lead to improvement in decision-
making which is essential for promoting democracy and good governance. 
Proponents of decentralisation, notably international donor agencies claim 
that, the democratic content of decentralisation has the potential to make 
local governments more responsive to local citizen‘s needs, bring about 
greater participation in public decision-making and improve efficiency, equity 
and development (World Bank, 2006, 2002; UNDP, 2002). The claim in 
these assertions is that decentralising power to communities or local 
representatives, has the potential to make development outcomes equitable 
and sustainable, resulting in improved systems of accountability that are 
more effective and transparent. This will also enable local leadership to 
21 
 
make effective demands on the central state (World Bank, 2001). 
Furthermore, decentralised arrangements allow for more community 
participation and therefore the voices of people are more likely to be heard in 
collective decisions.  
            Mainstream views on decentralisation that seek to involve common 
people in the public decision-making processes to make development 
outcomes efficient, equitable and sustainable are welcome. However, these 
views as found in the discourse on decentralisation inadequately provide 
insights beyond the economic and political aspects of decentralisation 
(Johnson, 2001). The dominance of efficiency and effectiveness in the policy 
discourse on decentralisation also accounts for the decline in the social 
thinking around the concept (ibid). This is as a result of the neoliberal state 
reform that advocates for a reduction in state-driven social policies and the 
privatisation of services (Peet, 2003). For example, decentralisation reforms 
since the 1980s have considered state social welfare and utility expenditure 
as an unproductive government expense (World Bank, 1993). While there 
are arguments to support privatisation as a form of decentralisation on fiscal 
grounds, concerns over its impacts on poorer consumers exist.  
 Decentralisation as a mechanism for local governance extends 
beyond just the role and responsibilities of local government structures to 
include broader institutions and processes that organise the collective life of 
society (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Bierschenk and Oliver de Sardan, 2003). The 
decentralisation literature says little about the role to be played by nonstate 
actors to make local governments work in transparent and accountable 
ways. For example, Aryee (2008) highlights how Ghana‘s local government 
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framework mentions the Unit Committees (UC) as the lowest local 
government unit, but yet makes no attempt to provide guidelines for 
community participation beyond the district level. Therefore, interrogating 
some of the theoretical concepts that underpin institutionalised 
decentralisation will broaden our understanding on the extent to which the 
introduction of new institutional arrangements leads to social transformation. 
   I begin by understanding institutionalised decentralisation as the 
―administrative bodies, systems and mechanisms, both local and 
intergovernmental organisations, which help to manage and support 
decentralisation‖ (Smoke, 2003: 10). This includes the mechanisms that link 
formal government bodies to other key local government actors such 
traditional authorities and Non-governmental authorities and civil society 
(Parker, 1995). These institutional arrangements then become the key 
architecture on which decentralisation is built and are mostly concerned with 
defining which formal institutions are to be involved in a decentralisation 
program, and the development of an appropriate legal framework that 
defines the relationships between different institutions within a particular 
locality. Institutional decentralisation has ―elements of politics (who benefits), 
organisational theory (structural changes) and bureaucratic reorientation 
(changes in roles, attitudes and behaviour orientation)‖ (Hobley, and Shah, 
1996: 12).  
 Though the institutional dimensions of decentralisation at the local 
level may be complex and varied, Parker (1995) identifies a set of 
discernable conditions that will make institutional decentralisation work within 
a particular locality. First Parker identifies the importance of a legal 
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framework that defines the local government structures, how they are to be 
constituted, and how they relate to other institutions. In Ghana, the local 
Government Act 462, 1993 provides the legal framework that underpins the 
process of decentralisation and has put in place sub-district structures to 
shape local governance. Secondly, an active civil society is advocated as 
very important in shaping the outcomes of decentralisation. Social capital is 
used here to refer to the level of associational life and the different forms of 
institutions that can participate in decentralisation. Parker, writes that in 
Ghana there is a variety of ―well-developed political, moral and legal 
institutions and possess identities‖ that have been encouraged through 
associational life (Parker, 1995: 33). Thirdly, local capacity is needed to 
undertake the role and functions that are devolved to the decentralised 
structures. Finally, there needed to be in place an effective system of 
accountability. The absence of a well defined system of accountability that 
sanctions individuals and  institutions that fail to carry out their functions 
appropriately may affect the legitimacy and authority of institutions devolved 
as a result of decentralisation. 
 In theory, devolving power from central government to lower levels in 
an administrative and territorial hierarchy as a result of decentralisation is to 
foster representative, accountable local government that is better able to 
discern and respond to local needs and aspirations. Institutional forms of 
decentralisation through representation offer local actors the power and 
capability to participate and shape the processes and outcomes of public 
decision-making (Blair 2000; World Bank, 2000). At the same time citizens 
are considered to be capable of effectively demanding accountability from 
24 
 
their representatives (Ribot, 2002a, 2005; World Bank, 2000; Smoke, 2000). 
At the individual level, Blair (2000) argues that, participation in local, local 
government structures can lead to improvements in self-identity and worth, 
which can help to break down customs of inequality and discrimination. 
Furthermore, membership in local administrative bodies can provide 
important skills that can be transferred to other walks of life (ibid). 
 The recognition of individual action and choice in decentralisation 
discourse moves the concepts into the realm of democracy and rights based 
premises (Newell and Wheeler, 2006; Gaventa, 2002). The transfer of rights 
by the state to citizens is claimed to create the space for citizens to engage 
and shape the activities of their representatives (Ribot, 2002a). With such 
rights of citizenship, individuals are supposedly assumed to act differently 
and exercise power in their interactions with their representatives enabling 
them to positively transform the power relations in which they are embedded. 
So, in decentralisation policy and practice, we see how citizenship right is 
valorised alongside regulatory and economic measures of the state aimed at 
transforming the values and beliefs of citizens (Haruna, 2001).  
 However, providing the poor with citizenship rights from the state 
may not offer them the political agency needed to influence the affairs within 
everyday life7 in which structural factors and associational life shape the 
outcomes of their actions (Bracking, 2005; Cooke and Kothari, 2001). In 
practice there exist varied forms of ―moral repertoires‖ on which society may 
                                                          
7 Featherstone  (1992: 160) notes that, ―everyday life is usually associated with the  
mundane, taken-for-granted, common-sense routines which sustain and maintain the  
fabric of our everyday lives.‖ 
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draw in order to validate any particular pattern of rights and obligations 
(Dean, 2001).  Therefore, operationalising any form of citizenship rights must 
consider the existing power relations and structural factors that shape 
actions in a particular context. 
 Given the centrality of political agency and local government 
structures in the practice of decentralisation, this study will focus less on the 
technical and administrative aspects of decentralisation, and more on 
understanding how policies to decentralise local governance bring about 
transformation of institutions and socio-political relations at the lower levels 
of society. Furthermore, the study will also put emphasis on how local 
government structures complement or challenge social organisation at the 
community level, given the critical role that the interplay of community 
institutions and local government structures have on the outcomes of 
decentralisation reforms. To do this, I will draw out three main elements, 
namely, agency, institutions and authority, to show how contemporary 
thinking around decentralisation especially on individual behaviour and 
social organisation is informed and shaped by new institutional thinking.  
 Firstly, decentralisation is assumed to deepen democracy and 
improve socio-economic development through the extension of political 
representation to the local level (Larson and Soto, 2008; World Bank, 2000). 
The general logic is that, humans should have a say in their own affairs. For 
example, Manor (1997) writes that, bringing government close to people 
helps to tap the creativity and resources of local communities by giving them 
the chance to participate in development. It is this democratic tenet of 
decentralisation that advocates for the strengthening of political participation 
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in which citizens possess the right to hold public officials to account through 
periodic elections, collective action and other democratic means (IFAD, 
2001). Such mainstream views on decentralisation claim that the devolution 
of power to local authorities creates incentives for increased civil society 
activity and representation of local population in decision-making (Grindle, 
2007; Tendler, 2007). The argument also runs that, once decisions are made 
at the community or local government level, they will be transparent and 
responsive to the needs of the community. Thus, decentralised 
arrangements allow for more voices of people to be heard in final decisions 
(Ribot, 2002a). In supporting this argument, Smoke (2003) writes that, if 
citizens are able to express claims and demands on their representatives 
and other state institutions in at least some modest way, they feel a sense of 
control and autonomy and become empowered in the process. 
 The assumptions on participation, accountability and responsiveness 
at the local level in the decentralisation discourse are shaped by rational 
choice decision-making and individual self-interest. These assumptions 
seem to suggest that, a prototype individual with entitlements and capacities 
enshrined in citizenship rights should become active after the introduction of 
decentralisation. The implication is that with such nominal ‗citizenship rights‘ 
and the right institutions, individuals will have the agency to actively 
participate in the new decentralised representative spaces based on the 
terms and contracts set in the policy documents and to confront perceived 
inequalities. The underlying emphasis is on the individual conceived as 
making choices and taking actions rationally independent of others. People 
participating in these new governance structures are assumed to be 
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strategic and autonomous capable of exercising agency to negotiate 
community rules and decisions, and amplify their voices to make 
development outcomes and practice responsive and accountable.  
 Secondly, in the name of decentralisation, new local government 
structures are being created to increase and deepen citizen participation in 
local governance (Smith, 2009). Ribot (2002a) insist on and encourage the 
creation of local government structures during decentralisation reforms. The 
mechanism adopted is to actively design robust organisational structures, 
bureaucratic in form, to replace existing inefficient local government 
structures or to make such existing institutions efficient (Ostrom, 2005). By 
focusing on getting the ‗institutions right‘ for effective governance, 
decentralisation reforms assume an instrumental perspective on local 
government structures. The practice involves the introduction of local 
government structures at the local level to create opportunities for 
competitive local electoral politics and, within this competition, an enhanced 
local voice and improved responsiveness (SLSA, 2003). For example, in 
most policy documents on decentralisation, such as the  Provisional National 
Defence Council Law (PNDCL) 207 in Ghana, we see an array of measures 
through the provision of a legal framework, clarification of functions the 
building of organisational structures and demarcation of boundaries, all of 
which echo the bureaucratic ‗design principles‘ of the mainstream 
institutional literature. These formalised local organisations are to make 
community governance efficient, equitable and sustainable through 
institutionalised participation (Ribot, 2002a). The overarching question is 
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how to design local government structures that are representative, 
empowered and downwardly accountable in practice. 
 Finally, the institutional decentralisation literature seeks to devolve 
and redistribute power to key authority structures at the local level to oversee 
and manage community initiatives (Osmani, 2001). Much of the recent work 
on decentralisation has focused on the institutional arrangements between 
central and local governments. The routine in these reforms is to craft local 
level institutions that are legally separated from the national centre with 
meaningful powers and sufficient resources for coordination and regulation 
purposes (Ribot, 2004). Gibson (2000: 4) writes that, "authority should reside 
at the lowest level commensurate with the necessary information and 
resources for making and implementing decision." The assumption is that 
creating new transparent and accountable authority structures will result in 
the flattening of hierarchical power within the community (Mansuri and Rao, 
2003). 'Traditional' or 'customary' authority is assumed to erode over time in 
favour of new democratic institutions at the local level (ibid). Similarly, 
hierarchical control of community management is supposed to give way to a 
level playing field for the expression of claims in which mutual trust, 
partnership and collaboration shapes the decision making process (World 
Bank, 2002).  
 The above decentralisation sketch is underpinned by neo-liberal and 
populist thinking that places emphasis on rational explanations for 
institutions and human action respectively (Craig and Porter, 2006; Ostrom, 
2005; 1990). Little attention is paid to the extent to which diversity and 
complexity of context shapes the actual outcomes of decentralisation leading 
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to unintended consequences (Geiser and Rist, 2009; Larson and Soto, 2008; 
Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). Therefore, narrowly focusing on getting the 
institutions and incentives for participation right oversimplifies the complex 
and contextual realities on the ground ((SLSA, 2003; Mtisi and Nicole, 
2003a; Mollinga, 2001). To date, a poor understanding of the institutional 
arrangements that make decentralisation and local governance work has 
impeded practical efforts in decentralisation and local governance. The 
process of decentralisation in any particular locality can only be understood 
against the background of the distinct socio-economic conditions, political 
process, history and cultural context of the area. I will now highlight the three 
inadequacies of the institutionalised approach to decentralisation that this 
study seeks to interrogate. 
 First, mainstream views assume that confidence and capacity for 
exercising voice at the local level emerges through participation in 
democratic bodies implemented at the community level through 
decentralisation (World Bank, 2006, 1997). This assumption inherent in the 
institutional arrangements for implementing decentralisation takes individual 
participation for granted without considering the pre-existing social context 
within which agency is exercised. It is problematic to simply assume that 
individual involvement in local governance institutions will lead directly to 
empowerment and efficiency in local governance. The empirical literature on 
decentralisation reveals that more participation did not automatically lead to 
empowerment and responsive policies (Crawford, 2009; Crook and 
Sverrisson, 2001; Goetz et al. 2001). Evidence suggests that already poor 
and marginalised citizens encounter difficulties in having their voices 
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included and heard to at the community level (SLSA Team, 2003). Similarly, 
the implementation of local level governance institutions within the 
community takes little account of the unequal ability of individuals to exercise 
rights, and the effects of wider social structures on them (Cleaver and Toner, 
2006; Hickey and Bracking, 2005; Agrawal, 2005). More so, the objectives of 
accountability, transparency and legitimacy found in the discourse of 
decentralisation are more tied to the state and its reforms without much 
focus on state-citizenship relations (Corbridge et. al., 2005). 
 Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) mention that the relationship between 
decentralisation and citizen participation is conditioned by a complex 
political, historical, social and economic factors that differ among localities. In 
community interactions, individual participation or involvement are shaped by 
diverse and dynamic factors such as the social position of the individual 
within the social structure and social relations (Cleaver, 2009, 2007; Toner, 
2008; Wong, 2008; Mason, 2000). Public participation in decentralised 
arrangements may benefit only those who are economically and socially 
better off due to the relative difference in power among the various actors 
(Agrawal and Gupta, 2005).  Individual actions and choices are also shaped 
by relational and contextual factors that guide appropriate and expected 
actions under certain circumstances (Cleaver, 2005). Some authors argue 
that decentralisation reforms are merely cosmetic because they fail to 
adequately engage with the existing patterns of inequalities (Saito, 2008; 
Larson and Soto, 2008; Bryld, 2001; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001).  
 Secondly, the literature on decentralisation has given little attention 
to the relationship between existing community-level institutions and local 
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government structures (Benjamin, 2008).The blueprint approach to 
institutionalised decentralisation pays insufficient attention to the diverse and 
multiple mechanisms that govern numerous interactions within the context of 
a particular locality (Benjamin, 2008; Johnson, 2004; Mosse, 2003; 
Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002; Metha et. al., 1999). There are plural 
institutions within the community with different shades of formality and 
transparency that shapes participation at the community level (Toner, 2008 
Meinzen-Dick, R. S., and Pradhan, R. 2002). Yet, the approach to 
decentralisation suggests the desirability of new robust and sustainable local 
government structures to replace weak and ineffective ones (Olowu and 
Wunsch, 2004). The assumption is that efficient local organisations can be 
consciously designed to make governance arrangements optimal (Ostrom, 
1992). New local government structures implemented in the community may 
not necessarily be equitable and inclusive or preferred especially when such 
local government structures are mapped onto existing local institutions 
whose architecture is shaped by structural and social cleavages. The terms 
on which the poor engage with local government structures are thinly 
explored in the decentralisation literature (Benjamin, 2008).  
 Thirdly, how power and authority devolved to diverse stakeholders is 
enacted and legitimated in practice is little considered or put into real 
scrutiny in decentralisation reforms. The assumption in decentralisation and 
local government reforms is that social actors are ready and capable to 
exercise authority and shape collective activities once power has been 
formally devolved by the state to the locality (World Bank, 2001; 1997). The 
‗processual‘ nature of authority and how it is enacted and legitimated through 
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social practice including everyday encounters are thinly considered (Lund, 
2006; Lentz, 2006). The reality of local government reforms reveals that 
having authority through legal instruments of the state does not constitute 
ability to exercise authority within the locality (Sikor and Lund, 2009; Ribot. 
2009). The power devolved from the state to certain individuals need to be 
exercised alongside other existing important authority figures such as 
traditional authorities within the locality. This suggests that within a specific 
locality diverse authority figures negotiate, forge alliance and compete in 
their attempt to exert authority since power is socially constructed and 
reproduced through everyday interactions (Cleaver, 2000). 
 The above institutionalised decentralisation sketch reveals that, 
despite the celebratory accounts of decentralisation in the literature, 
empirical evidence suggests the prevalence of high inequality and poverty 
(Geiser and Rist, 2009; Crawford, 2008; Crook, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Crook 
and Sverrisson, 2001; Blair, 2000). There is some uncertainty about the 
outcomes of decentralisation, especially, on the ‗good governance‘ and the 
poverty reduction agenda (Crawford, 2009; Johnson, 2001; Crook and 
Sverrisson, 2001; Blair, 2000). Critics suggest the existing framework for 
decentralisation inadequately embraces the complex dynamics of the poor 
and the various structural constraints that shape their engagement within 
their community (Geiser and Rist, 2009; Larson and Soto, 2008). For 
example, citizens are not able to participate on an equal footing, exercise 
voice in public discussions and access new local government structures 
(SLSA Team, 2003). Such outcomes of decentralisation reinforces the 
assertion in some parts of the literature on decentralisation that the approach 
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fails to transform asymmetric power relations and structural inequalities in 
which the poor are embedded (Geiser and Rist, 2009; Larson and Soto, 
2008; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001).  
 Other writers also suggest that, there are multiple institutions at the 
community level that shape both individual access to decision-making 
spaces and resources (Berry, 2009). These multiple institutions at the local 
level imply the diverse ways in which existing social structures of inequality 
and power relations shape the actions of people (Odgaard, 2002). The 
struggles and contestations that shape access to power and the distribution 
of resources at the local level are evaded. Rather, decentralisation policy 
and practice assumes a homogenous community, relegating social 
difference and politics to the back ground (Ribot and Larson, 2004; SLSA 
Team, 2003; WRI et al, 2003). Decentralisation and local government 
reforms need to consider the wider state–citizen relations, especially those 
involving issues such as the socio-political processes in wider society 
(Mosse, 2007). 
 This thesis argues that, if decentralisation is to provide realistic 
opportunities for choice and action, then a framework that elucidate how 
social dynamics influence community management or governance activities 
of diverse groups of people, and how these activities in turn shape particular 
kinds of outcomes is required. This is not to suggest that ‗social‘ thinking is 
absent in development policy, however, it has not been accorded a 
significant role in policy-making around decentralisation. For example, social 
thinking in decentralisation policy and practice failed to adequately take into 
consideration the structural factors that shaped poverty in societies.  The 
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discourse on decentralisation still tends to define the social context of 
democratic decentralisation in narrowly institutional terms (Ribot, 2004; 
Crook and Manor, 1998). 
 Therefore, this thesis advocates for a decentralisation framework 
that adequately captures the complex and dynamic social lives of the poor, 
their relations of exchange, the different ways in which structure enables and 
constrains their agency, and the wider mechanisms and practices through 
which governance at the community level are embedded.  
 The next section seeks to explore the literature to search for 
theoretical perspectives that shape the underlying conceptions of 
decentralisation. Emphasis will be placed on highlighting the primacy of 
rational principles made obvious in efficiency arguments for decentralisation.  
 
2.4 Theoretical perspectives that shape decentralisation 
 A possible approach to understanding decentralisation and local 
governance is by considering the New Institutional Economics8 (NIE) and 
public choice theory which is dominant in much contemporary 
decentralisation thought and practice (Leach, Mearns et al., 1999). The NIE 
draws on economic logic to understand individual behaviour in and of 
institutions. Furthermore, the NIE seeks to get the institutions right to shape 
individual action in collectively desirable ways (Harris et. al., 1995).  
                                                          
8
 Vatn (2005) clarifies the positions of the new and neo institutionalists and acknowledges the  
presence of some confusion in the literature regarding use of the neo and new in institutional  
discourse. Eggertson (1990), for example, distinguishes between new (Williamson, 1985) and  
neo institutionalism (North, 1990, Ostrom, 1990). In this thesis I use new institutionalism to  
cover both positions. 
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 The rational choice and behavioural approaches inherent in the new 
institutionalism offer a framework to understand governance at both policy 
and community or everyday level. According to Mollinga (2001: 733), the 
―appeal for the new institutionalism to policy makers lies in its suitability for 
designing standardised policy prescriptions, and its exclusion, or rephrasing, 
of the issues of power and politics‖ while advocating the important role of 
local institutions in governance. Agrawal and Ribot, (1999) write that the NIE 
literature suggests that greater efficiency and equity in public decision 
making is possible through the process of internalising externalities, utilising 
all available information and better linking service deliveries to needs. 
 Relying on the work of some institutional theorists such as North 
(1990) and Ostrom (2005, 1990), I will demonstrate how the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) and the Common Property Resource Theory 
(CPRT) fit well into the debate on decentralisation policy and prescriptions 
as both consider ‗institutions‘ and ‗behaviour‘ as key to reducing uncertainty 
(North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 1997). Though the two strands of 
the NIE have developed quite separately they are by no means unrelated 
(Bardhan, 1989: 1339). First both approaches are analysed from the point of 
view of self-interest individuals and their bounded rationality. The 
assumptions of individual utility maximisation tend to drive the overall 
approach of the NIE whether in discussions about individual or collective or 
institutional levels.  
 This section discusses the main arguments inherent in the two main 
strands of the new institutionalism by teasing out the underlying concepts to 
show how the new institutionalism theory explains decentralisation policy 
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and thinking at different levels of state and community. Finally, I will draw on 
‗emerging‘ post-institutionalist thinking to illuminate the inadequacies of the 
new institutional approaches to decentralisation that makes its pro-poor 
agenda doubtful in reality. 
 
2.4.1 Transaction cost approach- institutions as ‘rules of the game’ 
 The NIE focus on transaction cost as an important factor underlying 
institutional change. The transaction cost approach provides ideas about the 
crafting of robust institutional arrangement to lower information, monitoring 
and enforcement cost. The idea underlying the transaction cost approach is 
that, within a large complex economy, as the network for interdependence 
widens, the impersonal exchange process gives considerable scope for all 
kinds of opportunistic behaviour and the  cost of transacting can be very high  
(Ingram and Silverman, 2002). Transaction costs arise because of limited 
information, uncertainty about the future, and the prospect that individuals or 
organisations behave opportunistically in their interactions with others 
(Williamson, 1997). The transaction costs include the cost of information, 
negotiation, monitoring, coordination and enforcement of contracts (Bardhan, 
1989).  
 The key argument of the transaction cost approach is that institutions 
evolve to lower transaction and information costs that arise as a result of 
impersonal contact in exchange (North, 1990). To reduce the cost of 
transactions, institutions are introduced to lower the cost of constantly 
monitoring the opportunistic behaviour of individuals leading to efficient 
outcomes in social exchange. Inherent in the transaction cost approach is 
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the idea that decision-makers are rational and goal oriented, but because of 
the human cognitive and emotional architecture, they sometimes fail in 
important decisions (Jones, 1999). The pursuit of benefits is limited by 
individuals‘ capacity to retain and process information resulting in individuals 
becoming boundedly rational. The cost of information leads to high 
transaction costs that result in the possibility of opportunism on the part of 
individuals. High information cost limits the ability of people to monitor the 
choices of others (Bates, 1995).  
 The transaction cost approach treats actors as rational in the basic 
sense of making choices that further their interests, but distinguishes itself 
from neo-classical assumptions of rationality by attending to cognitive costs 
or mental models of decision making (Harris-White, 1995).  
 North (1990; 5) distinguishes between institutions and organisations 
by defining an organisation as ―a group of individuals bound by some 
common purpose to achieve objectives‖. For Uphoff (1986), an organisation 
constitutes the structures of organised and accepted rules. North (1990) 
writes that, when an organisation is conceptualised in this way it eventually 
becomes a subset of institutions. North‘s argument is that, organisations are 
characterised by their purposive origin and hierarchically organised roles. 
Institutions on the other hand, are structures and mechanisms of social order 
and cooperation governing the behaviour of a set of individuals within a 
given human collectivity (North, 1990). 
 Purposively crafting organisations together to specifically undertake 
community management functions is termed as the ‗institutional 
arrangement‘ (Ostrom, 2005). The institutional arrangement constitutes the 
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established policy and legal environment, the organisation, process, 
mechanisms and procedures for decision-making, negotiation and planning 
(Svendsen, 2005).   
 
2.4.2 Common Property Resources Theory- institutions as ‘rules in use’ 
 Another strand of new institutionalism that takes its theoretical 
grounding from ‗game theory‘ abounds in the Common Property Resources 
literature (CPR) (Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Wade, 
1988). The CPR theory focuses on how rules can be consciously crafted for 
effective collective action (Ostrom, 1990). This was in response to earlier 
claims that collective-action problems will rarely only be overcome (Hardin, 
1968; Olson, 1965).This approach epitomised in the work of Ostrom (2005) 
defines ―institutions as the prescriptions that humans use to organise all 
forms of repetitive behaviour and structured interactions including those 
within governments at all scales‖ (Ostrom, 2005: 3).  
 To use the game theoretic terms, institutions raise the benefits of 
cooperative solutions and the costs of defection for opportunistic individuals 
who seek to shirk their responsibility. The CPR approach looks for answers 
of how best to solve common dilemmas and other policy problems for self 
organising institutions. The approach focuses on the crafting of rules that 
shape positively individuals‘ private and collective interests through the 
design of appropriate institutional rules, sanctions and means of 
enforcement to ensure cooperation (Ostrom, 2005, 1990). 
 Inspired by institutional economics, the CPR literature is rule-
focused, normative, and driven by instrumental ambitions of crafting 
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institutions for efficient management (Ostrom, 1992; Agrawal and Gibson, 
1999). It signifies the rights and duties of a group of individuals to one 
another with respect to a resource held together. The CPR approach 
prescribes a structured form of ownership arrangement within which 
resource users develops management rules, provide incentives and institute 
sanctions to ensure compliance (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Schlager and 
Ostrom highlight the importance of operational rights and collective-choice 
decisions in collective action. Operational rights specify who has the right to 
access the resource. Collective rights refer to management, exclusion and 
alienation rights. At the collective-choice level, the CPR literature advocate 
for the need for participation in governance so that decisions concerning the 
resource are deliberated upon by all stakeholders (Ostrom, 1992).  
 The CPR literature presents a formal framework for identifying the 
different types of rules that shape resource management practices. 
According to Ostrom and Ahn (2003: xiii) ―the economic and political 
performance of societies …depend on how the members of a community 
solve the problem of collective action‖. Hence the collective action approach 
advocates the setting up of governance institutions based on principles of 
cooperation that involves all community members in the crafting of rules to 
govern interactions at the village level. The CPR literature recommends, a 
set of guidelines, mostly referred to as the design principles for ‗crafting 
robust self governing irrigation systems. I will now briefly highlight the main 
features of the design principles that have shaped the thinking around local 
governance mechanisms. 
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 2.4.2.1 Design Principles 
 The design principles provide the conditions under which institutions 
involved in the decentralisation of formal institutions will work best (Ostrom 
and Sawyer, 2003; Ostrom, 1992). When social capital glues the community 
together, the CPR literature suggests that groups can achieve co-operation 
and co-ordination in a wide variety of settings especially through the ‗right‘ 
institutional arrangements or design (Baland and Platteau, 2000; Ostrom et 
al., 1994; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). The design principles approach to 
institutions for collective action advocates for the codification of rules backed 
up with authority systems to monitor and sanction free riders (Ostrom, 2005). 
The claim is that, based on the right principles, robust institutions can be 
consciously designed to restructure individual incentives through the local 
structure of authority to ensure cooperation, making development outcomes 
efficient, sustainable and equitable over the long run (World Bank, 2003). 
 According to Ostrom‘s (2005: 267) design principles, ―when the 
users of a resource design their own rules (design principle 3) that are 
enforced by local users or accountable to them (design principle 4) using 
graduated sanctions (design principle 5) that clearly define who has rights to 
withdraw from a well-defined resource (design principle 1) and where cost 
are effectively designed proportionate to benefits (design principle 2), 
collective action and monitoring problems tend to be solved in a reinforcing 
manner‖ (Ostrom‘ 2005: 267; emphasis in original). The operation of the 
above principles is strengthened by the three further design principles 
namely; conflict-resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition of rights and 
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‗nesting‘ of local institutions with other levels of decision-making and 
governance (ibid).  
 As shown in Box 2.1, Wong‘s (2007: 25) simplifies Ostrom‘s design 
principles into three broad themes namely participatory decision making, 
good governance, and authority building. Decentralisation policy documents 
show the division of territories into unique administrative boundaries each 
nested to a higher level institution. Participatory decision-making of all 
stakeholders in communal activities implies that all community members are 
involved in the decision-making process. The participation of all social actors 
in the governance arena confers transparency, accountability, and equity to 
decision-making processes. The argument is that getting all individuals to 
participate in decision-making and negotiation of rules manifest in improved 
compliance to rules. Establishing and implementing new formalised 
organisations that promote participation enables the formally excluded 
groups to be involved in governance.  
 The CPR design principles call for clear structures of authority that 
sanctions free riding (Ostrom, 2005). Authority structures can monitor, 
enforce and impartially interpret collective rules. To sanction is to deter free-
riding and also make individuals to shed their self-interest towards 
beneficially collective goals. Clearly defined membership and boundaries 
enhance the process of governance administration and service delivery 
because it provides an idea about who is included and excluded (Shale, 
2005). Rules and roles provide an idea as to expected forms of individual 
behaviour and the nature of interaction. This is aimed at building relations of 
trust and cooperation which is to enhance community participation.  
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Box 2.1 Ostrom‘s Design Principles  
Participatory decision-making 
Joint decision-making 
Inclusion of marginal into groups and committees 
Negotiating rules 
Conflict resolution mechanisms 
 
Good Governance 
Clear accountability 
High transparency 
Clearly defined membership and boundaries 
Regular meetings 
Visible public manifestation of collective action 
 
Authority Building  
Clear roles and responsibilities 
Majority ruling by voters 
Rule based management 
Robust monitoring and enforcement mechanism 
Graduated sanction 
  Source: Wong (2008: 35) 
 Despite the strong appeal and use of the design principles in 
mainstream development policy, the underlying principles are often focused 
on good governance separating public management from social life (Cleaver 
and Franks, 2005; Mosse, 1997). Institutional formation is presented 
simplistically as unambiguous and uncontested, yet in reality it is a long and 
complex process involving complex interactions, relationships, struggles 
over power, legitimacy and resources (Cleaver and Franks, 2005). Concerns 
have been raised about the CPR approach‘s uncritical engagement with 
issues of power and the underlying historical and political processes of the 
community (Mosse 1997).  The next section discusses the limitations of the 
new institutional theory as applied in mainstream development. 
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2.5 The inadequacy of institutional theory   
 Decentralisation and local government reforms have benefitted from 
insights from new institutionalism. The NIE approaches suggest the 
conscious design of institutions based on certain ‗design principles‘ to 
govern behaviour, translating individualised rational acts into collective 
outcomes (Ostrom, 2005). However,  the post-institutionalist‘ literature has 
identified some inadequacies within the mainstream decentralisation 
literature from a theoretical and policy viewpoint to include; the inadequate 
conceptions of human agency, the interplay of formal and socially embedded 
institutions, the inadequate understanding of ‗the political and the 
community‘, the simple focus on the evolution of institutions and the desire to 
universalise, and the absence of the concept of social power (Metha, 2007; 
Cleaver and Franks, 2005; Johnson, 2004; Mosse, 2003; Benjaminsen and 
Lund, 2002; Mollinga, 2001; Metha et. al., 1999). 
 Institutional theory conceptualises individuals as rational whose 
motives and actions need to be shaped by rules and incentives (World Bank, 
2003; Uphoff, 2002). However, explaining individual behaviour according to 
simple incentives is narrow and problematic (Wong, 2004, Cleaver, 2000; 
Kabeer, 2000; Mason, 2000). Individual behaviour needs to be understood 
within a broader complex set of motivations some of which are socially 
informed (Cleaver, 2004). Mason (2002) writes that the way we think, feel 
and reason are not necessary rational. Such emotional elements are 
perceived as ‗inside‘ the individual but they have consequences for the way 
we think. Thus, to fully understand individuals‘ actions and the motivations 
shaping decision-making process, we need to position individuals in a life 
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world in which decisions are based on a broader reflection as much as on 
the immediate, context specific structure of incentives. However, such 
reflections differ among diverse individuals and do not turn the members of 
the community into a bounded, homogenous entity. A lot of factors such as 
wealth, political authority, ethnicity and age affect the position of people and 
their motivation to participate in local governance (WRI, 2003).  
 A major limitation of the mainstream institutional literature lies in its 
inadequate understanding of the relationship between bureaucratic 
institutions and socially embedded institutions9 and the normative privileging 
of the former over the latter in policy directives (Cleaver, 2002; Webster and 
Engberg-Perderson, 2002; Metha et. al., 1999). This is not to say that 
socially embedded institutions are necessarily ‗better‘ than bureaucratic 
institutions but as the two institutions, bureaucratic and socially embedded, 
interlink and ‗are not necessarily easily distinguishable‘ in practice (Cleaver, 
2002; Metha et. al., 1999). The boundary between formal and informal 
institutions is blurred in reality and preference for one may blind the potential 
for the other. For Metha et. al., (1999), the assumed dichotomisation 
between bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions fails to recognise 
the messy middle ground between these two forms of institutional 
arrangements. They argue that, the messey middle is beset by ―ambiguity 
and openness to divergent interpretations‖ (ibid: 16).  
                                                          
9
Cleaver (2002: 3) rejects the separation of formal and informal institutions and uses the term  
‗bureaucratic‘ and ‗socially embedded‘ to distinguish these two institutions respectively. 
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 There are multiple channels through which institutions can be 
accessed. Yet in decentralisation policy we see the normative privileging of 
bureaucratic over socially embedded institutions. Such privileging obscures 
the multiple ways in which various actors straddle the sphere of diverse 
institutions to access resources (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002; Cleaver, 
2002; Berry 1989). Bierschenk and Oliver de Sardan (2003) highlight the 
cumulative character of local institutions which make a distinction between 
traditional and modern or formal and informal as purely rhetorical devices. 
Understanding the interplay of both bureaucratic and socially embedded 
institutions and the underlying rules and norms reveal the way in which 
practices reflect the ‗right way of doing things‘ (Metha et. al., 1999 :20) 
 Related to the ‗formal-informal‘ divide, is the mainstream institutional 
literature privileging the local over the global, that brings into question the 
issue of scale and nestedness (Merrey, 2006; Ostrom, 2005, Webster and 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). Critics call for the multi-layering of institutions so 
that local institutions are nested with institutions that operate at the meso 
and macro levels to offer social actors ‗more room to manoeuvre‘ (Ostrom, 
2005; Srivastava, 2004). Local institutions, they argue, need to link the 
agenda of higher level institutions to provide individuals access to other 
flexible channels in which they can negotiate their concerns. However 
doubts are raised about the potential of these other spaces to provide 
equitable access and inclusiveness (Cornwall, 2002, 2004b). The over 
reliance on multiple local level institutions as the policy option for 
decentralisation raises the potential for social exclusion and the expansion of 
inequitable modes of decision making. Such multiple institutional 
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arrangements may perpetuate the disadvantaged positions in which the poor 
find themselves (Wong, 2007 Cleaver, 2005). 
 Institutional theory has also been questioned based on its simplistic 
and unilinear evolutionary conceptions (Franks and Cleaver, 2005). 
Institutional crafting assumes institutions as conflict free, fixed, and 
unchanging where institutional viability is linked with fixed and formal 
structures. The evolutionist idea that formal institutions can be deliberately 
crafted to meet some specific functional ends is questioned as unhelpfully 
narrow as it fails to recognise the complex and more diverse nature of 
institutional functioning (Franks and Cleaver, 2005; Benjaminsen and Lund, 
2002; Cleaver, 2002; Rocheleau, 2000). Simply focusing on crafting 
bureaucratic institutions to meet functional ends may either lead to 
arrangements that are not necessarily embedded in existing relations or 
practices (Cleaver 2000). Consciously crafting robust bureaucratic 
institutions fails to recognise the fluid and dynamic nature of institutions. 
Institutions in reality are often ad hoc, partial and intermittent, and change 
over time and space (Cleaver, 2001).  
 The assumption in the institutional theory that institutions can be 
specifically designed to represent all stakeholders has been questioned as 
being simplistic because power, inequalities, privilege and disadvantage are 
all features of institutional arrangements (Wong, 2007; Martin, 2004). The 
institutional design principles, assume that individuals equally participate in 
crafting rules (Ostrom, 1990). Rules of the game treat everyone equally, and 
all members of the group are assumed to be familiar with the rules (ibid). 
However, in reality institutions do not equally benefit all who participate in 
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them. Under conditions of asymmetric social relations, seemingly equitable 
institutional arrangements may lead to different outcomes for different people 
(Cleaver, 2005). People bring to bear their social positions and identity in 
shaping rules in use, since processes of rule crafting involves ongoing 
negotiation, imbued with power relations (Mosse, 2003). Therefore, focusing 
on rules overlooks the configuration of power relations and the modes, in 
which actors interpret, negotiate and apply rules (Villas, 1997). If institutions 
are conceived of as patterned social practice over time and what people do, 
then relations of power are always part of this patterning.  New institutional 
designs and prescribed roles are therefore not independent of the relations 
of power and authority at play within a particular locality (Chalmers et al 
1997; Leach et al 1997).  
 Participation of stakeholders in new forms of local government is 
prevalent within the institutional theory literature that shapes evolving 
governance approaches like decentralisation. Yet, how local government 
structures promote participation and social action is deficient in 
decentralisation discourse. The next section discusses participation, agency 
and power in governance. 
 
 2.8 Participation  
 This section, discusses the historical traces of participation in the 
development literature and how it has shaped the thinking and practice of 
decentralisation. The term participation has been part of mainstream 
development approaches since the 1940s acquiring various shades of 
meanings and diversity of practice to reflect the prevailing development 
48 
 
thinking and emerging development paradigms (Hickey and Mohan, 2004; 
Cornwall, 2008). The traces of participation in development practice reveal 
how it has been applied and adapted continuously through several 
approaches in development theory and practice. The plethora of 
participatory approaches identified in the literature put emphasis on the 
importance of ‗people‘ or ‗individuals‘ in shaping the outcomes of 
development. However, the particular participatory approach applied in 
development at any time depends on the ―political, ideological and time 
specific influences‖ (Morvaridi, 2008: 11). The inadequacies of a particular 
approach result in a redefinition of the underlying values and mechanisms 
shaping participation to reflect the current thinking about development.  
 For example, the discontent with state-led development and top-
down approaches to development in the 1970s resulted in the proliferation of 
different forms of participatory approaches each with its own meaning and 
associated practice. All the various forms of participation though reveals 
some diversity of practice, they are applied in development interventions as 
an appropriate remedy for exclusion, inequity and disempowerment 
(Cornwall, 2008). Some of the forms of participatory approaches shown in 
Table 2.2 focused on enlisting people perceived to be excluded from 
development to participate in projects. The failure of these project led 
participatory approaches to manifest in ‗good governance‘ in development 
resulted in the search for new forms of participation that gave citizens a 
greater role in development (World Bank, 1999). It is within this renewed 
emphasis on active citizenship participation in governance that 
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decentralisation received impetus in mainstream development discourse as 
an institutionalised form of participation (Ribbot, 2002a).  
 Hickey and Mohan (2004: 9) use four main criteria namely; ―the 
locus and level of engagement, ideological/political project, conception of 
citizenship, and the links to development theory‖ to analyse the different 
approaches to participation in development theory. Cornwall (2008) also 
considered the ‗differences of interest‘ that guides the various forms of 
participation in development approaches. Cornwall explains that dwelling on 
the diversity of interest brings to light ‗ideas about why or how‘ participation 
is utilised (ibid: 271). The difference in interest manifests itself in the debate 
on participation as a ‗means‘ or ‗ends‘ in development (Nelson and Wright, 
1995). Participation as a means is more related to efficiency of the approach, 
whiles participation as an end moves towards equity and empowerment 
goals of development. The depth and content of participation in any 
particular participatory approach is illuminated by contextualising the practice 
of participation. 
  Therefore, taking into consideration the purpose of this study, I will 
focus on ‗transformative‘ forms of participation that entail institutional reforms 
that reconfigure the relationship between the state and its citizens. Such new 
governance spaces located at the interface between the state and society 
are assumed to provide the opportunity for diverse citizens to engage with 
and shape institutions of the state. The claim is that citizens are active, 
conscious and strategic in these public spaces. The centrality of agency in 
these forms of participation is aimed at making development more inclusive 
equitable and sustainable. 
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 More attention is given to ‗participation as citizenship‘ because of the 
rights it bestows from the state to citizens to claim and assert their control 
over local governance spaces. Those who argue for a more transformative 
approach to participation rather focus on individual incentives and local 
organisations at the expense of wider issues of power and politics and other 
competing influences shaping the boundaries for action for different 
individuals (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  
 Critically analysing the transformative claims for participation in the 
development literature reveals the limited evidence in reality especially on 
the part of the poor (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Chambers (2005) writes that, 
the limited evidence of participation in development practice lies more with 
the improper application of the techniques and methods for doing 
participation in relation to the poor than on the underlying ideologies. 
Secondly, other authors explain that participatory approaches over plays 
individual agency neglecting the crippling effect of  social structure especially 
how it mediates access to resources and shape individual agency (Toner, 
2008; Hickey and Bracking, 2005). Thirdly, the wider issues of power and 
politics are also side-stepped in these transformative participatory 
approaches (Cornwall, 2003; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mohan and Stoke 
2000). These shortcomings of participation are manifested in the inability of 
certain individuals to shape the wider structural factors and outcomes of 
development.   
The varied outcomes of participation especially the variations in 
individual agency to shape outcomes of development suggests the need to 
ask some critical and reflexive questions about the nature and dynamics of 
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participation occurring in local government structures at the community level. 
Significantly related to the above is the level at which agency is sufficient 
and radical enough to enable people to adequately undertake active, 
conscious and strategic actions to challenge existing power relations 
(Cleaver, 2009; Toner, 2008). 
 The immediate question that comes to mind is how socially located 
individuals on their own are able to reposition themselves among seemingly 
diverse individuals within the frameworks of a ‗radical citizenship‘ approach 
to undertake certain activities to shape the affairs of their community 
(Cleaver, 2009; Cornwall, 2008). The resources on which people especially 
the poor have to draw from to take up and make use of these spaces are not 
made known, though evidence suggests that their resources are ‗thin, 
unequal and often depleted‘ (Cleaver, 2005; Hickey and Bracking, 2005). 
The enabling and constraining aspects of structure on people‘s ability to 
undertake certain ‗set of practices‘ within their community receive little 
consideration (Wong, 2008; Toner, 2008; Cleaver, 2004). The multiple 
institutional mechanisms mediating diverse interactions among individuals 
within the locality is not a matter of concern (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002; 
Metha et. al, 1999). 
 Responding to these inadequacies of participation requires a 
broader understanding of the concept as an activity enacted in space during 
interaction among diverse social actors. This gives insights into the 
contested and negotiated nature of the participation in reality. More 
important is the effects of power and social relations on the possibilities for 
action for different individuals (Cleaver, 2007; Toner, 2008). The next section 
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conceptualises participation as a spatial practice focusing on the role of 
‗power and difference‘ in shaping the action and choices of different 
individuals within the invited participatory spaces. The main argument of the 
section is that participation needs to be understood as a ‗situated practice‘ 
by the placing emphasis on the various factors that shape the boundaries for 
choice and action for different individuals within that space.  
 
2.8.1 Conceptualising participation as a spatial practice 
 In this section, I draw on the ideas of Cornwall (2002a; 2004a) and 
Engberg-Penderson and Webster (2002) to conceptualise participation using 
the ‗metaphor of space‘. Understanding participation as a spatial practice 
reveals some important aspects of participation that are often ‗unseen‘ in its 
application in development approaches (Cornwall, 2002). My intention is to 
understand the dynamics of participation by exploring the effects of power 
and difference within a bounded space populated by heterogeneous 
individuals with diverse interest and values, and who are differently located 
in the social structure. With this in mind, let us now move on to conceptualise 
participation as a spatial practice by taking into consideration how it relates 
to individual agency and transformation in governance. 
 
53 
 
Table 2.2: Modes of participation in development theory and practice 
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  The theoretical literature on decentralisation evokes the 
‗community‘ as sites for public engagement where citizens are provided with 
opportunities to come together to deliberate and make decisions on issues 
that affect them (Cornwall and Coehlo, 2007; Gaventa, 2006b). The 
community in this sense can be perceived as a bounded entity, 
metaphorically akin to a 1physical space‘, not identical to a space conceived 
in terms of distance, but rather one ―which is colonised, reproduced and 
transformed by human societies‖ (Sayer, 2000: 110). Sayer writes that space 
only exists through ―it‘s constituents and embodies the social relations that 
permeate that space‖ (ibid). Thus, people and their relationships are not 
outside the local government structures but are themselves spatial and 
shaped by the dynamics of that space (ibid: 110). Cornwall (2002: 2) draws 
on the notion of ‗space‘ to understand participation as ‗more concretely in 
terms of the actual sites that are entered and animated by citizens‘.  
 Engberg-Penderson and Webster‘s (2002) concept of ‗political 
space‘ illuminates the role of the poor in poverty reduction by placing 
emphasis on their ‗actions and strategies‘ to utilise resources and assets 
within a given institutional arrangement. They focus on the role of 
institutional channels, political discourses, and social and political practices 
of the poor to understand how development interventions will transcend the 
technical and incorporate the political nature of interventions for 
development to be beneficial to the poor.  
 Two types of participatory spaces, ‗invited‘ and ‗claimed‘ are found in 
the participatory literature based on their mode of emergence and how 
participants to the space are constituted (Cornwall, 2002a). Since 
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decentralisation in practice constitutes an invited space, I will focus more 
attention on invited spaces. ‗Invited‘ spaces such as local government 
structures are conceived by Cornwall as being brought into existence by 
external resource bearing agents which may be either transient or more 
durable in nature. On the other hand, popular spaces are seen as more 
evolving organically and are mostly claimed and brought into existence by 
actors at the ‗margins‘ but can be institutionalised or fleeting spaces 
(Cornwall, 2002a).  
 For Cornwall, invited spaces have the potential to lead to 
transformation by broadening citizen participation from inclusion to 
engagement aimed at ―enhancing equity than the narrower efficiency goals 
of participation‖ (ibid; 4). But who gets invited to participate and the 
modalities for invitation are left unquestioned allowing the whole process of 
invitation to become a privilege. It is also important to consider the variations 
among the invited participants in their ability to draw on the terms and 
contracts of the invitation.  
 Central to the invited participatory spaces are also its language of 
empowerment reflected in the notion of ‗radical citizenship‘ where 
participation is perceived primarily as a citizenship right bestowed on 
individuals by the state. By entering the invited space as citizens with 
sufficient rights will enable individuals to have voice on issues that affect 
them (Kabeer, 2006; Gaventa, 2002; Cornwall, 2002a). The invited arenas of 
participation then become an appropriate space that provides the actors, 
who populate it with voice, skills and the resources to engage, and deliberate 
within these spaces. Inclusion in the invited spaces it is claimed will unleash 
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the empowering potential of these spaces. Experience garnered within the 
invited spaces can also be used by the participants in other associational 
spaces in which they interacted (Mohanty, 2004). Such transformative 
actions are considered possible within invited spaces because such spaces 
are perceived as ‗homogenous sites‘ imbued with solidarity in which diverse 
participants have similar interest and are willing to cooperate. The invited 
spaces are normatively conceived and implemented as neutral sites where 
all participants are considered capable of acting purposefully and 
strategically irrespective of their social positioning and differential access to 
resources (Chhotray, 2004). Since individuals are positioned differently 
within the social system with multiple identities, just opening up new spaces 
and inviting participants to interact will vary for different individuals due to the 
differences in resources that they bring to bear to ‗make and shape‘ these 
spaces (Kapoor, 2005; Gaventa; 2004; Cornwall, 2002a).  
 Critics argue that the invited space inadequately enlists effective 
participation due to its neglect of the underlying structural factors that shape 
the space (Kapoor, 2002b; Mohan and Stoke, 2000). The ideals of 
consensual deliberation are rarely achievable in reality since inequalities, 
status and social positioning of people who populate the invited space shape 
the nature of communication within any social arena (Kohn 2002; Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001). Within the invited spaces the participation of multiple social 
actors with complex backgrounds in terms of beliefs, values and experiences 
varies due to the diffused power asymmetries and shared cultural 
background of the actors (Bebbington, et. al, 2004). The argument is that 
public decision-making is a negotiated practice among diverse social actors 
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in which accommodation, contestation, deferrals and conflicts occur 
(Crowler, 2007; Oliver de Sardan, 2005). If the public sphere involves 
interaction consisting of these multiple social actors then the ability to openly 
deliberate issues will be constrained for some based on the existing power 
relations and the differential positioning of individuals within the social 
system in relation to others (Sayer, 2000). 
 Critics also question the conception of the invited space as the site 
that offers the possibilities for meaningful social transformation since it fails 
to engage with issues of power and politics (William et. al., 2003a; Cooke 
and Kothari, 2001; Mohan and Stoke, 2000). Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan (1997: 240) write that, politics is present anywhere social actors 
interact on common issues and needs to be brought back firmly in to the 
analysis of development. The argument is that, the discussion of power 
within the invited space fails to illuminate the underside of everyday aspects 
of power relations especially how power and difference define the 
participatory space, ‗privileging certain voices and excluding others, and 
reinforcing the status quo‘ (Brock et al., 2001: 1).  
 In reality the invited spaces may even be bounded allowing only 
certain people access into the space which will make the invited participants 
read from the same script due to the suppression of divergent views 
(Cornwall 2002a: 18; Kapoor, 2002b). The broad invite to all members to 
participate in interactions in the invited space may overshadow individual 
differences and the unequal ability to shape deliberations. 
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2.8.2 Understanding power relations and politics within the ‘invited’ 
participatory spaces 
 The focus on efficiency and output concerns limit the ability of 
participatory approaches to facilitate any social change to the advantage of 
marginal groups due to the neglect of the underlying structural factors 
shaping individual participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mohan and Stoke, 
2000). The dynamics of participation and the effects of power relations within 
these spaces have consequences for who enter and exit these spaces, with 
what identity, discourse and interest (Gaventa, 2006; Cornwall, 2004a). This 
section intends to understand the workings of power in the new invited 
spaces by placing more emphasis on how power is conceptualised and 
applied in the normative thinking about local government structures. 
 Craig and Mayo (1995: 5) draw on Parsons (1963) consensual 
notion of power to conceptualise power within invited participatory spaces as 
not finite but variable. Such harmonious and circulatory power is assumed to 
reside with individual members within the invited space. This perception of 
power draws attention to the ‗generative‘ aspects of social power as 
‗expandable‘, capable of harmoniously accommodating diverse social actors 
with different intentions and values. The underlying assumption is a 
normative preference for cooperation rather than competition, where spaces 
for participation can expand so that many people have power without any 
one losing out (Eyben et al., 2007). These assumptions envelop 
manifestations of social divisions and differences that shape the dynamics of 
the invited space (ibid). 
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 The logic inherent in this conception of power, according to Craig 
and Mayo (1995) is that, ―empowerment of the powerless could be achieved 
within the existing social order without any significant negative effects upon 
the power of the powerful‖ through deliberative dialogue (ibid: 5). Thus, 
empowerment in invited spaces places an emphasis on relocating the poor 
within the prevailing order or bringing the marginal population in to 
participate (Cornwall, 2002a:3). Within the invited participatory space, 
heterogeneous actors, both the empowered and the powerful, with diversity 
of interest and different resources are assumed to co-exist to negotiate 
decisions by peacefully reconciling their differences through public 
deliberation. Such an approach to participation relates well with the ‗harmony 
model of power‘ that underpins the neo-liberal conceptualisation of 
participation and empowerment (Mohan and Stoke, 2000: 249; Craig and 
Porter, 2006). 
 Critics suggest that harmonising power within the invited space fails 
to highlight the structural factors that shape outcomes of individual actions 
(Kapoor, 2005). The simplistic and narrow conceptualisation of power within 
the ‗invited‘ participatory space is critiqued for evading issues of difference, 
social divisions, and more importantly social relations (Eyben et al., 2007; 
Kapoor, 2002b; Williams, 2004; Cooke and Kothari, 2001). The mode and 
nature of interaction occurring at any particular period are all shaped by 
contextual factors. 
 The discussion so far has revealed the taken for granted nature of 
many of the assumptions that underlie the concept of decentralisation. 
Concerns are raised about how the claims made about the effects of 
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participation in decentralisation and local governance are achieved in reality 
especially the impact on individuals and their social organisation. For the 
outcomes of decentralisation to be equitable and sustainable it requires a 
framework that adequately engages with how the process shapes individual 
participation and through which processes. Therefore, in the next section, I 
intend to provide an alternative perspective to decentralisation that takes into 
consideration the dynamic and complex role of individuals, institutions and 
authority.  
 
2.9 Alternative Perspectives to Institutionalised Decentralisation 
The practice of decentralisation as discussed in the literature review so 
far has revealed that decentralisation increases complexity by bringing new 
forms of power, authority and accountability to local settings already replete 
with ‗traditional‘ forms of organising. Similarly, decentralisation also exists 
within complex environments of contestation among social groups, perhaps 
between and across wealth, age, gender and ethnic cleavages. Therefore, 
the practice of decentralisation from the perspective of local governance 
should engage with local, social and economic complexity. In this thesis, I 
seek to complement and add to the set of critiques above to improve the 
practice of decentralisation in three possible ways. 
 First, decentralisation reforms tends towards rationalism in which 
individuals are considered as active and strategic capable of acting to 
transform the existing structural inequalities in which they are embedded 
(Dwievedi, 2001). Such individual strategic acts, perceived as radical and 
transformative, inadequately capture the role of social structure in shaping 
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human action (Wong, 2007; Cleaver, 2005, 2002; Webster and Engberg-
Pederson, 2002). The rationale for this argument is that more often than not 
mainstream development approaches fail to adequately consider the 
complex motivations shaping individual actions and behaviour and the 
unconscious motivation of several acts. The dividing line between the desire 
to undertake such purposeful acts and the capability to perform such acts 
within a society in which relations are inextricably linked is thinly explored.  
 Significant to this is the role of structural constraints and power 
relations in shaping popular agency. In reality, local communities may are 
dynamic and internally differentiated, and the priorities and claims of social 
actors positioned differently in power relations may be highly contested. 
These factors point to the importance of diverse institutions operating at the 
micro level, which influence control over community management activities. 
Therefore, understanding the complexity of interactions shaped by rules, 
procedures, and enactments occurring in everyday social life illuminates the 
dynamic relationship between agency and social structure (Giddens, 1984). 
 Secondly, decentralisation policy and practice advocate for the 
transfer of meaningful powers to a local government structures (Ribot, 2004). 
Robust local organisations are considered critical to effective governance in 
decentralisation policy and practice. The process involves crafting robust 
bureaucratic organisations and drawing on it to make local governance 
efficient and equitable. In reality, the process of institutional crafting is a 
‗messy and contested practice‘ (Metha et al., 1999: 7). Drawing on post-
institutional thinking, I argue that institutions in decentralisation policy and 
practice should be seen as ―regularised patterns of behaviour between 
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individuals and groups in society‖ (Mearns, 1995: 103), rather than as local 
government structures that enlist the participation of stakeholders for 
efficiency purposes. There are multiple and overlapping institutional 
arrangements, some visible others opaque, which are often consciously or 
unconsciously drawn upon by people to shape their numerous day-to-day 
social interactions (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002; Cleaver; Berry 1998). 
Martin (2004) argues that ―institutions have a legitimating ideology that 
proclaims the rightness and necessity of their arrangements, practices, and 
social relations‖ (1257). I advocate for an approach to decentralisation that 
views local government structures as flexible, partial and evolving. Such a 
dynamic view of local government structures allows for complexity, for the 
social and historical factors of the locality to be taken into consideration in 
the policy and practice of decentralisation (Mosse, 2003). 
 Finally, the narrow definition of the political and the uncritical 
application of power within the decentralisation literature is of much concern 
(Hickey, 2006; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Williams, et. al. 2003; Mohan and 
Stoke, 2000). Decentralisation translated through formal structures backed 
by legal arrangements obscure the issues of ongoing local politics and the 
processual nature of authority at the local level (Lentz, 2009; Lund, 2006; 
Bierschinek and de Sardan, 2003; Chhotray, 2004). The issue of power and 
politics should not be confined only to the affairs of the state but to the 
economic and social spheres of society, especially the contestations and 
struggles that occur among heterogeneous actors on decision-making and 
negotiations over resources. Mohan and Stoke (2000) write that since the 
preferred destination of decentralisation is the community, the politics and 
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the ensuing power relations shaping interactions among heterogeneous 
actors need to be considered. Therefore, I argue for a wider conception of 
power and politics in decentralisation approaches to include all social 
relationships based on power embedded in the day-to-day routinised 
interactions of social actors.  
 
2.10 Conclusion  
 This chapter discussed the diverse core notions and concepts that 
underpin the discourse of decentralisation indicating the complexity of the 
concept. The theoretical insights gained from the literature review provided 
the basis for questioning the transformative potential of decentralisation. I 
have shown that the mainstream literature on decentralisation pays a greater 
attention to achieving functional ends. Such a technocratic approach, I 
argued, inadequately takes into consideration the peculiarities and 
heterogeneity of context. The emphasis placed on effectiveness and 
efficiency within the decentralisation discourse is in tension with the 
principles of social equity and inclusion.  
 The various perspectives of decentralisation explored in this chapter 
revealed the conceptual separation of governance from other spheres of 
social life. The institutional approach to decentralisation bestows citizenship 
rights to individuals enabling them to behave autonomously irrespective of 
social relations. Power relations and existing structural factors that shape the 
individual agency are sidestepped in decentralisation. The mainstream view 
on decentralisation conceptualises authority as fixed and static however this 
review has shown that authority in local governance is rather than fluid and 
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permeable. Drawing on social theory and the emerging post-institutionalists 
arguments, the chapter has shown that the approach to decentralisation 
needs to critically engage with dynamic individual-society relations, discard 
the separation of the formal from the socially embedded institutions to 
identify the complex mechanisms that shape local governance within a 
locality.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
  3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents the methodology for this thesis by discussing 
the conceptual and theoretical issues that informed this study. It explains 
how the research was conducted; data generated, analysed and interpreted. 
The first section of this chapter presents the aims of the study, states the 
research questions for the study and then the theoretical orientation of the 
research. The second section discusses the data gathering techniques used 
in the fieldwork involving how data was subsequently processed, collated 
and analysed. Finally the chapter presents the ethical issues that guided this 
study, the evaluation of the conduct of the fieldwork and the discussion of 
issues of reflexivity. 
 
 3.2 Research Rationale, Objectives and Question   
 The author‘s interest in this research developed as a result of my 
reflections on the reality of decentralisation at the village level while working 
as a project officer with the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in a remote 
village beyond the Volta Lake in the Afram Plains district of Eastern Region 
in Ghana. I noticed the lack of interest of village members in the activities of 
the state such as using the local government structures of decentralisation at 
the village level to restructure ongoing relations in their favour. The state‘s 
absence in most parts of the district was mostly reflected in the poor 
condition of and in some cases non-existent public infrastructure and state 
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services, and widespread poverty. The absence of the state in the everyday 
life of most people created the enabling environment for local elites or 
traditional village leadership to fill the lacunae created by the state‘s absence 
and managed the local affairs of the villages. I became fascinated by the 
importance of communal life and the way in which local leaders were able to 
influence the day-to-day life of the village through diverse mechanisms. For 
example, within the village you will notice attempts by social actors to solve 
their everyday individual and collective problems through diverse 
mechanisms such as religious, familial and customary institutions. The 
interplay of creativity and continuity in solving community problems was 
observable during problem situations in the villages. My understanding of 
these observations was that whatever happened in the locality, people knew 
how to respond to their problems and the mechanisms on which to draw, 
which were shaped by certain individual beliefs, experiences, values and 
social relations.  
 In 2002 during one episode of local level elections in Ntonaboma, I 
observed the little enthusiasm of village members in the process of electing 
representatives to the district assembly and unit committees. What aroused 
my interest was that, if decentralisation had such little appeal among these 
diverse actors with different intensions and interest, then why do 
development policies amplify the concept as the best form of institutional 
arrangements for the state to tap into the resources of local areas for 
development. I did not write off the actions and strategies of the social 
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actors10 concerning their participation or non participation in both the 
elections and village affairs and their disregard for the state in their everyday 
life. Rather, I sought to gain access to their knowledge, the values and ideas 
shaping their actions, the constraints they encountered and strategies they 
employed to overcome their situation taking into consideration the structural 
characteristics of the society in which they were embedded. This was the 
genesis of this research. 
 This study seeks to understand the extent to which local government 
structures offer transformative possibilities for individuals and their social 
organisation. According to the World Bank (2001), decentralisation as a 
policy reform is assumed to contribute to poverty reduction mainly through its 
ability to facilitate the empowerment of the poor and make governments 
responsive to the needs and preferences of the poor. However, evidence in 
the literature suggests that the poorer, weaker and marginalised are 
constrained by inequitable institutional arrangements and seldom benefit 
from participating in social organisations that are supposed to support them 
(Franks and Cleaver, 2006; Hickey and Bracking, 2005). Similar concerns 
are raised about the transformatory potentials of the underlying institutional 
arrangements that facilitate decentralisation (Geiser and Rist, 2009; Larson 
and Soto, 2008). The institutional formation for decentralisation is over 
simplified in policy documents as the evidence in reality is messy and 
complex (Besley, 2003).  
                                                          
10 Long (1992: 12) uses social actors to connote ―those actors that can be meaningfully     
attributed with the power of agency‘. Examples are individuals, state and organisations who 
can engage in meaningful action, but in this thesis my emphasis is on individuals at the 
community level and their social organisation‖. 
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 This research was undertaken in Ntonaboma, a resettlement town 
located in the Kwahu North district of the Eastern Region of Ghana, between 
January and June, 2007. The research contributes to the debate on the 
transformative potential of decentralisation by ethnographically exploring its 
practice to understand the social processes that occur as a result of 
decentralisation. 
 
3.2.1 Research Questions 
  The main research question guiding this thesis is:  
Do local government structures lead to changes in participation and social 
organisation at the community level? 
 
 The general objective is to explore whether institutionalising 
decentralisation results in transformative outcomes in local governance at 
both the citizen participant and organisational levels or not. The specific 
objectives of this research are: 
 To understand individual participation in new decentralised local 
government arrangements at the community level. 
 To understand the interplay between bureaucratic and socially 
embedded institutions in local governance at the community level and 
the extent to which this interaction shapes community organisation. 
 To examine whether the devolution of power from the state to a 
particular locality transforms the existing relations of power among 
various local actors within the community. 
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 Responding to these objectives necessitated an exploration of the 
practice of decentralisation to understand how the introduction of new local 
government structures at the village level as a result of decentralisation 
leads to changes in participation and social organisation. In this research I 
placed emphasis on the actions and interactions of social actors and their 
engagement with diverse institutional arrangements, and how these actions 
and relationships affect the outcome of decentralisation at the village level. 
These issues guided the design and strategy for the research which is the 
subject of the next section. 
 
 3.3 Research Design and Strategy 
 In order to critically understand the interplay between local 
government structures and local peculiarities, a research design, based on 
non-numerical narratives was adopted for the study (Mason, 2002). The 
study adopted the actor oriented approach to illuminate the recursive nature 
of agency and structure in shaping outcomes differently for individuals in 
local government structures specifically designed to facilitate individual 
agency. The actor-oriented approach as a strategy in this research was to 
provide a wider framework for understanding the choices that individuals 
make and the reasons for such actions which are more often than not related 
to the specificity of context and the dynamics of social life (Long, 1992). 
 
 3.3.1 An Actor Oriented Approach 
 This study draws on an actor-oriented approach because of the 
emphasis it places on human agency within the context of the recursive 
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relationship between agency and structure (Giddens, 1984). The actor 
oriented approach considers the social actor as a ―knowing, active subject, 
who is aware of his/her own situation and possess knowledge about and an 
interpretation of the surrounding society and his or her own and others places 
and possibilities in it‖ (Jespersen, 1998: 44: emphasis in original). The starting 
point to such a conceptualisation is that social actors are knowledgeable and 
capable.  It accepts the heterogeneous nature of the community and the role 
of social relations in facilitating the outcomes of human strategic action. The 
actor oriented approach prioritises those ideas and motivations that enable 
people to pursue their strategies to achieve the intended objectives.  
 The premise underlying this approach is that actors involve 
themselves and react to local governance reforms at the community level 
based on both the information they have available and other factors that are 
inherently contingent on socio- cultural context, the changes in power that 
would result and the impact it would have on their goals (Jespersen, 1998). 
Focusing on how people responded to an intervention provides insights into 
the dynamics of the decision-making spaces, the various actors who shaped 
local governance and the motivations that shaped peoples‘ decision to 
intervene or not in certain situations.  
 The utility of the actor-oriented approach is that it positions the 
researcher to inquire into how far certain specific kinds of knowledge are 
shaped by the social relations in which they are embedded. It also provides 
the researcher the platform to investigate the differential abilities of different 
actors to respond to ‗similar structural circumstances, even if the conditions 
appear relatively homogenous‘ (Long, 1992: 20). The possibility of external 
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intervention leading to both intended and unintended outcomes implies that 
different groups or individual actors will understand the intervention quite 
differently. An actor-oriented approach places emphasis on the interests, 
characteristics and actions of different types of actors in a given context.  
 The appeal of the actor oriented approach to this study lies in its 
recognition of the diversity of actions and individuality. Since my intention is 
to understand the practice of decentralisation from a ‗bottom-up‘ perspective, 
the actor oriented approach seeks to offer insights into social actors‘ 
everyday life experiences especially the ‗emergent forms of interaction, 
procedures, and strategies that evolve‘ between heterogeneous local actors 
with varying degrees of interest (ibid: 25). It provides the researcher with 
diverse explanations of how things are done and the reasons for doing so. 
Such explanations, some of which may seem ‗illogical‘, bring deeper insights 
into the certain occurrences that the study seeks to understand. 
 Epistemologically the actor oriented approach embraces the 
existence of ―multiple social realities that is the coexistence of different 
understandings and interpretations of experience‖ (Long, 2003; 4). Within 
this epistemological standpoint, knowledge is not simply out there to be 
discovered but ―involved ways of construing and ordering the world‖ (ibid). 
The approach calls for a methodology that applies ethnographic methods to 
understand the reality of interventions especially, the ‗processes by which 
images, identities and social practices are negotiated, contested, and 
sometimes rejected by the various social actors involved‘ (Long, 2003: 48).  
  One of the constraints with this methodology as evidenced in this 
research was its limited applicability for understanding issues to do with 
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nestedness of the community to higher level institutions. The emphasis 
placed on the micro level to understand the practice and outcomes of 
decentralisation on individuals within the community inadequately 
considered other important civil society players and other formal 
organisations within the locality. Similarly, the research methodology also did 
not take into account the linkage and interaction between the community and 
the district assembly and how this interaction shaped the outcome of 
decentralisation. Another concern with this approach during the early stages 
of the research was the difficulty in identifying the key actors whose 
strategies and action shaped local governance within the community. 
 However, my position on the actor oriented approach is that different 
actors have different powers - the capacity to do something or prevent 
something from being done - and different means, therefore the particular 
conditions and environment in which they occur have to be considered when 
identifying the actor‘s process and relationships of power in response to any 
intervention. This requires focusing on the mechanisms of constraint and 
enablement which shapes the actions and intentions of differently located 
individuals. The focus on social actors and their social organisation also 
produced research questions that sought to find out reasons for these actors‘ 
complicity in producing outcomes that perpetuated, rather than challenged, 
the status quo. Such research questions flipped the focus on social actors as 
agents of change, which underpin current decentralisation assumptions, to a 
focus on mechanisms of constraint and enablement which shaped their 
actions and intentions within the community. 
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 3.4 Ethnographic Approach to Data Generation  
   Based on the idea that social life is always throwing up new data, 
this study adopted an ethnographic approach to data collection to 
understand the reality of decentralisation (Mason, 2002; Brewer, 2000). 
Ethnographic studies focus on the production and reproduction of everyday 
life by often ―othered‖ people, revealing meaning, social structure, power 
relations, and history (Lather, 2001: 481). The utility of the ethnographic 
approach lies in its ability to enable the researcher to understand social 
realities by ‗investigating into the practices and conceptions of the actors 
concerned, the interplay of the pragmatic and cognitive relationships and the 
structural and institutional context in which all this occur‘ (Oliver de Saardan, 
2005: 3). It also overcomes the dichotomies between bureaucratic and 
socially embedded institutions by enabling the researcher to gather data 
from all sites in which interactions occur rather than dwell on pre-determined 
sites (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen, 20020). 
 Since this study adopted an actor oriented approach which sees 
―meanings, values and interpretations as culturally constructed‖ (Long, 2001: 
50), the data collection exercise used observation, in-depth-interviews and 
group discussions (GD). The purpose of triangulation in ethnographic 
research enables the researcher to use two or more comparable processes 
within the research process to enhance the comprehensiveness of data, to 
contextualise the interpretations, and to explore a variety of similar and 
dissimilar viewpoints. Triangulation was used in this research to observe as 
many parts of the social setting, and as many persons and roles, as possible 
by using different methods of data gathering and analysis. The use of 
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multiple methods of data collection enabled me to operate within and across 
research strategies using different data sources to corroborate each other 
and also to respond to all the research questions for the study (Mason, 
2002). 
  Ethnographic approach provided firsthand experience through 
observation and conversation to understand how local actors participated in 
new local government institutions that are transplanted onto the community 
as a result of decentralisation. Drawing on ethnographic approach to data 
collection, I sought to bring out the meanings that social actors gave to 
participation, the motivations for their actions and their experiences about 
decentralised governance within the context of Ntonaboma. Local actors‘ 
ability to shape decision making processes and the resources needed to 
access and participate in the decision-making processes were examined. 
The interactions that occurred in the field between the village members and 
the researcher were meant to understand the actions of people and the 
motivations that shaped their actions. I also sought to find out the 
institutional mechanisms or channels that mediated the diverse interactions 
that occurred at the village level. Questions related to who did what in the 
village, and in relationship with whom were asked to enable me get deeper 
insights into who were the key social actors in the management of the 
community‘s public affairs. Living in the community and observing 
interactions among diverse social actors in the management of the 
community‘s affairs also provided a platform to understand the different ways 
in which people in authority exercised or legitimated their power.   
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 3.4.1 Negotiating Access to Selected Site and Cases 
  This study was designed with the view that getting the support of 
gatekeepers was very important in gaining full access to the ‗natural settings‘ 
in which ethnographic data was to be collected. For this study, I used gate 
keepers to direct me to places, events, or people likely to be helpful to the 
progress of my investigation (Bryman, 2004). In the Afram Plains, I re-
established contact with the local Catholic priest in Donkorkrom who was 
known to me during my previous work in the district as a development 
officer. The parish priest introduced me to the District Chief Executive (DCE) 
the next day who was briefed on the intentions of the study. The DCE gave 
me an introductory letter to be given to any of the district assembly (DA) 
members in Ntonaboma. This was aimed at facilitating my access and the 
research in Ntonaboma. However, I subjectively decided not to use the letter 
from the DCE to gain access to Ntonaboma as this had the potential to lead 
to unintended outcomes such as me having links with the ruling party.  
 On arrival in Ntonaboma initial enquiries were made about 
leadership of the community. Customarily, and in tandem with local norms in 
Ntonaboma suggested that a visitor must seek access to the community 
through the traditional leadership of the area. I interacted with the traditional 
leadership and having spelt out the mission of my research, they allowed me 
to go ahead with my research. Fortunately, a contact was made with the 
assembly member for Akroso village who incidentally happened to be the 
Mankrado for Akroso village. He later introduced me to the chief of Agyaade 
village and then to the representatives of Yamuoso and Supom villages. The 
DA member for Akroso village provided me with a fieldwork guide.  
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 During the initial phases of the data generating exercise, it was 
observed that the DA members and the Unit Committee (UC) chairpersons 
were not very transparent in the identification and selection of individuals to 
involve in the study. I noticed that they asked my fieldwork guide to send me 
to respondents who to some extent were the influential individuals within the 
villages. I also got to know that the initial respondents selected by the DA 
member for Akroso village were government appointees to the DA and UC. 
As time went on I became partially enrolled into the village life and could 
hang out in the evenings with the village folks when the Pandora box opened 
and I could enter into the ‗life world‘ of the individual village actors to 
understand the local village realities especially on issues bothering 
governance and individual actions. Staying in Ntonaboma for a long period 
of time made it possible for me to interact more frequently and freely with 
people. Continuous stay in Ntonaboma enhanced the nature and quality of 
interactions especially when we ‗hung out‘ in the evenings. This strategy 
helped me in having easy access and more time to converse with my 
informants in the evening after they had returned from their farms. This 
made it possible to be privy to some unofficial information that ‗slipped out‘ 
during conversations.  
 
 3.4.2 Observation 
 The research design used for this study adopted an observation 
technique because the ontological perspective of this study sees ―interaction, 
action and the behaviour‖ of social actors as very central to this study 
(Mason, 2002; 85). Atkinson et. al., (2001) have commented that 
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ethnographic approaches are grounded in a commitment to the first-hand 
experience and exploration of a particular setting. As Mason (2002; 87) 
suggests, ―observation allows the generation of multidimensional data on 
social interaction in specific contexts as it occurs rather than relying on 
people‘s retrospective accounts, and on their ability to verbalise and 
reconstruct a version of interaction or settings‖.  
 Through observation I gathered data from the various setting in 
which actors interacted to deliberate on communal issues. Observing 
interactions among diverse actors at its natural sites enabled me to have 
useful insights and meaning of how social relations, cultural norms, and 
economic factors shaped how people socialised, associated and participated 
in public spaces of deliberation which were found not to be so different from 
interactions occurring in other spaces at the everyday level. Through 
observation of communal labour I managed to gather detailed information on 
the practice of communal labour, the rules that shaped the practice, how 
these rules were made and the socially embedded principles shaping the 
actions of village members within the context of communal labour. 
 The main ‗natural occurring‘ settings selected for the study were the 
general village public meetings, village social gatherings, UC (town 
committee) meetings and meetings of other committees in the village. During 
the period of fieldwork, a public meeting was observed one in each village. 
To understand the dynamics of these spaces, I focused on understanding 
the nature of the interactions and the actions of participants in public 
deliberations, especially the motivations for their actions in their encounters 
within these spaces. The nature of participation and the rules that shaped 
78 
 
interactions within these settings were of particular importance during the 
observation process.  
 Within the UC and other village public meetings, observations were 
mainly focused on the power dynamics operating within these spaces and 
how it shaped the decision making process for different located individuals. I 
also took note of the rules, norms and practices that shaped the negotiation, 
accommodation and struggles taking place within these committees at the 
village level. In all, a total of three unit/town committee meetings each were 
observed for Akroso, Agyaade and Yamuoso villages respectively. I also 
observed the Ntonaboma tractor committee and the Akroso and Yamuoso 
Traditional Council meetings. These observations enabled me to place an 
emphasis on understanding the behaviour of members during meetings, how 
decisions were arrived at, who shaped the outcomes of decisions and the 
power dynamics within these spaces. Also observing these diverse 
institutions with the village enabled me to have deeper insights on how these 
committees overlapped in the performance of their functions within the 
village. It also revealed the characteristics of individuals who had formal 
positions on these committees. 
 During the observation of the first village meeting in Akroso village, 
the Amankrado who presided over the meeting tried to make the meeting as 
participatory as possible but the participatory rhythm and attendance waned 
during subsequent village meetings. The attendance for the first meeting I 
observed was very high because village members had been informed that 
there was a ‗visitor‘ (that is the researcher) who will be attending the 
meeting. Further stay in Ntonaboma revealed poor attendance at public 
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village meetings. In observing interactions in settings, issues that were of 
interest to the study and gaps that needed follow up were written down in my 
diary. I also noted down my impression of the nature and the dynamics of 
interaction in the village meetings. Much importance was placed on local 
norms and the differential ability of participants to shape the interactions 
occurring within these spaces. 
  
 3.4.3 In-depth interviews 
 The in-depth interviewing technique for data collection was used for 
this study.  Such an approach to data collection involves gathering accounts 
of local actors by means of in-depth interviews in the form of conversations 
which allowed them to describe their experiences as they saw them. Using 
the ‗conversational‘ approach of interviewing allows respondents the 
freedom to also comment or give insights into other issues that may not 
come up during the interview process. The utility of the in-depth interview is 
manifested in the ‗considerable latitude‘ in gathering information from various 
individuals with diverse socio-economic and cultural backgrounds (Bryman, 
1988: 46).  
 It is important to note that the themes and issues of interest for the 
study were not static but were developed to guide the interviewing process. 
As put by Mason (2002; 63) ‗most qualitative research operates from the 
perspective that knowledge is situated and contextual, and therefore the job 
of the interview is to ensure that the relevant contexts are brought into focus 
so that situated knowledge can be produced‘.  
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 Using this technique for the study allowed for the exploration of 
people‘s action and strategies to gain useful insights into the negotiations, 
struggles and contestations occurring in village governance. Specifically, the 
in-depth interview technique enabled me to interact with respondents to find 
out their role in the unit committees and the extent to which the new local 
governance institutions shaped the nature of their participation. Key issues 
important to the study were picked up during conversations and used to 
further explore their views in relation to their ability to access new 
institutional spaces, exercising voice in the decision making processes and 
demand accountability through their participation in village governance. The 
conversation with community actors provided the platform to have deep 
insights into the village governance process such as the rules used in the 
village, how these rules were made, who participates in the rule making and, 
how these rules were enforced, how sanctions are undertaken. For most of 
my respondents, I had to revisit them for further interactions to fill in some 
gaps which were not well captured during the previous conversation.  
 Village members were normally engaged in casual interactions to 
acquire an in-depth understanding of village power relations. Such informal 
conversations proved very useful in understanding the interactions among 
diverse village members and how social relationships mediated individual 
access to resources and other positions within the village. It also provided 
insights into historical experiences, motivations, values and norms shaping 
village interactions. To explore the transformative potential of these new 
spaces, I had to engage people from diverse backgrounds including those 
from poor and well to do households, old and young, married and single, 
81 
 
educated and uneducated, settlers and indigenes in informal conversation to 
find out the nature of their participation. This was to enable me understand 
the selection process and their mode of engagement for these diverse group 
of individuals.  
 In-depth interviews offered insights into the existing institutional 
practices for village governance. Members of the unit committee, elected 
and appointed assembly members, traditional council representatives and 
other powerful individuals within Ntonaboma were also interviewed to 
unearth the dynamics of the institutionalised spaces, how power permeates 
such spaces and to understand how formal and ‗informal‘ institutions interact 
and shape local governance at the village level.  
 
 3.4.4 Life history approach 
 In addition to observation and informal interviews, the life history 
method was also used in this research to trace the changes or otherwise that 
have occurred in the life history of social actors. The life history approach is 
a form of unstructured interview that allows the respondents to reflect on 
their life history, highlighting the changes and processes that shaped their 
experiences (Bryman, 1988: 49). Using the life history approach was 
effective in getting information from respondents because it allowed me as 
the researcher to structure the narrative to suit the interest of the research. 
For example, it enabled me to gather information on diverse and mixed 
range of motivations from respondents for participating in numerous village 
activities. It also gave ideas on their efforts and endeavours to get things 
done in the villages. This approach was very useful in understanding how 
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and why some social actors were able to acquire allocative and authoritative 
resources to become very influential members of the community. The 
interviews produced narratives that provided useful insights into social 
actor‘s subjective values or dispositions that are acquired socially or 
culturally over time. 
 
 3.4.5 Group Discussion (GD) 
 The study sought to understand female respondent‘s participation in 
local governance and how they were able to shape interactions around 
village public affairs. The GD was used in this study to gather the views of 
female respondents separately from the intruding nature of their husbands 
during the interview process. During the early stages of the data collection 
process it was difficult to get female narratives within a setting in which there 
was no influence from their husbands or other male members of the family. 
Some of these women during interactions muted or distorted their 
experiences about participation in community management. Bringing all the 
women together resulted in the gathering their actual experiences about 
participation in decentralised local governance. How women shaped and 
were shaped by the social relations in which they were embedded, was 
discussed during the GD process. 
 Secondly, the GD was also used to gather the experiences of 
traditional leaders and other village committees during the study. The GD 
provided an arena to get all members of the traditional council in the various 
villages to discuss issues related to local governance.  
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 However, the GD had its own limitations as certain members within 
the various group tried to monopolise the interactions that took place. This 
occurrence was shaped by power relations, but I tried to manage the 
discussions that took place often calling on people who were often mute to 
express their views. This was very pertinent in the traditional council group 
discussions. Within the female groups, the respondent looked up to certain 
individuals among them to talk on their behalf.  
  
 3.5 Secondary Data Sources 
 Secondary data was initially collected from government and district 
assembly documents. Specifically, the secondary sources of data comprised 
published and unpublished government documents such as the 1992 
constitution, and laws relating to decentralisation. The Afram Plains district 
Assembly bye-laws and development plans were also gleaned. The major 
constraint encountered was that the available documents from the district 
assembly were often limited to technical descriptions with little narratives 
especially documents that had to do with the provision of services and 
tangible structures. This limited the reliance on secondary data in responding 
to the questions raised in this study. 
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3.6 Data generated 
 The research methods generated three types of data. The first type 
of data generated emanated from my ethnographic observation of activities 
within the settings selected for the study namely village public meetings, unit 
committees meetings, traditional council meetings and the domain in which 
communal labour occurred. Field notes, tape recordings and transcripts of 
in-depth conversations and discussions undertaken constituted the second 
type of data generated. The next section discusses how the data was 
recorded and analysed. 
 
3.7 Data Recording and Analysis 
The analysis of data for this thesis was a difficult, complex and time-
consuming endeavour. The data analysis began with the first set of 
conversations and field notes gathered in the field. This made the data 
analysis an ongoing project within the fieldwork (Glaser, 1992). Considerable 
effort was made to integrate observations, recorded conversations and field 
notes to give order and themes to the emerging data. Field notes constitute 
a representation of observed events, persons, places and written accounts 
of interactions that have been condensed and preserved to offer insights and 
meanings to the researcher time and time again (Mason, 2002). At the end 
of the data collection activity, I listened to the conversations and read 
through the field notes to get an idea of what has transpired during the day, 
which aspects of each conversation from which respondents needed call 
backs and whether the emerging data answered the research questions set 
for the study.  
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 Data collection was integrated with data analysis, allowing me to 
check out patterns and the research questions as they emerged and 
redefined data collection strategies as necessary (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). Precisely, key words, themes and relationships were identified to 
order the data into categories. Before setting off for fieldwork for this study, 
the plan for analysing the data generated was to use the computer assisted 
software, precisely the Nudist software. But when the process of data 
generation began, I observed that the data emerging from the narratives of 
the respondents were bulky and complex due to the fact that, I allowed the 
respondents to raise issues and topics which they felt were relevant and 
needed to be heard. However, this did not mean that my research became 
poorly focused and ineffective, but giving the respondents the flexibility to 
talk about other village issues was a strategy to get in-depth information from 
my respondents and also build attachment with the community members.  
 The initial idea to use a computer software abandon to analyse the 
data was abandoned for a manual more subtle procedure that brought out 
the layers of meanings from the emerging data. During the data collection 
process a matrix was developed in which the various words and themes 
coming out from the data were placed into categories resulting in a 
spreadsheet that brought order to the messy, complex and bulky data. This 
process was done every day in the evenings after collecting data in other to 
draw out the relationships, meanings and ideas from the data. The process 
of ongoing data analysis during the fieldwork revealed the gaps in some of 
the responses and aided in preparing for follow-up interviews.  
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3.8 Reflections on my position as a Researcher 
 In qualitative research, the positionality of the researcher in respect of 
the researched can significantly influence the research process, data 
collection and analysis. Malterud (2001: 483-484) writes that, a researcher's 
background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, the 
angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, 
the findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and 
communication of conclusions. In this study, my position as a former 
development worker in the study area shaped the data collection in certain 
ways. In the villages studied, I was both an ‗insider‘ and an ‗outsider‘ 
simultaneously with both positions changing with different settings and social 
actors that I came across. The general binary implied in the "insider – 
outsider" debates is that, it is less than real, because it seeks to assume that 
being an "insider" or "outsider" is a fixed attribute. Also, given that the data 
collection process is about constructing social meaning – a process that 
involves both the researcher and the source – in many ways such a dualism 
is meaningless in practice. To illustrate this point, the following examples, 
focusing on my positionality in relation to categories of informants are briefly 
recounted. These observations lead to the suggestion that at a particular 
time, at a particular place, I did find myself being an "outsider", which 
frustrated access to certain types of information and informants. First, the 
fact that the study area was an opposition strong hold and had a high 
number of migrants made some of the respondents very anxious in divulging 
certain experiences and expressing their own accounts. Within certain areas 
of Ntonaboma, especially in the Zongo areas of Akroso and Agyaade 
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villages, I felt at the margins during the data collection process as some of 
the key actors within these areas were not interested in responding about 
certain issues related to access to resource management and power 
relations. It appeared that some of the community members were particularly 
suspicious of the underlying reasons for my interest in decentralisation and 
overtly cautious about the fact that, I had not chosen any other area in the 
Afram Plains district other than Ntonaboma, which is known to be against the 
ruling government. The Ntonaboma community is also on record to have 
prevented the current District Chief Executive (DCE) from visiting the area 
because they claim he had neglected the community from the developmental 
activities of the district.  
My surname, OSEI-KUFUOR, also created a lot of challenges for me 
during the fieldwork. I bear the same surname 11as the ‗President of Ghana‘, 
John KUFUOR who was the president of Ghana at the time of the study. In 
Ghana, surnames go a long way to determine one‘s place of origin, tribe and 
family relations. These factors have a lot of implications for politics in the 
country. Hearing of my surname made the community members to 
immediately imagine my political orientation. The selected study community 
is also perceived as an opposition area, so I had to do a lot of explanation 
during the fieldwork to convince people that I had no relation with the 
president that what I was doing was for academic work. During the initial 
stages of the data collection exercise the majority of the respondents were a 
                                                          
11 During the period of my research in 2007 the president of Ghana was John Agyekum –     
                 Kufuor and Ashanti 
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little bit apprehensive or suspicious of my intentions for the research which 
shaped the way some respondents engaged me in detailed conversation. 
The fear was that engaging a ‗stranger‘ with the same surname as the 
president could lead to some unintended outcomes for the individual and the 
community. However, for those who supported the party of the president 
they thought my visit provided an opportunity for them to support me in to get 
the information needed for the study. In all these I had to reflexively maintain 
a neutral position and continuously explain my position as a researcher with 
no links to the presidency. 
 The cultural norm or practice of keeping ‗bad‘ things from the view of 
the visitor or stranger as stated in a proverb that „ohohoo na owi akooko na 
ni abo‟ meaning ‗it is the stranger who consumes the fowl that is deformed or 
the no one wants‘. The essence of this proverb is to highlight the difficulty in 
getting respondents or informant from the community if the researcher used 
a gatekeeper up the social hierarchy of the village. The gate keeper, in this 
case the DA member for Akroso wanted to influence the selection process of 
respondents, by suggesting individuals to be interviewed. The leaders also 
did not want to suggest individuals perceived as their opponents or people 
they disagreed with in the village. Their fear was that, they would reveal 
unpleasant things about their activities in the village. During the interview 
process, I realised that such individuals suggested by the village leaders 
were biased in their responses and sometimes economical with the truth. 
This had the tendency of introducing bias into the respondent selection 
process if not carefully negotiated. It became evident during the data 
collection process that such respondents appeared to be telling me what 
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they thought I should hear because they were not certain of how the 
information given was going to be managed despite reassurances of 
anonymity. This could be explained by the fact that, not many field research 
activities have been conducted by researchers in Ntonaboma community. 
This was evident when I was constantly told by some respondents during the 
early stages of the research that, community participation in local 
governance was very high and all local government structures were in fact 
functional and working very well. The names of community representatives 
on the various committees were shown to me to reinforce the claim by the 
respondents that local government structures were effective in Ntonaboma. 
On the other hand, other people in the community who saw me as an 
‗outsider‘ realised the opportunity to spill the beans on how certain people 
had monopolised local government structures in the community and took the 
opportunity to blow the whistle without putting their social relationships in the 
community at risk. 
 In the study, the DA member for Akroso village, Nana Akuamoah 
Boateng, who later became my host, gave me a research guide who showed 
me around the four villages and also led me to my selected respondents. 
However, during the early stages of my research I noticed that the 
respondents were not enthusiastic about giving detailed information or being 
interviewed. I thought it was due to inertia and with time things would be 
alright. One day after an interview session with a female respondent who 
was above fifty years old and a UC member she told me that if I wanted to 
get reliable and accurate information, then, she will advise that I undertake 
the research or conduct my interviews alone or if possible change the 
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research guide. According to her the research guide was perceived as an 
informant to Nana Akuamoah Boateng, hence individuals would find it very 
difficult giving out information if I am always seen in his company. According 
to her the fear of being labeled as having said something unpleasant about a 
village leader or the need to avoid conflict will make the selected 
respondents say ‗only good things‘ about the leaders and not the reality of 
how things were done in the village. It was later that I got to know of a latent 
conflict among the various chief chiefs on land use and ownership which had 
affected interaction and trust between the researcher and the researched. 
 All the interviews with the local actors were carried out in the local 
predominant language, ‗twi‘. However, there were other respondents 
especially the settler farmers who could not speak ‗twi‘ fluently and preferred 
to speak in their own indigenous language, ewe. This impeded some of the 
respondents to express themselves in their native language. Provision was 
made for a translator for individuals who could not speak ‗twi‘. This made the 
process of data transcribing very difficult since I could understand ‗twi‘ but 
not ‗ewe‘. The physical presence of the translator during these conversations 
to some extent affected the depth and nature of some of the responses. I 
had to make call backs to further engage the respondents repeating similar 
questions and probing further for more responses so that it could be checked 
against earlier responses for authenticity and consistency. However, majority 
of the interviewees agreed to the recording of the conversations, which 
facilitated accuracy in transmitting people‘s views during the data analysis. 
Many of the interviewees when told that their identities would remain 
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confidential in the study pointed out to me that ―we are now in a democratic 
era so we can all speak our mind freely without any fear‖.   
 Despite efforts to interview more women representatives among the 
elected and appointed DA and UC representatives, more than 72% of them 
were men reflecting the male dominated political structure of decentralisation 
at the local level (Afram Plains District Assembly, 2002). Similarly, 
interviewing women during the data collection process was challenging due 
to the protective nature of husbands. Interviewing women in the presence of 
their husbands was a difficult activity since most women felt uncomfortable 
talking in the presence of their husbands. A related study on conflict and 
peace building in the Afram Plains by Aryee et al (n.d: 7) noted the difficulty 
in interviewing women especially on sensitive issues since the ―existing 
culture forbids women from making pronouncements on controversial issues 
like land without the presence of men‖.  
  As an ‗outsider‘ who sought to interview their wives, their husbands 
wanted to sit in whilst the interview took place, mostly trying in a subtle 
manner to shape the conversation. For example, during the data collection 
there was an instance when I asked the husband of a female respondent if 
he could excuse us or move away a little bit to enable the wife feel free to 
talk. However, the wife responded in defense of the husband that they are 
one family and whatever she knows the husband is aware of; so it is not a 
problem if the husband sits in the interview. As I spent more time in the 
village and became immersed in the community it became evident that the 
actions of the husbands were formed by history of the actions of a teacher 
posted to the town in 1996.  
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 Historical narratives during the research revealed that a teacher was 
once posted to the Ntonaboma community and he absconded with the wife 
of his landlord. This occurrence explained the actions of the husbands to 
shield their wives from ―outsiders‖. This limited the female respondents for 
this study and resulted in a bias towards male respondents for the study. 
However, there were other women respondents who were not married or 
whose husbands did not interfere with the interview process. As I spent more 
time in Ntonaboma, my status also changed from visitor to a known person 
working within the villages. I could manage to go about my research in the 
village without much attention to my presence and encountered minimal 
constraints with community members. With time I became familiar with 
community members and could normally interview their wives in the 
evenings when they were cooking their family meals. This was an ideal 
opportunity to have full access to the respondents as they had time to talk 
while cooking and their husbands were either out with their peers or hardly 
came near the area where cooking took place. 
 Another important issue that I had to consciously consider was 
respondents‘ expectations concerning the outcome of the research findings. 
The respondents wanted to know whether by their participation in the 
research they stood to benefit from any governmental intervention. I had to 
continuously explain to them that my research was purely an academic 
exercise but I will also make sure that the findings are published so that the 
state could draw on some of the findings to inform its policy decisions. 
However, I assured the community members that I will make the findings of 
the study known to them through a GD when I complete the study. Other 
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respondents also made a request for money personally from me which I had 
to politely turn down. My fear was that when I start giving out money to 
respondents it will become the routine where others will also demand 
payments before they were interviewed. I kept on telling the respondents 
that if they do not benefit from the findings of the study their children stood 
the chance of benefitting in the future. 
 The initial plan to engage two research assistants from the 
community to help with the fieldwork had to be dropped. This was mainly 
due to three reasons; first the quality of the field notes from the previous 
interviews by the research assistants, secondly, their ability to ask questions 
that reflected my research themes and finally the ethical issue of their 
community membership making people not to come out with information that 
was seen to be sensitive. However, since the orientation of this study is 
based on in-depth actor narratives it became evident that it will be difficult to 
engage research assistants do undertake that kind of interview. Also the 
fees quoted by the prospective research assistants were on the high side as 
compared to my initial budget for the research. This did not in any way affect 
my study as the extent of my duration in the field enabled me to get in-depth 
information on the issues I was researching on. 
 The theoretical sampling approach adopted by this study placed no 
limit on the number of respondents selected for the study. The argument of 
the theoretical sampling approach is that once the researcher reaches 
‗saturation point‘, the data collection exercise he can be halted (Mason, 
2002). During the data generation process, I noticed that I had reached 
saturation point when I observed that data emerging was mostly a repetition 
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of the information I had already gathered. Despite having no pre-determined 
limit on the number of respondents, I was able to gather enough data for this 
research, though undertaking the data analysis was a dilemma. Using an 
electronic format to analyse the data became unfeasible due to the sheer 
volume of data gathered and that fact that a lot of analysis had already been 
done during the period of the field work. 
  
 3.9 Ethical Issues and validity  
 For each interview and observation undertaken for this study, I 
sought informed consent from the individuals concerned and the gate 
keepers‘ for the settings respectively. The issue of informed consent of 
social actors was of prime importance during the data gathering exercise. 
Before observing any site, permission was sought from the gatekeeper of 
that site. Similarly, all respondents who were interviewed for this study gave 
their informed consent before going ahead to interview them. I also informed 
all the participants that their inclusion in the research process was not 
mandatory and that they could opt out if they have any intentions of 
withdrawing from the interview process. 
 During the data collection exercise especially the GD and the 
interviewing process, participants sought anonymity and confidentiality which 
was agreed. The participants were cautious of the fact that some vital 
information concerning some of the issues being discussed especially 
responses concerning equity and equality concerning community 
governance spaces, access to resources and their social lives gets to their 
husbands it may lead to some bad consequences. Consent was always 
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sought from respondents before tape recording the conversations and 
writing down responses. Tape recording in some instances made some 
respondents feel uneasy and in some instances respondents asked me to 
stop the recording since what they were saying was ―off-record and should 
not to be captured on tape‖. Some respondents also did not give informed 
consent to be recorded on tape as they had some reservations concerning 
recording their conversation which may limit what information they could 
divulge to me. The idea of writing down field notes or tape recording 
conversation was not abandoned as consent was always sought from 
participants before doing so. While some respondents felt uneasy with the 
recording of conversation others had no problem with it. 
  On the issue of the validity of this research, I was informed by Mason 
(2002: 30) argument that, the research process is not passive or neutral, but 
―interactive, creative, selective and interpretative‖. These elements about the 
research process causes concern for generalisation and data reliability, 
especially external validity of the research. Though the ethnographic 
approach adopted for the study is often critiqued for paying too much 
attention to a small number of cases, in this research it enabled me to get 
deeper insights and contextual account of people‘s experiences about local 
governance. While there are limits to the generalisations that can be made 
from micro-level analysis, detailed community studies offer an opportunity to 
examine local dynamics driving broader trends. This is supported by 
Jackson‘s (2002) argument that, researchers should focus on the atypical, 
the unusual and the rare in order to contribute knowledge of some larger 
picture. This study was more about illuminating how new local government 
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structures shaped individual participation and social organisation, hence, the 
findings from the case study are generalisable beyond the specific context, 
so far as decentralisation reforms similar to the Ghana approach has taken 
place. Obviously, the findings will limit generalisation to other localities in 
which new local government reforms have taken place due to the difference 
in context specificities and the circumstantial uniqueness of Ntonaboma 
which is embedded in history and culture. Generalisability however was not 
the goal of this research, but rather this study focused on the practice of 
decentralisation at the micro-level, to illuminate how the local government 
structures shape community participation and community management 
within a specific context.  
  
 3.10 Conclusion 
  This chapter has discussed the approaches for primary data 
generation. The chapter highlighted the rationale, the objectives of the 
research and the research questions that guided the study. The research 
design was based an actor oriented approach that views social actors as 
‗knowledgeable‘ and ‗capable‘. The research approach also embraced the 
dynamic relationship between agency and structure. In order to gather 
individual experiences with decentralisation, the study employed multiple 
ethnographic data generation approaches notably the semi-structured 
interviewing technique, participant observation and the GD to enter into the 
social worlds of local actors at the community level. The data generated from 
the field was analysed manually and used to answer the research question 
for the thesis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INSTITUTIONALISING DECENTRALISATION IN GHANA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  Decentralisation policies, like all development interventions, are 
implemented in an on-going social and political local process shaping the 
practice of governance and social interactions at local levels. In this chapter, 
my main argument is that decentralisation reform is a complex and dynamic 
process that transcends the technocratic and managerial approach 
pervasive in many policy reforms (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 3). Therefore, it 
is important to highlight the historical, politcal and socio-economic conditions 
that shape decentralisation in a particular context. 
  Specifically, this chapter aims to provide a historical background of 
initiatives to institutionalise local government in Ghana. An understanding of 
the different trajectories of local government reforms offers insights into how 
local government has been reinvented to specifically shape behaviour and 
social organisation in Ghana. Similarly, historical analysis makes clear the 
reality of the top-down nature of local government reforms in Ghana. The 
chapter also discusses the interplay of certain political, economic and 
external factors that have influenced the trajectory of local government 
reforms in colonial and post-colonial Ghana. In this instance, my interest is 
on highlighting the emphasis placed on rationality, effectiveness and 
efficiency to coordinate human actions in achieving specific functional goals. 
The chapter also illuminates the changing positions of traditional or 
customary institutions in these local government reforms.  
99 
 
  For an adequate analysis of data presented in this thesis, this 
chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part presents a historical 
analysis of the practice of decentralisation in Ghana from 1878 to 1957 
focusing on conscious attempts by the colonial state to intervene in rural 
communities by formalising local government structures. Following Olowu 
and Wunsch‘s (2004) review of literature on African history of 
decentralisation, the first part of the chapter is further categorised into first, 
second and third waves of decentralisation.  
 The second part of the chapter highlights the continuities and 
discontinuities of past and present local government reforms by different 
political regimes in colonial and post- colonial Ghana. This is to illuminate the 
varied importance attached to efficiency and power of the central state 
against underlying issues of democracy, social inequity, power inequality 
and empowerment. The last part of the section puts the sub-district 
structures which are very important for this thesis into perspectives.  
 The final section of Chapter Four discusses the context of 
Ntonaboma to give the reader insights into the background of the study area. 
The essence is to prepare the reader for the discussion in the following three 
chapters.  
 
4.2 Beginnings of local governance in the Gold Coast from 1878 to 
1951 
    The focus of this section is to elaborate on how the rural population 
in the Gold Coast was incorporated into the decision-making arena of 
colonial power. Aryee (2000b) traces the period between 1878 and 1951 as 
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a signpost to illustrate attempts by the colonial authority of the Gold Coast to 
institutionalise local government arrangements. The period also represents 
the colonial state‘s imposition of its claim to control, administer and exercise 
sovereignty over the Gold Coast territories (Aryee, 2000b, 1994; Nkrumah, 
2000). The reorganisation of the Gold Coast by the colonial authorities was 
guided by the principle of ‗indirect rule‘. The introduction of indirect rule as a 
technology for governing the rural population marked the extension of the 
British colonial state into the rural areas of the Gold Coast (Ray, 2003; 
Mamdani, 1996). Steps towards institutionalising decentralisation were 
purposely taken for administrative and control purposes. 
  Although the colonial government retained many indigenous social 
institutions in the Gold Coast, it superimposed a new consciously crafted 
‗monocentric‘ administrative system of government on the already existing 
polycentric social and political institutions that governed the complex 
community interactions and individual actions (Berry, 2002; Ribot, 2008).  
  The decentralisation of political structures by the colonial authorities 
was for the effective management of subjects and extraction of wealth 
(Boone, 1998). In order to effectively shape the government of the Gold 
Coast, and fully incorporate the rural areas into their local government 
administration, the colonial authorities relied on the passing of ordinances to 
regulate the role of chiefs to facilitate the extraction of wealth and also 
govern the inaccessible hinterland (Ubink, 2008; Ray, 2003). In the attempt 
to formalise local government and enhance their political and economic 
goals, the Gold Coast colonial authorities utilised these ordinances to 
consciously demarcate territorial boundaries. The subject population were 
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grouped into administrative units under dual hierarchies of traditional and 
colonial authority and integrated into the overall management of the colony 
(Ribot, 2008).  
  An example of the colonial state‘s formal legislative attempts to 
institutinalise local government in the Gold Coast was the 1878 Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance of the Gold Coast Colony that sought to influence, but 
not necessarily to determine, in the first instance, the selection and removal 
of traditional leaders (Meltcafe, 1964: 390 cited in Ray, 2003). Examples of 
formal law aimed at institutionalising local government were the Municipal 
Ordinance of 1859 establishing municipalities in the coastal towns of the 
Gold Coast, the 1878 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, the 1883 Gold Coast 
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and the ordinance of the Northern Territories 
and Ashanti in 1932 and 1935 respectively (ibid). All these ordinances were 
aimed at consolidating and strengthening the power and authority of the 
chiefs as local government functionaries within the society and at the same 
time reengineering the executive, judicial, and financial arrangements in the 
Protectorate.  
  The new local government administrative arrangements were 
grounded in ‗legal dualism‘ of formal and customary law suggesting that 
there was never a wholesale adoption of the former to shape social 
exchange (Mamdani, 1996: 17). Ray (2003) writes that alongside these 
formal laws of the Gold Coast were entrenched customary laws that 
regulated nonmarket relations, in land, in personal and in community affairs. 
This suggests that, pre-colonial Gold Coast had existing structures that 
shaped interaction and collective action. Formal law was deliberately 
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instituted to narrowly ‗govern conditions of law and order, taxation, and 
justice for the colonial order‘ within the jurisdiction of urban centers which 
had European populations (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 30).  
  Mamdani (1996) writes that the deliberate separation of formal and 
customary law to shape the interactions of the urban centers and native 
population respectively led to differentiation among the population. Mamdani 
writes further that, ―the emphasis on differentiation meant the forging of 
specifically ‗native‘ institutions through which to rule subjects‖ (Mamdani, 
1996: 8). But the use of existing customary laws of the Gold Coast in the 
affairs of the colonial authorities was constrained by the contested 
understanding and struggles over the interpretation of these customs within 
the rural societies. Such contestations and struggles over the meaning of 
custom resulted in either a redefinition or discarding of traditional practices 
whenever they were considered repugnant in the lights of colonial 
conception (Berry, 2002). 
 The new arrangements for local government resulted in the 
strengthening of ties between the traditional chiefs and the colonial 
authorities but were more often contested and negotiated in practice. The 
ordinance transferred most chiefly powers to the crown, but it also allowed 
tribal chiefs to make by-laws, subject to the Governor‘s consent. Within the 
overall structure of the colonial government, the traditional political 
authorities were placed under District Commissioners who supervised the 
day-to-day affairs of the protectorate. The chiefs were positioned below the 
District Commissioner. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of Ghana’s history of decentralisation 
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   It is important to mention that, although the tradition of political 
authority was basically incorporated into the structure of colonial 
government, the process of incorporation was embedded, and still is, in 
tension and conflict, in relation to customary law at the local level. The 
resistance of traditional authority and native population to colonial rule is also 
well documented (Ubink, 2008; Ray, 2003). Berman (1998) cites the 
example that, African society shaped the colonial state formation through 
acts of rebellion, ungovernability and revolt. Indigenous elites were also 
noted to have contested the colonial government‘s claim to lands and 
resources (Berry, 2002; Mamdani, 1996). The argument here is that, natives 
had strategies through which they negotiated or contested the policies of the 
colonial authorities. Thus, the outcomes of colonial strategies of 
incorporation at the local level were worked out through compromise and 
struggles in a variety of areas such as taxes and property rights. 
  Commenting on the dynamics of participation within the new local 
government arrangements during the era of indirect rule, Mamdani explains 
that it was signified by a ‗mediated - decentralised – despotism‘ (Mamdani, 
1996: 17). He notes how the NA were not democratically elected but 
handpicked to represent the interests of the British Colonial Government as 
well as to administer law and order. Mamdani writes on some of the central 
features of the Native Authority as institutions that, 
 ‗..., bore little resemblance to a local administration, say in Britain. Its personnel 
functioned without judicial restraint and were never elected. Appointed from above, 
they held office so long as they enjoyed the confidence of their superiors. Their 
powers were diffuse, with little functional specificity… Native Courts, Native 
Administration, and a Native Treasury … crystallized the ensemble of powers merged 
in the office of the chief…These powers also included a fourth: making rules‘ 
(Mamdani, 1996: 53). 
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  The functional strategies of colonial local government was 
consciously designed as a means of penetration and management of rural 
subjects but did not place emphasis on the social values of the local 
population, other existing forms of collective action and patterns of social 
organisation (Ribot, 2008; Haruna, 2003). The colonial local government 
arrangements placed much emphasis on rationalising the colonial state by 
putting in place bureaucratic organisations such as ‗establishing treasuries, 
appointing staff and performing other local government functions‘ (Nkrumah, 
2000:55).  
The rational strategies of the colonial government placed the new 
local government arrangements alongside the existing social organisations 
of the rural areas. Hence, the approach encountered ‗enduring 
consequences‘ at the local level due to the disregard of the heterogeneous 
nature of most rural societies compromising the possibility for efficient and 
effective government administration of the rural areas (Boone, 1998: 5-7). 
 Olowu and Wunsch (2004: 29) trace some characteristics of colonial 
decentralisation policies as ―reflecting the power and perceptions of the 
colonial powers rather than the reality of cultural forms and norms‖. They cite 
the absence of authentic customs and practices in the colonial administration 
system of local governance due to the relative ignorance of the ‗context‘ by 
colonial officers. The impact of the relative absence of existing customs and 
practices was that local government instrumentally and narrowly over relied 
on existing traditional local organisations while at the same time ignoring the 
―grain of the social fabric‖ (Kelsall, 2008: 8). Other existing institutions and 
norms within the locality that appeared to help solve collective action 
106 
 
problems of the community were ignored. Subsequent post-colonial local 
government reforms adopted a conservative approach towards traditional 
authorities. Furthermore, the role of the traditional chief and the participation 
of local people in governance were ambiguous with much emphasis placed 
on strengthening the role of the central state for a functional and efficient 
government. 
 The next section discusses colonial attempts to transform local 
governance in the period towards independence.  
 
4.2.1 Colonial efforts at ‘modernising’ local government, 1944- 1957 
 Between 1944 and 1954 there were attempts to turn ‗indirect rule‘ in 
the Gold Coast into a form of 'modern' local government (Aryee, 2000b). 
During the 1950s, the colonial government in the Gold Coast abandoned the 
approach of relying on traditional chiefs to mediate rural areas to establish 
bureaucratic structures. After 1947 a deliberate strategy of decolonisation 
and decentralisation aimed at abandoning indirect rule was pursued through 
the establishment of local councils in several parts of the Gold Coast (ibid).  
 The moments preceding independence saw conscious efforts by the 
colonial government to reform government structures and introduce 
institutions that sought to engage directly with the natives. ‗Decolonisation‘ 
as a policy of the colonial administration rested on the assumption that self-
government required democratic legitimacy for central government. The 
fulcrum of such an approach was to technically craft efficient and democratic 
local government institutions that placed emphasis on ‗efficiency, democracy 
and the local‘ and, an enhanced role for African administrators in the affairs 
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of the state (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 31). This period of reforming local 
government was also the beginning of the decline in the participation and 
influence of the traditional authorities in local government.  
 In the Gold Coast the major policy that provided the platform for 
colonial modernising efforts of local government was the Sir Henley 
Coussey‘s Committee on Constitutional Reform presented to the Legislative 
Council in December 1949. The Coussey‘s Committee report recommended 
a three-tiered local government structure based on land mass, population 
and resource availability suggesting a rational approach to local governance 
reform (Mohan, 1996). The local government council was made up of two-
third elected membership and one-third chiefs, with paramount chiefs as 
presidents of the council (Aryee, 2003a). The lowest tier was the Village 
Area Council, which was to provide a wider participation of all sections of the 
community in the deliberation of the affairs of local authorities.  
 The Local Government Ordinance No. 29, 1951 led to the 
establishment of elected local councils which officially ended the colonial 
policy of ‗indirect rule‘ in Ghana. The 1951 Ordinance had two local tiers 
namely the Local and Urban Councils and the Town, Village and Area 
Committees. The District, Urban, and Local Councils superseded the power 
and authority of the traditional authorities. The progress from ‗indirect rule‘ to 
modern forms of local governance was still expressed by the notion of 
African societies as ‗closed, corporate and consensual‘ suggesting the 
potential for collective action in local development (Ranger, 1983:24 cited in 
Berry, 2002). The period preceding 1957 saw the multiplication of standard 
local government council and tiers all over the Gold Coast (Asibou, 2002). 
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 However, the principles underlying these new local government 
reforms implemented in 1951 were based on state regulation of which were 
incompatible with the ‗grain‘ of African societies (Kelsall, 2008). The reform 
focused more on the establishment of macro-structures and economic output 
at the expense of ethical and cultural values (Haruna, 2001).  The outcome 
for local government reforms were many institutional inventions that in reality 
were problematic to operate due to the inadequate understanding of the 
meaning of the social, and the diversity of institutions shaping interactions in 
rural life (Ribot, 2008; Berry, 2002; Mamdani, 1996). 
 
4.3 Reinventing government - the ambiguity of local government  
       reforms from 1957 to 1981 
 The provision of a viable framework of local government in Ghana 
dominated the post-independent administration‘s reforms and thinking. In the 
post-independence period from 1957 onwards, successive governments in 
Ghana preoccupied themselves with local government reforms that were 
regarded as a necessary condition for the socio-economic development of 
the country. These local government reforms sought to remedy some of the 
negative consequences of centralised planning by crafting local government 
structures with some degree of political, administrative, and financial 
autonomy that aimed to harness the abilities, knowledge, and incentives of 
rural people (Aryee, 2008).  
 However, efforts to create local government structures between 
1957 and 1981 swiftly changed in favour of central planning which sought to 
concentrate the power around the state by enlarging and strengthening 
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existing bureaucratic structures of the central state (Chazan, 1999). This was 
a strategy to achieve the political objectives of recentralisation of state power 
limiting the scope for democratic participation and a weakening of local 
government structures (Aryee, 2004; Chazan, 1999). 
 A review of local government reforms between 1957 and 1981 
revealed that decentralisation was promoted to consolidate the power of 
central state (Aryee, 2008; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). The motives behind 
efforts at decentralising power and authority failed to transform the nature of 
power and participation of local actors within local government (Haruna, 
2001). In reality, the reforms failed to redistribute power to those originally 
excluded by colonial administration. As succinctly captured by Mahwood the 
orientation of the post-independent state shifted from ―local autonomy in 
favour of central planning and greater control over public resources 
(Mahwood cited in Olowu and Wunsch. 2004: 33). The outcome of the 
state‘s desire to control power and resources from the national level resulted 
in a deconcentrated administration similar to, but weaker than the colonial 
one.  
 The establishment of a viable system of local government in Ghana 
since independence in 1957 has proved to be problematic due to 
considerable political instability and economic decay (Crook, and Manor, 
1998; Ninsin, 1985). After independence, attempts at decentralisation 
reforms were introduced at different times. For example, the Local 
Government Act 54 of 1961 was enacted during the government of the CPP 
under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Crook and Manor, 1998; Mahwood, 1983). The 
main features of this Act included a central government body, named as the 
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Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) which dealt with national issues and 
the local authorities as central government agencies.  
 After independence in 1957, the government of the Convention 
People‘s Party (CPP) rejected the 1957 constitutional provision for regional 
assemblies, fearing that such a step would promote regional or ethnic 
separatism, hence the centralisation of all decision making authority in the 
nation‘s capital (Aryee, 2004; Saaka, 2001). The Nkrumah government 
rather denounced regional structures claiming that these regional structure 
hindered national unity. Thus, the Nkrumah government reduced the 
regional (middle) tier of government to a purely an advisory position. 
According to Aryee (1994), the fragmentation of local government units by 
Nkrumah was a way of weakening the decentralised structures envisioned 
by the national constitution.  
 The strategies and mechanisms for governing rural areas under 
Nkrumah were ‗centralised‘ and ‗deconcentrated‘, sustained through 
bureaucratic institutions that enhanced central leadership and consolidated 
the power of the state (Chazan, 1999). The centralisation of power was 
justified as a more direct way to achieve rapid socio-economic development. 
The outcome was the placement of local government directly under the 
aegis of central institutions and the elimination of regional political bases that 
could enhance the power and autonomy of regional political leaders who 
advocated pluralism in national level politics.  
 The burgeoning administrative structures at the regional and local 
levels suggest that much effort was placed on deconcentration of local 
government. The Nkrumah government relied on conscious ‗interventionism‘ 
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aimed at shaping and micro-managing social processes in towns and 
villages and linking localities directly to the state (Boone 1998). In February 
1966, the CPP government was overthrown through a military coup by the 
National Liberation Council (NLC). Harris (1983) writes that among the first 
actions of the NLC was the replacement of the CPP‘s Regional and District 
Commissioners and the reduction of the districts from 160 to 144. The 
members of the 183 urban and local councils were taken over by 
management committees made up of three civil servants and a public 
nominee and chaired by the District Administrative Officer (DAO).  
This local government reform re-introduced chiefs into the 
institutional arrangements but with a more subdued role just as a member of 
the committee (Harris, 1983). The inclusion of traditional rulers was to 
enable the NLC to assert their legitimacy as a political regime because they 
lacked popular legitimacy. The Town and Village Development Committees, 
which were voluntary bodies mainly concerned with community development 
also underwent re-engineering. These local government arrangements that 
were temporal continued until 1974, when they were replaced by District 
Councils.  
 The NLC introduced a new form of local government structure after 
constituting three commissions. The proposed reform was a four-tiered 
arrangement of Regional, District, and Local Councils and Town and Village 
Development Committees (Aryee, 2004; 1994). These structures continued 
to form the architecture of local government system implemented in Ghana 
after the NLC regime. However, the functions and powers inherent in the 
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new structures constituted a radical departure from that of the NLC 
(Nkrumah, 2000).  
 The main features of the new local government structure were 
District Councils that combined local government functions and political 
activities of the ruling Progress Party (PP) (Harris, 1983). Beneath the district 
councils were the local councils whose area of jurisdiction were coterminous 
with that of the traditional authorities within the district. Membership to these 
local councils were either elected or appointed. The reliance on appointing 
the district and regional chief executives by the centre reflects minimal 
interest in decentralisation as a ‗radical project‘ by the state, but primarily as 
a means of perpetuating state control. The town and village development 
committees functioned as the lowest tier of the local government system.  
 The National Redemption Council (NRC) overthrew the PP government 
in 1972 through a coup. The local government policies pursued sought to 
secure the legitimacy of the regime rather than decentralising power and 
authority to local communities. This was evident in the suspension of the 
1971 local government Act. Emphasis was placed on getting Regional 
Commissioners to take responsibility of the regions whiles maintaining the 
management committees in the districts. Later intentions to decentralise 
local government shifted toward gaining political control over the country due 
to the economic decline and attempts by other elements in the government 
to overthrow the NRC regime.  
 The suspended 1971 Act for local government and decentralisation 
was re-introduced in 1974 under the regime of Lt. Col Acheampong 
maintaining the position of DCE. The 1974 decentralisation and local 
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government reform amended the 1971 Local Administration Act and 
established 65 district councils (Nkrumah, 2000). Membership in the new 
local government institutions was again two thirds elected and one-third 
representatives of traditional councils with the military positioned at the apex 
as Regional Commissioners and head of all government machinery in the 
region (Aryee, 1994). The local government reforms introduced were 
generally characterised by deconcentration, and aimed at strengthening 
central government control at the local level (Nkrumah 2000). 
 In November 1978, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) replaced the 
NRC introducing district council elections. In June 1979, The Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Committee (AFRC) overthrew the SMC. The AFRC handed 
over power to the People National Party (PNP), a civilian government in 
September, 1979. The PNP government initially announced the creation of 
additional 40 districts bringing the total number of districts in Ghana to 105 
(Aryee, 1994). However, another military government, the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC) on December, 31 1981 overthrew the PNP before 
the creation of these new districts could be implemented.  
 The ongoing discussion in this section reveals that, the local 
government reforms undertaken by successive governments in Ghana 
between 1957 and 1981 were meant to reinforce the dominant role of the 
central state. At the same time these local government reforms reflected the 
desire of the various governments to create democratic structures after 
independence. Also, the attempts to ‗tweak‘ local government reforms by the 
state between 1966 and 1982 placed emphasis on perpetuating the 
dominant role of the central state, improving the deteriorating infrastructure 
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and tackling the narrow economic base of the country rather than on local 
participation and empowerment as governance reforms (Aryee, 2000; 
Nkrumah, 2000; Mohan, 1996). The reforms elaborated a concentration of 
power around the central state rather than transforming the unequal power 
relations that shaped governance arrangements within the communities. For 
example, the various Local Government Acts that were implemented within 
the period 1957 to 1981 employed strategies that sought to reinforce the 
power of the central state through forged alliance with local elites. Boone 
(1998: 7) writes that, ―post-colonial fusion of elites‖ has often been achieved 
by reinforcing the powers of local notables and neo-traditional bigwigs over 
the community members often in ways that compromise the bureaucratic 
efficacy at the local level and appeal to invented traditions of communal 
solidarity that are discordant with attempts to build individual citizenship 
identities within a unified nation state‖. 
 In reality, much of post-colonial local government reforms were less 
relevant and meaningful to the circumstances of the local people especially 
in establishing structures that enhanced political participation and transforms 
structures of inequality. Most of these reforms undertaken during the period 
of 1970s and 1980s resulted in economic crisis and high levels in poverty 
(Abrahamsen, 2000; Mohan, 1996). The reforms failed to significantly 
improve the living standard of Ghanaians. It also did not adequately engage 
with the existing socio-cultural arrangements prevailing at the local level but 
rather to encourage rational management planning and development 
associated with the process of institutional reform (Wardell and Lund, 2006; 
Haruna 2003; Boone, 1998; Aryee, 1994).  
115 
 
4.4 The ‘third wave’ of decentralisation - Pressure from donors to  
reform  
 The third wave of decentralisation was grounded in the PNDC‘s 
philosophy of ‗power to the people‘ and shaped by the ‗Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) (Haruna, 2003; Mohan, 1996). The decentralisation 
programme under the PNDC was born out of a process of state restructuring 
and democratisation inspired by the ‗neo-liberal agenda‘ and designed by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a result of 
unsustainable debt and economic decline (World Bank, 1983: 39; World 
Bank, 1990). In June 1982, the PNDC passed Law 14 to dissolve the district 
councils elected in November, 1978 under the People‘s National Party 
government. The PNDC instituted management committees and later District 
Secretaries to replace the district counsellors who later became responsible 
for the implementation of government policies and also manage the affairs of 
the rural population, (Mohan, 1996).  
 The ‗Rawlings Revolution‘ of 31 December 1981 stressed on 
genuine accountability and popular participation to be the fulcrum of 
decentralised government. According to Mohan, the first attempt by the 
PNDC to decentralise power to local people was through the organs of the 
‗revolution‘ which was named the Committee for the Defence of the 
Revolution (CDR). The CDRs as populist organisations were deemed to be 
robust replacing the existing Village Development Committees that were 
perceived by the PNDC regime as inefficient and undemocratic.  
 Later the PNDC government made its intention to decentralise public 
services for the purpose of efficient administration known through a policy 
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guideline issued in May 1982 (Aryee, 2004; Mohan, 1996). In this policy 
guideline, emphasis was placed on the deconcentration of central 
administrative authority to the various regions, districts and communities to 
enhance local participation in governance (PNDC, 1983). The overall goal of 
the decentralisation programmes launched in 1988 by the PNDC regime was 
to redress the overcentralisation of power at the national level, improve 
urban–rural imbalance, and enhance local participation in national decision 
making (Ministry of Local Government 1996; Ahwoi 1992). To achieve this 
goal, central government ministries, departments, and agencies took more 
responsibility for policy planning and analysis, while local authorities shared 
responsibility for policy implementation. 
 However, as a result of the influence of lender conditionalities, the 
PNDC government in December 1983, announced a new governance policy, 
the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) that sought to minimise the role 
of the state, and restructure the inefficient public sector leading to new 
regimes of governance (Aryee, 2008; Batterbury and Fenando, 2006; Ribot, 
2002a). Basically the ERP was for economic liberalisation and political 
restructuring and was implemented in two stages. The first ERP was 
implemented between 1984 and 1986. The ERP during this phase sought to 
increase and export a higher percentage of the output from the agricultural 
sector especially cocoa, control inflation, improve international 
creditworthiness and rehabilitating Ghana's infrastructure. The second phase 
of the ERP from 1987 to 1989, also emphasised growth and balance of 
payments, but stressed improvements in the public sector. 
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 Ghana's decentralisation programme which was a major component 
of the ERP‘s political restructuring commenced in 1988 due to strong donor 
pressure that advocated ‗minimizing government intervention‘ in political, 
administrative and financial matters of the state (World Bank, 1984).The 
outcome was a process of state restructuring and democratisation. 
Decentralisation and local government reforms were recommended by 
donors and introduced in Ghana as a mechanism to enhance efficiency and 
optimal management of state institutions. The rationale for reducing the role 
of the state was to economise on scarce resources, make governance more 
responsive to the needs of the population and reduce corruption. local 
government reforms were advocated by donors due to their potential in 
raising resources, providing services, expanding rural-urban linkages, 
stimulating private investment, and implementing national development 
policies (Olowu and wunsch, 2004).The potential of local governments 
through civil society to offer accountable, representative and responsive 
modes of governance as compared to the central state supported arguments 
for limiting the role of the state in governance (World Bank, 1991; 1984).  
 Local government reforms were implemented based on technical 
issues masking political and cultural preferences (Haruna, 2003). These 
reforms were consistent with donor prescriptions that suggested that 
improving the economic performance of the country ―requires both policy 
reforms and strengthened institutions for management‖ (World Bank, 1984: 
39). Hence, decentralisation reforms were introduced as a technocratic 
project aimed at increasing efficiency and building institutional stability. The 
reforms placed more emphasis on technical issues aimed at achieving 
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efficiency than on participation and social justice (Abrahamsen, 2000). 
Critics argue that the reforms were introduced as ‗neutral technologies‘ 
placing emphasis on ‗technical considerations of economy and efficiency, 
rather than ideological and political preferences‘ (Shihata cited in 
Abrahamsen, 2000: 12) 
 The reforms initiated under the SAP saw the rationalisation, 
retrenchment and the divestiture by government of its responsibilities 
through the deconcentration of large numbers of government ministries to 
district level and the privatisation of many state owned institutions (Aryee, 
2000). This reflected donor intentions to deregulate, separating the 
provision12 of services from production responsibility, where the latter was 
turned over to the private sector. Reduction in government spending on 
services saw the removal of subsidies and the introduction of user fees on 
services all in the name of ‗cost recovery‘ (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; 
Nugent, 1995).  
 The reality of the cost recovery agenda was inadequate provision of 
social services to the poorest and vulnerable resulting in the instrumental 
use of local institutions and empowerment of citizens to mange basic social 
services (World Bank, 1989). The inclusion of citizens as consumers still 
emphasised the cost sharing approach but added a new dimension of 
empowerment. As stated by the World Bank, the inclusion of citizens was 
aimed at ‗empowering the beneficiaries to demand improved services and of 
                                                          
12
 Provision is used in this  case to mean the decisions made on the quality and quantity of  
public goods and services and how to finance, monitor and regulate the production of these  
goods and services. On the other hand production  has to do with the technical transformation  
of resources into the delivery of goods and services (Olowu and Wunsch , 2004) 
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fostering a sense of individual and community responsibility for delivery‘ 
(ibid: 86). The ideals of empowerment manifesting in community participation 
and responsibility were all couched in economist and monetarist sense 
aimed at both transferring the burden and responsibility of the state onto 
citizens and making development cost efficient (Larson and Soto, 2008). 
 Haruna (2003) raises concerns about the governance reform 
program undertaken by the PNDC for pursuing over ambitious economic 
growth as a result of the exigencies of economic decline. He argues further 
that the governance reform program adopted by the PNDC was based on 
western values and ideas that emphasised methodological individualism and 
rational explanations and, an instrumental and homogenous notion of 
‗community‘ that could not fit fully well into ―a culture based on a different 
kind of localism‖ (ibid: 343).  
 The policies underpinning these reforms were overly dependent on 
aid conditionalities and recommendations from international finance 
institutions. These recommendations were mostly technical in nature 
focusing on good government whilst ignoring the complex historical, 
structural realities of the country (Abrahamsen, 2000; Mohan. 1996). The 
neglect of internal contextual factors especially the social outcomes of the 
reforms led to worsened conditions under the SAP programme. The 
outcome as Abrahamsen puts it was ―a merely technical adjustment‖ that led 
to increase in poverty levels and social differentiation among the population 
having serious consequences for political, economic and social development 
of the country (ibid: 10). 
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4.5 Continuities in colonial and post-colonial local governance reforms 
 In this section, I intend to illuminate the continuities in colonial and post 
colonial local government reforms to show that these reforms have been 
narrowly concerned with crafting an efficient and effective local government 
as opposed to wider issues of poverty, exclusion and power inequalities 
associated with context. Using examples of colonial and post colonial 
approaches to local government reforms, I argue that both reforms tilted 
towards technocratic orientation and a continuity of western values and 
ideals to reinforce the centralisation of state power (Spencer, 2007; Williams 
et. al., 2003b; Heller, 2001). However, the only fundamental difference 
between colonial and post colonial mode of governance is the introduction of 
citizenship, democracy, participation and ‗good governance‘ principles by the 
latter.  
 
4.5.1 Bureaucratic and top-down nature of reforms 
 A historical analysis of local government administration in both 
colonial and post-colonial administration in Ghana reveals a continuity 
regarding the emphasis placed on rationality, centrality and predictability 
normally associated with the bureaucratic approach (Haruna, 2003). In 
Ghana, decentralisation in both colonial and post-colonial reforms has been 
applied as a ‗political project‘ to reinforce the power of the central state 
rather than promote the participation of citizens. This continuity in local 
government arrangements is evident in the replication of centralised and 
hierarchical organisations by contemporary governments reproducing the 
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colonialist power relationships (Crawford, 2008; Aryee, 2008; Owusu, 2005; 
Cooke, 2003).  
 Cooke (2003) writes that, the reason for successive governments in 
Ghana to maintain and reproduce centralised and hierarchical organisations 
could be explained by the desire of the state to maintain control of the rural 
areas. The approach for effective state control of rural areas, he argues, lies 
in the reproduction of the design and reform of local government structure 
through certain ―technologies of government‖ to enable central government 
to bring rural areas under its surveillance. Although all governments since 
independence have put forward inefficiency of state structures and socio-
economic development of the rural areas as the main argument for 
decentralisation, it is evident in the literature that the motivation to 
decentralise was to hold on to power and authority through a network of 
patronage power (Aryee, 2008; Owusu, 2005; Ribot, 2002).   
 Significantly associated with the bureaucratic reforms is the ‗top‘ 
down nature of Ghana‘s decentralisation programme. The continuity in the 
top-down approach is reflected in the nature and manner power and 
authority is generally transferred from central government to the districts. For 
example, under colonial rule, the decision to appoint district commissioners 
was made from the top. Similarly, the current local government system 
appoints DCEs and other DA members from the centre as was done during 
the colonial period (Asibuo, 2000). Various studies reveal the top-down 
nature of staff appointments to decentralised departments at district level.  
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 4.5.2 Ambiguous role of chiefs in local government reforms 
 Exploring the history of local government in Ghana reveals that there 
has been very little consistency in the roles carved for traditional authorities 
as an administrative extension of the state. The literature on local 
government reforms in Ghana reveals how new local government structures 
are frequently superimposed on existing customary governance structures 
(Ubink, 2008; Ray, 2003). Most local government reforms since the colonial 
period did not completely abolish the role of traditional chiefs but 
accommodated them within the new arrangements as a result of the diverse 
sources of the legitimacy of their authority and the role they played in 
shaping the affairs of their communities. The continuous inclusion of 
traditional chiefs in local government reforms from the ‗indirect rule‘ 
approach to the current local government framework has been fraught with 
ambiguities (Ray, 2003; Ribot, 2002a; Lund, 1998; Nugent 1995).   
 The role played by traditional authorities in shaping the affairs of 
their respective communities made them an indispensable partner in the 
affairs of the central government. However, evidence suggests that post 
colonial governments have consistently lacked a clear policy regarding the 
role of traditional authorities in local government reforms (Ray, 2003). 
Various local government reforms all re-engineered the role of traditional 
chiefs in local government. The nature of their involvement varied with every 
local government reform. For example, the 1951 Constitution under the CPP 
government made available 37 out of the 75 seats in the new Assembly to 
be elected by the Chiefly Territorial Councils (Boafo-Arthur, 2001). The 1952 
local government reforms in the Gold Coast, separated traditional councils 
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from the new local government authorities but the one-third representation of 
chiefs on the local government authorities was retained (Ray, 2003). In 
1954, the role of chiefs in local government was reformed leading to the 
establishment of an elected local government assembly with membership of 
104. Further reforms such as the 1957 Constitution reserved only one-third 
membership of local government seat for chiefs due to the preference for 
party officials at various levels to chiefly authority. Traditional chiefs were 
later banned from taking seats on the local government authorities through 
the Local Government Act of 1961 (Ray, 2003; Aryee, 1994). Further 
reforms such as the 1969 constitution made provision for chiefs by not only 
establishing the National House of Chiefs but also reserved one-third of the 
membership of District Councils for chiefs. Additionally, a provision was 
made in the Regional House of Chiefs for the inclusion of not more than two 
chiefs from the region on to the Regional Councils. Similarly, the 1979 
constitution made provision for one-third of the District Councils to be made 
up of traditional authorities in the district in accordance with traditional and 
customary usage (Art.183 [i]). The reforms also maintained the place for two 
chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs to be on the Regional Councils.  
 The current Local Government Law (PNDCL 207) of 1988 changed 
the role of chiefs in local governance by limiting their involvement to only the 
RCC. The Local Government Act (Act 462) of 1993, section 5 (d) makes 
provision for the participation of chiefs but they lost their one-third 
membership on the district councils. The populist approach adopted by the 
PNDC perceived the active participation of chiefs in the district councils as 
undermining their ‗revolutionary‘ ideals (Aryee, 2000; Mohan, 1996). 
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Legislative Instrument 1589 of 1994 also did not make any provision for the 
automatic inclusion of chiefs in the sub-district structures such as the Urban, 
Zonal, Town Councils and Unit Committees. Yet the role of chiefs in the 
affairs of their territories still prevailed at the local level, particularly in more 
rural areas of the country (Ray, 2003). 
 The absence of any structured and formalised arrangement that 
seeks to foster partnership and participation of traditional institutions in local 
governance affects the reality of the decentralisation process (Ayittey, 1991). 
In traditional communities claims are made about the potential of traditional 
authorities to foster inclusion and egalitarian principles to shape interactions 
(Owusu-Sarpong, 2003). Despite the idealised potentials of traditional chiefly 
authorities, the catalogue of local government reforms ranging from colonial 
impositions to contemporary reforms shaped by external imperatives, 
continue to offer traditional authorities passive roles in the affairs of 
decentralised institutions transplanted within their territories (Ribot, 2002). 
Although certain aspects of the development literature view traditional 
authorities or chiefs as undemocratic and also unrepresentative of the larger 
population (Ribot, 2002a; Mamdani, 1996), their intimate contact with the 
local populace provides them with the opportunity to shape activities at the 
community level. Other authors also maintain that, the relationship between 
the traditional chiefly authorities and the community is that of inclusiveness, 
representing the whole community beyond difference aimed at seeking the 
welfare of their subjects and mobilising them for development13. Such claims 
                                                          
13  For example, in Ghana traditional authorities still continue to play an important role in the  
affairs of their locality despite several local government reforms that sought to shrink their  
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made about the position of traditional chiefs reveal their dynamic and often 
contradictory nature in local development. 
 This passive and conservative role given to traditional authorities in 
the current local government framework has consequences for the 
legitimacy and authority of the new actors brought into the local governance 
arena (Juul and Lund, 2002). The authority of the chiefs in the public affairs 
of the community is legitimised based on tradition, religion and custom, while 
the legitimacy of official actors in the new local government framework are 
derived from elements that emphasise legal or formal rules and democratic 
elections (Ray, 2003; Lund, 2001). Since authority is enacted in practice 
among diverse individuals there is the possibility for struggles and 
contestations if there are competing structures and sources of authority. This 
accounts for the evidence in some districts of the tensions and acrimony 
between either District Chief Executives and the chiefs on one hand or either 
the Assemblyman or Unit Committee (UC) members and the chiefs 
(Crawford, 2008; Ribot, 2002). 
 The role of traditional chiefs in the affairs of their communities is an 
outcome of historical and political struggles or cultural processes that need 
to be taking into consideration in fashioning out a role for them in local 
government reforms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
authority. For example, people still maintain close ties with their traditional chiefs in order to  
maintain their native identities. In certain instances, people rely on chiefs to validate the   
deeds to their land titles after having it documented by institutions of the state such as the  
lands commission. 
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4.6 The New Local Governance System in Ghana 1988 to present 
 This section discusses the institutional arrangements of the current 
Local Government Act, Act 642 which serve as the main legal framework 
underpinning the process of decentralisation in contemporary Ghana under 
the fourth republican constitution. The government reforms in Ghana 
commenced with the process of state restructuring and democratisation by 
the PNDC in 1987 with the District Assembly (DA) concept promulgated 
under a new Local Government Law in 1988 (PNDC Law 207). The PNDC 
Law 207 introduced a four-tier structure that makes up the current system of 
decentralisation in Ghana in 1988. The legal provisions of decentralisation 
lay claim to a democratic and devolved form of decentralisation in which 
popular participation was encouraged (Crawford, 2008; Government of 
Ghana, 1992). The DA structure implemented by the PNDC government 
incorporated the principles of representative democracy (Aryee, 1999; 
Ayittey, 1991). 
 In structural terms the new DAs reflected a ‗mixed‘ or ‗fused‘ type of 
decentralised authority forming part of a single integrated hierarchy of 
government administration from local to national levels (Aryee, 2008; Crook 
and Manor, 1998). Each DA brings under one authority, the twenty two line 
departments and agencies deconcentrated by the new law to the district. 
The local government reforms undertaken in 1888 created 107 District and 
Municipal Assemblies that was later increases to 110. They DA were 
formally recognised in PNDC Law 207 and established individually through 
legislative instruments. As Law 207 states, ―a District Assembly shall be 
responsible for the overall development of the District and shall ensure the 
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preparation and submission to the Council for approval the development 
plan and budget for the District‖ (PNDC, 1988: 7).  
 Most of the functions assigned to the DAs were related to the 
provision of services at the local level. The district assemblies were linked to 
the grassroots or villages through the sub-district structure notably the unit 
committees. The unit committees were designed to formalise the relationship 
between the district and the grassroots. 
 The institutional arrangement of the local government structure in 
Ghana is illustrated in Fig 3.2. At the apex of the framework is the central 
government that frames and shapes the policy for the decentralisation 
process. The Regional Coordinating Council is an administrative and 
coordinating agency created in each region to regulate, monitor and 
supervise the activities of the DAs in that region. It also oversees the use of 
all funds allocated to each district assembly by any agency of the central 
government. 
Beneath the RCC are the District Assemblies variously labelled as 
metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies14 based on spatial and 
population size. The DAs as district level institutions link the communities 
upwardly to the state. They were created as the pivot for government 
administrative and developmental decision-making in the district. Presently 
there are 138 district assemblies in Ghana made up of 4 metropolitan 
                                                          
14 The metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies are the political and administrative  
authorities in the districts which exercise legislative, deliberative and executive functions. The 
metropolitan assemblies are areas with population of more than 250, 000; the municipal 
assemblies are areas with population of between 95,000 and 250,000 whiles the district 
assemblies are areas with population between 75,000 and 95,000. 
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assemblies, 10 municipal assemblies and 124 district assemblies (Aryee, 
2003).  
 Membership of the DAs is made up of the District Chief Executive 
(DCE) who represents the central government; seventy percent (70%) are 
elected members and thirty percent (30%) members appointed15 by the 
state. The appointed members are appointed by the President in 
consultation with the traditional authorities and interest groups in the district. 
The government appointees are assumed to complement the elected DA 
members with technical expertise that is lacking among the elected 
members. 
Each of the elected DA members represents an electoral area in 
district. The total number of elected DA members is equal to the sum of 
electoral areas in the district. Members of Parliament (MPs) whose 
constituencies fall within the authority of the DA are considered as non-
voting members of the DA.  
The Act that establishes the decentralisation programme requires 
DAs are supposed to undertake functions that promote and support 
productive activity and social development in the district. As outlined in the 
PNDC Law 207, the main function of the DA is their responsibility for the 
overall development of the district including the provision of services and 
management of basic infrastructure and district works. They are also 
                                                          
15 This provision coupled with the appointment of DCEs has been used by successive  
governments to fill the DAs with party officials and patrons to allow the central government 
extend its control over the activities of the DAs. In the recent elections in 2008 in which the 
opposition party won, the first act of the new government after assuming office in 2009 was to 
revoke the appointment of all government appointed members of the DA.  
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responsible for effective mobilisation and allocation of resources for the 
provision of public services in the interest of all the communities. 
 Beneath the DAs are the sub-district structures16 established by 
Legal Instrument (LI) 1589. Though these sub-district structures have been 
part of the decentralisation framework since 1988, inadequate interest by 
community members and limited financial support from the state to make 
these structures operational delayed its implementation since 1993 
(Crwaford, 2008; Aryee, 2003a; Ahwoi, 2000). The sub-metropolitan, urban, 
zonal, area councils and the Unit Committees (UC) constitute the micro 
mechanisms for political representation and participation at the local level. 
The sub-metropolitan district councils (sub-metros)17 constitute settlements 
that are found in the cities in most regions of the country. The composition of 
the sub-metros consists of not less than twenty five (25) and not more than 
thirty (30) members (PNDC Law 207). 
 The membership of the sub-metros is made up of all elected DA 
members whose areas of authority fall within the electoral area and 
presidential appointees‘ resident within the sub-metro and not more than 
twelve UC members in the area of authority of the sub-metro. The sub-
metros and urban councils18 are similar in composition and mandate but are 
only different in spatial size and population sizes. These councils are not 
                                                          
16 Based on the population size of the settlement the sub-district structures are further  
characterised as sub-metropolitan district councils, Urban, Zonal, Town, and Area councils. 
Though they are all suppose to perform similar roles within their area of authority their 
composition varies but are all made up of the same category of representatives. 
 
17
 The sub-metros are created for settlements with population above 100,000 people.   
In all there are thirteen (13) sub-metros in the country. 
 
18 The urban councils are created for settlement with population over 15,000 but less  
than 100,000. There are currently 34 urban councils in Ghana. 
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elected bodies but membership to the council is based on appointments 
made by the DCE as the representative of the President in the district in 
consultation with the Presiding Member19 (PM), traditional authorities and 
other identifiable organised productive economic groupings in the urban 
area, municipality or town.  
The Zonal councils20 however differ in composition made up of not 
less than fifteen (15) and not more than twenty (20) members. This 
composition is made up of not more than five elected DA members and not 
more than ten representatives of the UC members and not more than five 
appointed members of the DA. The town or area councils21 and the UCs 
constitute the lowest level institutional arrangements that form the sub-
district structures of the DA system. The town or area councils have identical 
composition as the zonal councils. The urban, zonal and area councils are 
the rallying point of local enthusiasm in enlisting support for DA activities 
because of their closeness to the people. This reflects the emphasis placed 
on bureaucratic institutions in Ghana‘s local government reform programme 
to achieve functional ends. 
The decentralisation legislation also affected local governance at the 
community level. The PNDC Law 207 defined the rural village or urban 
                                                          
19 The PM is elected from amongst the DA members at its first session. The PM  
chairs the general meetings of the DA. He has an ambiguous role as a ‗Speaker‘ of  
the DA and a respected community leader who mostly have links with the political  
party in power. 
 
20
  Zonal councils are zones in the ‗one-town‘ DAs and are established for settlements  
with population over 3000. There are 108 zonal councils in Ghana. 
 
21
 The Town Councils are established for settlements with population between 5,000  
and 15,000 whiles the Area Councils comprises a number of settlements with   
population below 5,000 that are grouped together. The area councils cover villages  
and rural communities and in some cases can be identified with a traditional  
authority. 
131 
 
neighbourhood as the lowest level of the central government‘s hierarchy. 
The legislation dismantled the Village/Town Development Committees (TDC) 
for being inefficient and undemocratic and replaced it with the Unit 
Committees. The UCs are elective bodies consisting of ten members elected 
through universal adult suffrage and five appointed members selected by the 
DCE on behalf of the President in consultation with PM and other identifiable 
groupings in the Unit. The UCs also serves as focal points for deliberation on 
local issues in order to make recommendations to the DA. The UC‘s 
mandate include supervising and monitoring staff performing duties and all 
self-help projects of the DA in its area of authority. It is also responsible for 
the organisation of village communal labour work, revenue generation, public 
educational campaign and registering deaths and births in the Unit.  
  It is unclear in policy documents as to the extent to which the current 
decentralisation framework consciously planned and deliberately structured 
for ‗good governance‘ purposes is effective in meeting the various needs of 
the locality and its citizens more efficiently. The compatibility of the new 
formal local government structures, in this case the UC with existing 
institutional arrangements and the social values of the locality in which it is 
anchored is adequately clarified. 
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Figure 2.1 The New Local Government Structure 
 
Source: Aryee (2003). 
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  The next section critically analyse the empirical literature that 
evaluates the outcomes of the functions of the UCs in Ghana to enable me 
draw deep insights into the affairs of the UC which is the main object of this 
study.  
 
  4.7 Does crafting institutional solutions to decentralisation lead to 
effective and efficient governance at the community level? 
 
 The decentralisation policy in Ghana optimistically highlights the 
potential of the sub-district structures in managing the affairs of the 
community (PNDC Law 207). Based on the institutional arrangements shown 
in Figure 3.2 the UCs are the lowest formal organisations through which the 
empowerment and participation concerns of citizens can be pursued in 
practice. The UCs as a local political institution22 acts as the interface 
between the central government and the local population. At the local level, 
the UCs provide the enabling platform that allows social actors to participate 
in decision-making and articulate their claims for the provision of public 
services from the DA through their local representatives (Aryee, 2000; 
Botchie, 2000).  
 The UC concept is required to operate in a formal and transparent 
manner to enlist the participation of community members for the socio-
economic development of their areas (Aryee, 2008; Boafo-Arthur, 2001; 
                                                          
22 It is built on the ‗principles of probity and accountability‘ of the PNDC regime with     
an emphasis on rights, transparency, representation and regulation which is parallel  
to the ideals of the ‗good governance‘ agenda (Mohan, 1996). 
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Gyimah Boadi, 1994). As stipulated in the legal framework setting up the 
decentralisation process, the UCs are non-partisan organisations at the 
‗village to promote popular local participation in local decision-making‘ 
(Article 240[2]). The assumption is that it will be effective in mobilising the 
community for development if it is de-politicised. They are also to replace 
existing village level organisations responsible for community mobilsation for 
development. This reveals the evolutionary, ‗apolitical‘ and ‗ahistorical‘ ideals 
that informed the establishment of the UCs (Mosse, 1997).  
 Various studies in Ghana focusing on the activities of UCs highlight 
their non-functional nature and their inability to contribute to the overall 
national effort towards poverty reduction (Crawford, 2008, 2004; Aryee and 
Asante, 2003; Botchie, 2000). Some of these studies specifically 
investigated the causes for the non-functional nature of the UCs. The studies 
evaluated the UCs based on the static functions prescribed for it in the 
community within the decentralisation framework (Crawford, 2008; USAID, 
2003; CDD, 2003). For example, a study conducted by Crawford (2008: 126) 
in some selected districts in Ghana discovered that only nine out of the 
twenty-two UCs were functional in the study area as at 2004, and even the 
functional UCs were dependent on a small number of activists. Crawford 
explains further that, ―the remaining thirteen though existing on paper had 
effectively ceased to function‖ (ibid: 126). Concerns also arise regarding the 
dearth of human resources and organisational competence to operationalise 
the UCs at the village level (Botchie, 2000).  
 As a response to some of these problems encountered at the sub-
district level, the NPP government in 2004 reviewed district boundaries 
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aimed at consciously creating 28 additional district assemblies out of the 
existing 110. This increased the total number of district assemblies in the 
country to 138 (Institute of Local Government, 2004). The rationale for 
creating these additional assemblies was to enhance the efficiency of the 
district assemblies by reducing their spatial size so that the assemblies 
would be more proximate to their constituents. Proximity in the 
decentralisation literature is supposed to make governments vulnerable to 
citizen pressures, and makes it easier for citizens to become more informed 
and hence more demanding of good services (Tendler, 1997).  
 In reforming the decentralisation framework in Ghana there is a 
renewed emphasis on achieving efficiency by instrumentally creating more 
new local government units. Reforming the spatial dimensions of the DAs 
was aimed at an optimal use of the DA common fund for efficient and 
effective delivery of public services. Such an approach reflects much 
endeavor on the part of the government towards efficiency than to poverty 
reduction and equity concerns. However, critics question the efficiency and 
equity rationale for the creation of the new districts and sub-district arguing 
that it was rather informed by populist demands of the PNDC activitist 
(Aryee, 2000; Ahwoi, 2000).  
  Rational explanations for the participation (non participation) of 
community members in the affairs of the UC are also found in the reasons 
cited for the non functional nature of the UC (Crawford, 2008, 2004; Aryee 
and Amponsah, 2003; Aryee and Asante, 2003: 70). Crawford cites the 
‗unmet expectations regarding payment of sitting allowance‘ and the 
‗sacrificial‘ or voluntary nature of the community representative‘s role‘ as 
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some of the main reasons for the non functional nature of the UCs in Ghana 
(Crawford, 2008).  
 Though the rational factors listed may account for the non-functional 
nature of the UC, inadequate consideration is attached to the realities of the 
context of decentralisation at the community level; the social processes, 
relationships, human values and structures shaping decentralisation (Franks 
and Cleaver, 2007). Difficulties in getting community individuals involved in 
public processes of the UC are acknowledged in policy narratives but only 
focusing on incentives sidesteps other social and cultural factors that shapes 
participation and non-participation in the collective activities. Similarly, the 
complex and wider motivations for individual participation in the affairs of the 
UCs are not given adequate attention.  
 Exploring the literature on decentralisation in Ghana reveals that, 
studies that explicitly focus on the sub-district structures are lacking23 The 
few that were found pay little attention to the depth of social practices and 
processes that shape the UC. Such partial explanations for the non-
functional nature of the UC are based on mechanistic notions that assume a 
―material rationality and relegates many important issues to the realm of 
values and norms‖ (Shepherd, 1998: 63). This is not to say that the 
functional explanations for the inactive nature of the UCs based on 
instrumentalities and economic rationality are not important but we have to 
complement it with an analysis of the ‗social‘ to understand more completely 
                                                          
23 Crawford (2004) acknowledges that there is inadequate research into the activities  
of the highly localised examples of representative democracy epitomised in the unit 
committees. 
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the reasons for the inadequacies of the UCs in undertaking their prescribe 
full governance roles and responsibilities within the community.  
 A detailed analysis of the socio-political context will illuminate how 
social relationships, existing socially embedded institutions, ongoing politics 
and power shape the UCs, especially in the performance of their functions 
within the village. It is at the everyday level within the locality that the UC as 
an institution is subjected to diverse interpretations, adaptations, 
contestations and struggles by different social actors revealing the 
complexity of the process of decentralisation in rural life.  
 The next section provides a contextual background of Ntonaboma, 
the study area, before moving on to answer the analytical questions guiding 
the study. This is aimed at immersing the reader in Ntonaboma to provide a 
deeper understanding of how particularity of history and place enmeshes 
with local government reforms to shape the processes of social 
transformation which is the focus of the next three chapters.  
 
4.8 Overview of the study  
 This section briefly provides a description of the Kwahu North 
District24 before presenting a detailed profile of Ntonaboma, the study village. 
The Kwahu North district is about 100km from the Eastern Regional capital. 
The district resembling a peninsular is cut off from the rest of the country due 
                                                          
24 The district was called Afram Plains by Legislative Instrument 1415 but had the  
name changed to Kwahu-North district in 2007 by Legislative Instrument. 
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to limited physical access. It is a remote rural district with high levels of 
poverty. 
 As the Map on page 143 shows, the Kwahu North District is located in 
the northern most part of the Eastern Region of Ghana. The spatial size of 
the district is about 5,040 sq km making it the largest district in the Eastern 
Region in terms of landmass (Afram Plains District Assembly, 2001). The 
district is isolated from the rest of the Region by Lake Volta to the south and 
east, and the Obosum River to the north. The district can be accessed from 
the mainland of Eastern region by three main entry points all of which involve 
a ferry service.  
 Scarp- lands are a major geologic feature affecting the climate of the 
Afram Plains. Climatically the district lies within the wet guinea savannah 
zone which is characterized by double maxima rainfall in June and October. 
The rainfall pattern which is unreliable is characterised by a main rainy 
season April through the middle of July then a minor rainy season in August 
through October followed by a long dry hot season from November to March 
  According to the 2000 Population and Housing census, The Afram 
Plains District has a population of 143,950 (Ghana, Statistical Service, 
2000).The population is scattered in 544 villages spread over the 5040 sq 
km land area (Afram Plains District Assembly, 2001). The district has a low 
population density of 19 persons per square kilometer with a growth rate of 
3.6% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2001). The sex ratio for the district is 114.9 
indicating a higher proportion of men than women in the area deviating from 
the nation and regional patterns (Afram Plain District Assembly, 2001).  
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  The Kwahu North district has three urban towns namely; 
Donkorkrom, Tease and Ekye Amanfrom. The Area Councils (AC) in the 
district are Donkorkrom, Forifori, Amankwaa, Ntonaboma, Ekye-Amanfrom, 
Mem-Chemfre, Nyakuikope, Tease and Samanhyia. In all there are forty 
nine (49) and one hundred and ninety (190) electoral areas and unit 
committees respectively in the district. The majority of the inhabitants in the 
district are settler farmers from the Volta and Northern regions of Ghana who 
have moved southwards to the district due to desertification in the northern 
areas of the country that lies in the savanna vegetation zone (Deshler and 
Edmonds, 2004). These groups include the Asante, Krobo, Ewe, Effutu and 
Ningo, and people from the north of Ghana such as the Dagomba, 
Konkomba, Dagaba and Fulani (ibid).  
The main indigenous tribes are the Akan speaking group 
predominantly found in the western part of the district.  The ewes constitute 
the second largest group in the district. The nature of their fishing occupation 
places them mostly along the banks of the Volta Lake. People from the 
northern part of the country constitute the third major ethnic group in the 
district. They are found in most of the farming villages due to the nature of 
their occupation either as sharecroppers or tenant farmers. The Fulani tribe 
is into livestock rearing and mostly migrates from the northern part of Ghana 
and other neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali. However, 
the settler farmers appear to be in the majority and they dominate both the 
farming and fishing industry in the district (GDHS; 2005; King, 1988). 
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The main pull factor attracting immigrants to Afram Plains is the 
availability of land for both farming and grazing of livestock. Therefore 
access and ownership rights to resources differ among the various ethnic 
groups inhabiting the plains. The diverse ethnic groups each following their 
own sociocultural practices often disrupt and undermine the practices of 
other ethnic groups. Contestation and struggles occur as a result of the 
indigenous population‘s insistence on having their customary arrangements 
to shape resource and community management arrangements. Two key 
issues informed the struggles and contestation that occur between the 
indigenous and settler25 populations. First, the confusion about the status of 
settlers, and second, conflict between settlers and paramount chiefs in 
relation to security and tenure of resource ownership and use (King, 1988).  
  The district has transient population that could be attributed to the 
high settler population and the migration of natives to urban areas (GDHS, 
2005). Young school leavers and immigrants from the North (tenant farmers) 
are usually the major source of labour but the majority of them leave the 
plains after accumulating some funds. This phenomenon has resulted in an 
ageing farming population reflected in the population dynamics of the district 
(ibid).  
 The major crops cultivated are maize (corn), beans, rice and yams. 
Some of these crops especially yam and maize are grown in commercial 
quantities and serve as a major market attraction to traders from the national 
                                                          
25
 Two categories of persons reside in the villages - those considered indigenous to the area     
and those considered settlers. The indigenes are regarded as natives of the villages and the 
settlers are migrants from different parts of Ghana. 
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capital. However, there exist large tracts of teak plantations in the district. 
Apart from farming, fishing activity is the emerging occupation mostly 
undertaken by the Ewes.  
  The study site, Ntonaboma, is about 30km from the district capital, 
Donkorkrom. Ntonaboma was created as a resettlement town26 in 1968 due 
to the construction of the Volta Lake27. The name Ntonaboma means ‗ato 
abomaa‟ literally meaning we have met the plateau. Since the majority of the 
villages affected by the construction of the Volta Lake had populations of 
less than 100 inhabitants, the resettlement scheme was consciously 
designed in such a way that villages were regrouped into larger population 
units in order to facilitate efficient and effective provision of social and 
physical infrastructure and services (King, 1988).  
  In Ntonaboma four such villages namely Supom, Akroso, Yamuoso 
and Agyaade were put together to constitute the resettlement town. The 
population in Ntonaboma as at 2000 was 2819 distributed as follows; 
Akroso, 1325; Supom, 812; Yamuoso, 363 and Agyaade, 319 (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2001). Current projections by the district planning office 
estimate the population to be 3548 (Afram Plains District Assembly, 2007). 
  Resettlement strategies were focused on compensation and 
reconstruction of livelihoods. Houses similar in design and content were 
constructed and given out to registered households. The resettlement policy 
                                                          
26 There are five such resettlement towns in the district namely; Forifori, Adeemmra,  
Amankwakrom,  
  
27
 The creation of the Volta lake affected an estimated population of 80, 000 people in almost  
740 villages scattered over an estimated land area of 7,770 sq Km (Tamakloe, 1994; Quartey,  
1969). 
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adopted was to provide each registered household with a ‗core house‘ 
irrespective of the household size and complexity and material assistance for 
the completion of additional three rooms (Gordon and Amatekpor, 1999; 
Tamakloe, 1994).  
  In Ntonaboma, resettlement houses were distributed as follows; two 
hundred and thirty (230) households for Akroso village, fortytwo for Supom, 
sixty three for Yamuoso and thirty three for Agyaade (VRA, n.d). However, 
the indiscriminate distribution of the one room core houses irrespective of 
the size of an individual‘s original house led to the abandonment of some of 
these houses in their original form. The perceived inequality by some 
villagers especially the people from Supom concerning the mode of 
allocating the resettlement houses and the positioning of some villages such 
as Akroso and Agyaade on upper areas of the village topography has 
resulted in some selling their houses and moving to the resettle at the banks 
of the Obosom River (VRA, n.d).  
  Unprepared land ranging between five and twelve acres was to be 
allocated to each registered household based on the nature of farming 
activity undertaken prior to the resettlement programme. However, the land 
allocated to each household was not commensurate with the existing lands 
owned prior to the resettlement scheme. Household ownership rights to both 
the plot of lands on which their houses were located and the farming lands 
were not properly worked out, documented and transferred to the re-settlers. 
According to Gordon and Amatekpor (1999) no re-settler to date had legal 
title to either their housing plot or to their agricultural land.  
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  Evidence suggests that the struggle over ownership rights of housing 
plots is minimal and mostly occurs among kin and family members due to 
the formalisation of ownership rights during the resettlement period (King, 
1988). However, there have been considerable struggles and contestation 
over agricultural land due to the neglect of existing arrangements over 
ownership and access rights to land. Conflicting claims to land ownership by 
traditional authorities have exacerbated the issue of land ownership rights 
among the four villages. Similarly, no arrangements were made for existing 
fishermen; they were expected to develop their fishing activity themselves 
(Tamakloe, 1994). 
  Generally, the family heads and traditional authorities are the 
custodians of the lands though it is common practice for migrants to pay a 
regular ―user fee‖ to the native traditional leaders (chiefs) of the land to which 
they have relocated (ibid). The settlers follow this practice of land acquisition. 
Land could be obtained through leasehold, renting or outright buying. 
Natives‘ farm on their own land mostly family owned acquired during the 
resettlement period but most of the lands are undocumented. Some settlers 
have acquired deeds to land through outright purchase or leasehold from 
chiefs or family heads though such absolute claim to land ownership is often 
contested by other families and traditional authorities.  
  The majority of migrants work as tenant farmers or share croppers 
involved in either abunu or abusa faming systems but the prevailing mode of 
farming system is the abunu. The two systems are farming arrangements 
where the land owner gives out the land to the tenant farmer for cultivation 
and provides all the inputs. The harvest is shared between three or two for 
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the abusa and abunu respectively. While food crops are cultivated in the 
Abunu System, cash crops are mostly cultivated in the Abusa System. 
However, due to the transient nature of labour, especially among the migrant 
or settler population, land is mostly rented for farming and this has perverse 
consequences for resource management because the immigrant population 
do not attach much importance to sustainably managing the land (Afram 
Plains Development Orgainistaion, 2004). The main concern of the settlers is 
to continuously cultivate these lands or graze their animals and relocate 
when resources are depleted. 
  Agriculture is the main occupation of majority of the inhabitants. 
According to Lawson (1968), about ninety percent (90%) of the population 
during the resettlement period comprised farmers with varied incomes, 
depending on the nature of the crop cultivated. However this trend in 
occupation has continued with a gradual decline in the farming population 
due to the increase in fishing and fishing related activities. The major crop 
cultivated in the Ntonaboma area is yam. Each village has settler farmers 
and labourers located along the area adjoining the Digya National park 
where most of the Ntonabaomna farm lands are found. Though the settler 
farmers have established their own hamlets they have still maintained links 
with the four villages in Ntonaboma in terms of customary norms and other 
practices that shape the ownership rights to farming lands and other 
resources.  
  In the former villages before the resettlement programmes, fishing 
was not a major occupation among the indigenes. However, relocating near 
the Obosom River motivated some people to undertake fishing as an 
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additional livelihood activity. The 2000 housing and population census 
confirmed the increase in fishing population. However, this could be 
attributed to the increase in fishing and fishing related activities such as fish 
smoking and drying in the area. Fish smoking and drying is mostly 
performed as a family business. 
  Ntonaboma is characterised by severe erosion due to the lack of a 
proper drainage system, poor water supply systems, and high incidence of 
unemployment, low income, poor road network and inadequate housing. The 
main source of water supply is groundwater usually extracted from boreholes 
and wells. Public transport to Ntonaboma from Donkorkrom, the district 
capital is on every Wednesdays.  
 When the electoral area demarcation exercise for the 
decentralisation program in Ghana was implemented in 1988, Ntonaboma 
was carved out of the Atebubu District in the Brong Ahafo region and added 
to the Eastern Region for administrative proximity, efficiency and functional 
purposes (Afrma pLains District Assembly, 2001). So administratively, 
Ntonaboma is in the Kwahu North District of the Eastern Region, but 
traditionally it belongs to the Brong Ahafo Traditional Council. Prior to the 
demarcation exercise, Ntonaboma had only one electoral area but it was 
divided into two electoral areas namely Akroso and Agyade/Yamuoso 
electoral areas each with its own DA representative. During the demarcation 
exercise Supom became part of Agyaade village because of its historical 
and traditional links dating back to the resettlement period (ibid).  
 However, Agyaade and Yamuoso villages were put together as one 
electoral area. There have been contestations between Agyaade and 
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Yamuoso villages over the location of the UC office. Invisible to the outsider, 
these struggles over official location of office is all about superiority and 
power over one another. The historical explanation is that the chief of 
Agyaade is a paramount chief because his ancestors constitute the original 
settlers of the area with ownership rights to majority of the land in 
Ntonaboma. On the other hand, Yamuoso village owe allegiance to both 
Akroso and Agyaade chiefs because they originally resettled on the Akroso 
and Agyaade lands during the construction of the Volta Lake.  The names of 
the two villages were put together to constitute the Agyaade/Yamuoso 
electoral area to avoid conflict but as will be discussed in chapter six each 
village maintains their own form of governance arrangements. However, 
local governance arrangements provide the platform for the two villages who 
are in conflict to discuss development projects of mutual interest. 
   For the purpose of local government representation, there are two 
elected district assembly members, each for Akroso and Agyaade/Yamuoso 
electoral areas respectively. Akroso village has two unit committees namely 
Ahenbrono and Sukuumu unit committees. Agyaade, Yamuoso and Supom 
villages were put together and divided into two units namely 
Agyaade/Yamuoso and JSS UC. The Junior Secondary School (JSS) UC 
comprises parts of Supom and Agyaade villages. This brings to four the 
number of UCs in Ntonaboma. The other hamlets bordering Ntonaboma 
were grouped into the Digya electoral area with their own assemblyman and 
two unit committees. 
  Traditionally, Ntonaboma is the only community within the Afram 
Plains district that has two chiefs as „Omanhene‟ belonging to the Brong 
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Ahafo Traditional Council28. One unique feature of Ntonaboma is that it is a 
resettlement town comprising four different villages each with its distinct 
culture, customs and practices in terms of community governance. The four 
villages are fused together for administrative efficiency and governance 
purposes as one local government unit. Since the village traditionally 
constitutes the base for primary organisation and community resource 
control, each village operates separately from one another and has its own 
unique traditional system of a chief and elders who attend to their customary 
and village needs.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
  This chapter discussed both colonial and post colonial attempts at 
consciously re-engineering social organisation through local government 
reforms in Ghana. The main focus of the chapter was to highlight the 
emphasis placed on the conscious crafting of local government structures 
ased on external imperatives in local government reforms to mediate the 
relations between the state and society. A historical analysis of 
decentralisation reforms in Ghana revealed that decentralisation was not a 
novelty in Ghana but has traces in colonial history. The review of local 
government reforms revealed the continuity of the ‗top-down‘ approach to 
development that reinforces the power of the central state.  
                                                          
28
 The Traditional Council is an assembly of Chiefs with the status of a Paramount chief. The  
paramount chiefs have the highest ranking within their traditional councils. Each region in  
Ghana has this council which is hierarchical in nature from the national, through to the  
regional to the district. These traditional councils exist alongside the democratic system.  
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  The chapter highlighted the shifts in the policy orientation of local 
government from approaches that place the emphases on the active role of 
the state towards policies that enhance community participation, 
representation, transparency and accountability in governance. The temporal 
dynamics of local government reforms reveal the traces of instrumental use 
of traditional chiefs to make new local government arrangements functional. 
The discussions in the chapter revealed that the various local government 
reforms from the colonial period to contemporary times were introduced 
based on universal and bureaucratic principles. But such principles 
inadequately focused on the contextual specificities of the local communities 
to appreciate the relationships, norms, beliefs, values and expectations that 
have an enduring influence on the choices that people make.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INDIVIDUAL AGENCY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN 
NTONABOMA 
 
 5.1 Introduction 
   This chapter concentrates on the actual workings of new local 
government structures implemented at the village level as a result of 
decentralisation. The chapter explores the claims made about participation in 
decentralisation policy as being able to sufficiently engage in public decision-
making and negotiations to shape outcomes of interactions. My intention in 
this chapter is not to idealise individual agency29 as active, strategic and 
rational but to see it as a situated practice involving diverse individuals 
differently positioned within and interacting in a complex social world in 
which outcomes for each varies. The key argument in this chapter is that, 
community members in their public engagement with new local governance 
spaces do not act as autonomous or abstract individuals. Rather, their 
actions are shaped by social relationships and the dynamics of the context in 
which they are positioned (Cleaver, 2009; Toner, 2008). 
  Contemporary approaches to institutionalising decentralisation 
places an emphasis on citizenship rights in development so that marginal 
actors can strategically and purposively act to claim their rights and make 
their voices in part be heard by the state (Hickey and Mohan, 2004; 
Gaventa, 2002). The claim is that citizenship rights through decentralisation 
offer individuals a broader form of agency that enables them to participate in 
                                                          
29 Agency is used in this sense to connote the possibilities for individual action. 
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governance spaces as equal participants (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). 
Grounded in such notions of ‗active citizenship‘ is individual autonomy and 
consciousness of action, some sort of power where individuals are 
conceived of as capable and free enough to challenge inequitable structural 
arrangements once the right local organisations are in place (World Bank, 
2006, 2001).  
  As illustrated in chapter four, the current decentralisation policy in 
Ghana, the Local Government Act (Act 462) 1993, draws on an optimistic 
mode of agency to reflect the empowering and transformative outcomes of 
participation in new governance spaces which may not be compatible with 
existing social realities (Aryee, 2008). The Act 462 involved the creation of 
District Assemblies and sub-district structures (urban/town/area councils and 
unit committees) that provided a forum at the local level for the people to 
deliberate, legislate and execute actions necessary for development of their 
areas. The main aim of the Local Government Act 462 was ―to promote 
popular participation and ownership of the machinery of government… by 
devolving power, competence and resource/means to the district level‖ (cited 
in Map Consult 2002: 35). This is reinforced by Article 240 [2] of the 1992 
Constitution of Ghana that states that,   
―To ensure the accountability of local government authorities, people in 
particular local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be afforded the 
opportunity to participate effectively in their governance‖ Article 240[2][e]. 
 
 The Local Government Act (Act 462) 1993 assumes that, individuals‘ 
are capable of participating in the local government structures to which 
power is transferred. Inherent in this assumption is the claim that, 
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decentralisation provides the infrastructure for popular engagement and 
opening up the state apparatus to new forms of local agency (Heller et al., 
2007; Ribot, 2003; Gaventa, 2002). 
  However, the call for active citizen participation in the Local 
Government Act 642 tends to over romanticize individual participation and 
isolate human action in public management from social life. Differential 
abilities to participate and equity of outcomes for different individuals seem 
not to be a major concern (Aryee, 2008; Crawford, 2008). The subjective 
nature of much everyday action and the role of power and social relations in 
shaping outcomes of individual agency in local governance are side-stepped 
(Wong, 2008; Toner, 2008; Cleaver, 2005). My argument is that, the actions 
and choices that people make concerning participation in local government 
structures are informed by the actual social, cultural and historical 
peculiarities of context. I argue further that, decentralised structures often 
interact with local interest and patterns of authority to reinforce or enhance 
existing or differential patterns of privilege. 
   This chapter draws on post institutionalist thinking to argue that, 
positioning individuals within a social world illuminates the extent to which 
their actions are mediated and shaped by social relations and other socially 
embedded practices. Specifically, I intend to show how different individuals 
with varied resources and capacities participate in new local government 
structures, shape public decision-making processes and demand 
accountability from representatives. I argue that the factors shaping 
participation at the local level work in similar ways on different individuals 
manifesting in varied outcomes. I demonstrate in the chapter that a lot of 
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contextual factors shape the agency of the poor within their locality, and that 
exercising agency is much more complex than recognised within 
decentralisation policy and practice.  
   I draw from the work of Giddens (1984), Douglas (1987) and Cleaver 
(2007, 2004) to explore the scope for individual agency in the new spaces of 
decentralisation. Douglas (1987) notion on routine and habit in mediating 
individuals‘ choices, decision-making and modes of social relations allow me 
to understand how the poor do things‘ in their everyday lives without 
necessarily being necessarily transformatory. I will also use Cleaver‘s (2004) 
work on institutions and the ‗social embeddedness of agency‘ to illuminate 
the role of social relations, moral understandings and livelihood 
interdependencies in shaping the agency in local governance. 
   The first section of this chapter focuses on issues of representation 
to specifically find out the reality of who gets elected or appointed into new 
institutional spaces, what are their characteristics and what resources and 
opportunities they draw on to get elected or appointed. The role of history, 
routines, local norms and culture in shaping individual agency to become a 
representative in the new local governance spaces is discussed to highlight 
the differing levels of advantage for different individuals. The complex nature 
of the decision-making process in the community and the diverse 
motivations shaping action are discussed. Exercising agency to be an active 
participant in these new local government structures or exacting 
accountability is shaped by a lot of contextual factors. The last section of the 
chapter also highlights the various strategies employed by village members 
to shape final decisions and call leaders to account.  
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 5.2 Questioning individual equitable access in the Local Government  
              Act 462, 1993 
 The concept of political decentralisation strongly rests on the belief 
that the selection of representatives from local electoral jurisdictions allows 
citizens to know better their political representatives and allows elected 
officials to know better the needs and desires of their constituents. Focusing 
on the framework for decentralisation in Ghana, I demonstrate that the 
processes of incorporation espoused in the Local Government Act 642, 
1993, fail to give proper representation to the poor and the marginalised. In 
Ghana, the institutionalisation of representative forms of democracy 
stipulated by the Local Government Act 462, involved the creation of new 
governmental structures to which citizens were formally elected or 
appointed. In Ghana, democratic local elections were introduced under the 
1988 reforms, though on a non-partisan basis in which candidates stand as 
individuals. 
 Proponents of decentralisation claim that, a representative 
democratic system of local government provides a constant incentive for 
representatives to serve the voters because they can be sanctioned by the 
voters during elections if they fail to meet their expectations. Representation 
in decentralisation discourse is to make local government transparent and 
accountable (Smoke, 2003). The underlying assumption is that, democracy 
will be deepened by the extension of political representation to the local level 
through enhanced political participation by local civil society actors 
(Crawford, 2003). The Act gives equal opportunity for local actors to either 
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compete via elections or be appointed by the president in consultation with 
certain institutions to become a representative at the DA.  
  The choice of democratic representative form governance in 
Ghana‘s decentralisation programme is informed by the ideals of the new 
institutionalism that emphasise on explicit fair ‗rules of the game‘ so that new 
local leaders can emerge through competition, paving the way for such 
representatives to work in the best interest of the public. The decentralisation 
literature suggests that, political competition through elections can be an 
important driver for pro-poor change (Blair, 2000). The process enables 
voters to sanction their representatives through elections to make local 
government responsive and accountable to the community. 
  Although, the Act assumes equitable access for all individuals by 
making it a non-political activity, in practice it is neutral as it only provides the 
route for certain individuals up the social hierarchy into the political system. 
Also, the Act shifts responsibility from the state to the individual to draw on 
the existing legislation as equal citizens to become a community 
representative. For example, it is the state that is supposed to provide 
contestants to the DA with the platform to launch their electoral campaign. 
Apart from this, the Act does not give an idea as to the resources on which 
people should draw to access these representative spaces. Yet, in practice 
the process of gaining access to institutions is shaped by a range of social, 
economic and legal mechanisms (Berry, 1997).  
 My argument is that, it is not only legal frameworks that facilitate 
individual‘s access to new local government structures. Other factors such 
as institutional power, social identity, social status, as well as material 
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resources, customary authority, knowledge and the ability to use institutional 
mechanisms all shape the process of gaining access to institutions 
(Benjaminsen and Lund 2002; Berry 1989). The structural factors that shape 
differential participation in new local government structures are not 
considered by the Act. Rather, the Act assumes a homogenous community 
in which individuals can pursue their self-interests and equally participate in 
local government structures. The Act 642 does not the socio-economic and 
cultural heterogeneity of different individuals with different identities within 
the community. In the section that follow, I  will use data from Ntonaboma to 
show how social institutions, habits, routines and ‗right way of doing things‘ 
mediate individual choices, and decision making to access new  local 
government structures. 
  
 5.2.1 Who gets elected or appointed as representative? 
  This section discusses how access to new decentralised institutions 
at the local level was acquired. The decentralisation literature claims that 
political competition through elections can be an important driver for pro-poor 
change and good governance (World Bank, 1997). In practice participation in 
representative local government structures normally occurs through voting in 
elections, standing as a candidate, taking part in election campaigns whether 
partisan or non-partisan, contacting or trying to influence government 
authorities such as attending official meeting with representatives (Crook 
and Sverrisson 2001). However, participating in any of the above activities 
such as getting elected or being appointed as a formal village representative 
was observed to be more than an individual rational and strategic act as the 
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mainstream literature on decentralisation suggests. Becoming a village 
formal representative was rather a dynamic process in which structural 
factors shaped outcomes differently for different people. My main argument 
is that, it is also naive to assume that introducing elections will transform the 
relationship between citizens and government, or empower the mass poor to 
participate in local government structures.  
  By providing the profile of some past and present elected and 
appointed DA and UC representatives, I intend to analyse the actors 
involved and the strategies and resources employed to become either DA or 
UC representative.  The analysis will demonstrates that in reality an actor‘s 
ability to become a formal representative on the DA or UC is shaped more 
by the various sorts of allocative and authoritative resources that the 
individual is able to deploy than on claims to citizenship rights. The argument 
is that simply establishing appropriate mechanisms for access to enhance 
social equity is problematic as it may fail to benefit the poor. 
 Specifically, I will place emphasis on the structuring of relations to 
argue that the differential ability of actors to draw on resources existing in 
social relations reproduces inequalities in access to local government 
structures. The characteristics of these representatives are highlighted below 
to illustrate the role of patronage relations in shaping access to local 
government structures. Yet, in the democratic decentralisation literature 
patronage is seen as contradictory to more democratic forms of political 
representation (Kelsall, 2008).  
  Evidence from Ntonaboma suggests that traditional leaders 
consciously looked out for people with a particular orientation, people with 
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whom they can easily cooperate, senior members of the village and 
professionals such as teachers to get onto these new institutional spaces, 
thus limiting the access of the poor to the UC and DA spaces. The selection 
process to the DA institutional arrangements at the village level favours 
people with the resources such as education, wealth and social networks 
needed for political activity. The examples of the various reprersentatives 
such as Nana Akuamoah Boateng, Amankrado30 and the current DA 
member for Akroso village; Mr. Apraku Nkansah, the cousin of the Agyaade 
village chief and the current DA member for Agyaade/Yamuoso village; Mr 
Gyansah-Ado, a subchief of Agyaade and a former DA member for 
Agyaade/Yamuoso village illustrate my argument that representative local 
government institutions at the local level may not necessarily be democratic. 
Extending the analysis to the UC, Nana Osei-Afram is a local chief but 
serves as the UC chairman for Supom/Yamuso electoral area. Also, Mr. 
Nketaia a retired educationist is a member of the Akroso traditional council 
while at the same time chairman of the Akroso village town committee.  
 
 Nana Akuamoah Boateng, 57, Male, Sub-chief and Assembly Representative, 
Akroso (three terms, 1998 to present) 
 The current DA member for Akroso is a local chief popularly known as ‗Amankrado‘ 
who acts in the absence of the substantive chief who is a lawyer and lives in Accra. 
He has been an assemblyman for the past eleven years from 1998 to the present. 
He succeeded Raymond Suelo in the 1998 local level elections. Amankrado works 
with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and is stationed in 
Donkorkrom, the district capital. His location at the district capital enables him to 
follow up on community issues. He is a post secondary school graduate and has 
worked with the NCCE since its inception in 1992. Among Nana‘s roles in 
                                                          
30 The Amankrado acts in the absence of the village chief and in Akroso village where the  
current village chief, who is a lawyer, is based in Accra the national capital, the Mankrado 
wields a lot of power in day-to-day village interactions.  
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Ntonaboma as a local chief are to settle disputes and perform customary functions 
in the absence of the chief. Together with some family heads he also lets land to 
settler farmers or ‗outsiders‘ who need land to farm. He receives all customary tolls 
on behalf of the local chief. Nana lives in one of the purposely built houses in the 
village which is distinct from other re-settlement houses. He has his own toilet and 
does not use the community toilet provided by the district Assembly reinforcing his 
status in the village. He has four children who are all located outside the village. His 
first child has completed university and works with a financial institution in Accra. 
Nana has paid his NHS contribution and receives a regular income from the state. 
He also receives extra income from his land rent and farm produce. 
 
   As a traditional leader who acts in the absence of the paramount 
chief of Akroso village, Nana Akuamoah Boateng is very visible in the 
collective spaces within Akroso area of Ntonaboma. Nana Amankrado also 
serves on the UC, the tractor committee, the VRA resettlement fund 
committee and the School Management Committee. He is also the leader of 
the associational group that recently benefited from the Cashew Project 
piloted in Ntonaboma in 2008.  
   Outside Ntonaboma especially in Donkorkrom, Nana Amankrado 
represents the ‗face‘ of Akroso village in the District Capital. He boasts of 
supporting members from his community such as securing bail for those 
arrested by the police, getting placements for Junior Secondary School 
(JSS) graduates form Ntonaboma at the District Secondary School in 
Ntonaboma and getting jobs for others. According to him nothing happens in 
Akroso without his knowledge. He is able to control events due to the social 
resources at his disposal. It is through these actions in the community that 
his dominant position in the village is reproduced. Nana Akuamoah Boateng 
thinks he is the best person to represent the village of Akroso at the 
assembly.  
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   The other Assembly member for the Agyaade/Yamuoso electoral 
area is Mr. Apreko Nkansah. He is a native of Agyaade village and a first 
cousin to the current paramount chief of Agyaade village. He has been a 
head teacher for more than seven years but is currently pursuing a post 
graduate degree by distance education. This he claims will enable him to 
become a director in the education hierarchy before going on retirement. His 
cousin, the Agyaade village chief asked him to stand for election as the DA 
representative for the Agyaade/Yamuoso electoral area. This example 
illustrates how kin networks facilitate access to new institutionalised spaces.  
  
 Mr. Apreko Nkansah, 47, Male, Assembly Representative, Agyaade/Yamuoso 
(first term, 2006 to present) 
 Mr. Apraku Nkansah is 47 years old, married with two children and the current head 
teacher of the local Ntonaboma District Assembly JSS. His place at the district 
assembly is influenced by both his position as a head teacher and relations to the 
local chief. Apart from his teaching job he has a two acre farm for cultivating yam 
which he sells to get additional income for the family. He employs labourers on his 
farm during the main farming season. His wife operates a small supermarket in the 
town.  He also keeps some animals. He is the Lay President of the Methodist 
church. His wife attends the same church and is the treasurer of the ‗Christ Little 
Band‘, a women‘s‘ group in the Methodist church. He is a member of the Tractor 
Committee, Area Council and the Funeral Committee. He serves as the secretary to 
the Area Council. As a head teacher he is also a member of the School 
Management Committee and belongs to the Parent Teacher Association (PTA). He 
is also a member of the UC and the AC. He cooperates with village members to find 
solutions to problems that affect them.  His work as an assembly man and a head 
teacher requires him to keep good relationships with village members. 
 
   At the Unit Committee (UC) level, Mr. John Nketia, a retired 
educationist is an example of village representatives who accessed the new 
institutional spaces based on the close network with the village traditional 
leadership. His example also offers insights into how village members draw 
on human capacities, availability of time and age to become village 
representative. The same can be said of other representatives who were 
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mostly retired teachers and bureaucratic civil servant who had returned from 
the city after retirement. The example of Mr. Nketia the current village 
committee chairman for Akroso exemplifies the extent to which access to 
new institutional spaces favours those who are elderly, literate, deemed to 
have experienced a successful life in bureaucratic office, and respected 
within the community. 
 
 John Nketia, 72, Male, Current UC Chairperson, Sukuumu UC (2002 to 
present) 
 Mr Nketia had retired as the Eastern Regional Manager of the Presbyterian 
Education Unit since 2001. He attended Ntonaboma primary school and continued 
at St. Peters Secondary School. Upon completion he continued at the University of 
Ghana where he graduated in Philosophy and Classics. He started teaching at 
Pope John‘s Secondary School in Koforidua Easter region in 1961. In 1988 he went 
back to the University of Cape Coast to pursue a master‘s degree in education. He 
relocated with his wife to Ntonaboma and has since then lived there farming on a 
parcel of land he owned by the family.  As the head of his Aduana family he decided 
to come home to enable him deal with family matters. All his eight children are 
working and did not join him to Ntonaboma. He lives with the wife in a renovated 
resettlement house which belonged to his mother. An eleven year old girl lives with 
them to support with family chores. During the UC elections for 2006 the village 
leaders approached him and requested him to stand as a UC member. He got 
elected as a UC member though there was no election as the number of candidates 
fell below the required number necessitating an election. During the maiden 
meeting of the UC members he was recommended to become the chairman of the 
UC. His nomination was informed by the fact that he had worked as a Regional 
Manger of an education unit and was the highest ranked person in terms of 
education, age and work experience among the members present during the 
inaugural meeting of the UC. 
 
   Mr. Nketiah‘s example suggests that village individuals 
preferentially opt for a certain degree of ‗resourcefulness‘ and 
‗knowledgeability‘ on the part of potential village representatives to the DA. 
Further, interviews with community members revealed the preference for 
resourceful village representatives who would ensure that their village was 
not overlooked in the development process at the District Assembly. 
Participants at the GD with the Akroso Traditional Council re-echoed some 
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of these sentiments saying that it was better having a knowledgeable 
individual to represent the community. They used the role of Nana 
Akuamoah in following up on the external affairs of Akroso village at the DA 
as an example. This suggested a bias towards people who are wealthier, 
better educated and politically more powerful. It also reinforces Agrawal and 
Gupta (2005) argument that institutionalisng local government structures in 
communities that are highly stratified along the lines of power, income, 
wealth, and social status obscures the internal differences within the village, 
thereby further marginalising certain disadvantaged individuals. 
   Not only do village traditional leaders and members look out for 
resourceful individuals but they do want representatives who are literate and 
have some form of basic knowledge about the way government works so 
that they can manoeuvre to bring home some development projects from the 
state. Instances were cited of a DA representative to the district assembly 
who was changed during the following elections because he failed to bring 
any development project to the community during their term of office. Some 
of these former representatives were alleged to be mute during DA meetings 
and never brought any development to the down (interview with Fredrick 
Asante, 26/3/2007). Representation was given a meaning to reflect an 
individual who can bring something in the form of development projects to 
the community from the district assembly.  
 ‗DA members should have the skills to lobby, negotiate with higher authorities and 
be presentable to the ‗outside world‘ (GD with the Akroso Traditional Council on 
Monday, 26/03/2007).  
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   As indicated above, the section process of village representatives 
placed much attention on individual characteristics where preference was 
given to people who had the time and capacity to solve and follow up on 
diverse and spontaneous village problems. People who do not have to 
secure permission from someone before being able to do things outside the 
village on behalf of the village are those that are preferred by the village 
leaders as epitomized in the interview below; 
 ‗if you have a wage labourer, a tenant farmer or a share cropper who is 
always going for ‗by-day‘  how do you get him to go for assembly meetings 
and leave his farm work? The village representative or leader job requires 
someone who is on his/her own and will not later become a burden for the 
village. Since it is a voluntary work we need people who can sacrifice their 
time and even possibly afford to do things on their own for the village such as 
paying for minor expenses especially the UC members before approaching 
the village for re-imbursement.‘ (Interview with Nana Akuamoah Boateng, 
Mankrado of Akroso on 05/02/2007). 
 
   Evidence from Ntonaboma suggests that the inequitable patterning 
of relations shaped negatively the ability of some village members to 
become representatives to the DA. For example, almost all the former and 
present elected DA representatives in Ntonaboma and the key individuals 
within the UCs had link to the village traditional leadership suggesting the 
socially negotiated nature of access to local government structures. This 
example also highlights how traditional rulers who are barred from active 
politics consciously recruited certain individuals who represented their 
interest to populate the new spaces of the DA structures. The UCs and DA 
as new local governance structures specifically created at the local level to 
enhance equitable access were filled with community elders, notables and 
people with strong links to formal institutions of power. 
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   Similarly, political resources from the perspective of the political 
regime at the national level facilitated the ‗room-for-manoeuvre‘ for some 
individuals to draw on social relations to become formal village 
representatives at the district assembly. The example of Mr. E. Y. Mensah 
reveals how close affinity to a political party and local centres of power 
facilitated access to formal spaces. He is the polling station chairman and a 
founding member of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which is also the ruling 
government. He has voluntarily supported the activities of the party in the 
constituency. According to him, the appointment as a DA member 
epitomises his contribution to the party and the development of the area. His 
position as the chairman of the AC was little recognised by other AC 
members such as Nana Akuamoah Boateng who question the procedure for 
his election as AC chairman. According to them the meeting that voted for 
his election was not properly constituted. The meeting that elected him as a 
chairman for the Ntonaboma AC involved only l members who were inclined 
towards the ruling party (NPP). They accused the DCE of not informing other 
members when the meeting was convened. 
   Apart from the political position he is also the vice chairperson of the 
district farmers association. He is very active in village activities and serves 
on the village tractor committee and the health committee. He recently rebuilt 
his resettlement house and has also bought two other houses from two 
families from Supom who were relocating to settle near the Obosom River. 
He has given one of the houses to the community to accommodate the 
National Service personnel posted to Ntonaboma. The example of Mr. E.Y. 
Mensah illustrates how access to material and non-material resources 
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interlinked to facilitate an individual‘s access to institutions. Significantly 
related to this was his links to other authority figures outside the village such 
as the DCE. 
 E. Y. Mensah, Male, Appointed AssemblyMember and Area Council Chairman 
  Mr. Mensah is 71 years old and hails from Kwame Danso in the Brong Ahafo 
Region. He is a trained psychiatrist nurse and states that he undertook a 
professional course in Ethiopia in 1973. Upon his return he was posted to the 
Mental Hospital in Ankaful in the central region. He was later transferred to the 
Koforidua General Hospital in 1986 where he met Madam Cristiana Mensah who 
hails from Supom in Ntonaboma. He has 4 children from the current marriage. He 
was the first medical assistant to wotk in the community.While working in Koforidua 
he acquired a 10 acre land in Ntonaboma where he started a yam farm. He used 
about 6 acres of the land to develop a teak plantation. Upon retirement he came 
together with his wife to settle in Ntonaboma to continue his farming activities. He 
then started a cattle ranch near his teak plantation. He stated that his farming 
activities have made him to remain in Ntonaboma although he visits his hometown 
in the Brong Ahafo region every year. He is also an elder at the local Pentecost 
church. He operates the only chemical shop and the only corn mill in Ntonaboma. 
He employs labourers on his farm and a herder for his cattle He has received the 
best district farmer award twice in 1998 and 2003 and the best eastern regional 
farmer award in 2003.  
    
   During the first term of the NPP administration in 2001, the DCE for 
the Afram Plains district was a native of Ntonaboma which led to the 
selection of more people from Ntonaboma such as E.Y. Mensah and Madam 
Acheampong as government appointees to the DA. Though the current 
appointed assembly members, E. Y. Mensah and Beatrice Acheampong 
were not forthcoming in stating their political allegiance, their narratives 
imbued with praises for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government of 
President John Agyekum-Kufuor gave a clue to their political orientation. 
Getting an assembly person with closer ties and links to the ruling 
government through the DCE and the district assembly enables the 
representatives to manoeuvre and negotiate their way in the arenas of power 
to get more development projects for the village. The example of Mr. E. Y. 
Mensah who has used his links to the DCE and the political party in 
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government to get the clinic in Ntonaboma renovated in 2004 almost after 7 
years of disrepair. During interactions he talks of the number of visits to the 
DCE in order to get the clinic renovated.  
 
Mr. Raymond Suele (52), Male, Former Assembly Representative, Akroso, 
1994-1998  
 Raymond was the district assembly members for Akroso electoral area from 1994 
to 1998. He is married with six children, deals in building materials but has recently 
turned to fishing as a main occupation. Raymond hails from Bator in the Volta 
Region of Ghana but was born in Mankyere village. Raymond has basic education 
and was a former activist of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) that 
governed Ghana from 1981 to 1992. He characterises himself as neither poor nor 
rich yet he owns a small canoe fitted with motor that operates on the Volta Lake to 
catch fish. His wife sells the fish to other market women. He owns more than 20 
cattle and other animals which he sells for off farm income. 
 
    
   Raymond is not actively involved in the activities of Akroso village 
due to the problems he had with the traditional leadership in Akroso village. 
He mentions that he had disagreement with the Akroso village chiefs 
because they accused him of using his position as a DA member to settle 
land cases, a function he was not customarily entitled to do. However, he 
explained that people brought the cases to him as a government 
representative and not otherwise. He migrated to set up his own village near 
the banks of the Volta Lake but was accused by the Akroso village chiefs of 
not attending to the development needs of Akroso. He accuses the village 
leadership of discrimination just because he was not an indigene. He did not 
contest the 1998 district assembly elections but is still a UC member.  
   The example of Anane Gyansah-Ado also illustrates the role of the 
political context in giving certain people the room to manouvre to get onto 
new institutions. He was very active during the early days of the PNDC and 
was a member of the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). 
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He has also travelled extensively within the district and mentions his close 
links with the former president Rawlings anytime he visited Afram-Plains 
district. His ties with the district assembly and locus of power made him the 
obvious choice as a village representative to the district assembly during the 
early years of the decentralisation system. He decided not to contest during 
the 2002 district assembly elections partially due to his age and because 
other village members had shown interest in becoming village representative 
to the DA. 
Anane Gyansah-Ado, 72, Male, Assembly Representative, (two terms, 1998 -
2006) 
 Anane Gyansah is a retired teacher who was the DA member for Agyaade/Yamuso 
from 1988 to 2006. He is a native and a sub chief at the Agyaade Traditional 
Council. He worked as a pupil teacher in the basic schools in and around the 
villages in Ntonaboma till he came on pension. He is married with seven children, 
all of whom live outside Ntonaboma and pays him occasional visit. Two of his 
grandchildren live with him. His wife aged about 63 years recently suffered a stroke 
and was recovering. He states that he is poor and depends on only his inadequate 
pension salary and whatever comes from his farm. He has also offered part of his 
land to some settler farmers‘ for rent, while others do share cropping on other lands 
that he owns. He also inherited one of the resettlement houses from his uncle which 
he has rented out to other settler families to earn more income. 
  
 
   The examples of Raymond Suele and Gyansah-Ado support the 
earlier argument that access to powerful external political actors facilitated 
access to new local government structures. Their examples also hint of how 
both village elders and members reflexively looked out for individuals with 
political ties with current governments in the selection process of village 
representatives to the district assembly.  
   Mr. Stephen Addai‘s example illustrates how certain individuals who 
are not natives but resident in the village draw on the personal 
characteristics to access the UC space to become a village representative. 
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Corporeal human conduct evidenced through active participation in 
communal activities and mobility to undertake errands for Nana Akuamoah 
Boateng facilitated Stephen Addai‘s ability to become a UC member. He did 
not rely only on his embodiment but also he had to draw on his close 
association and expression of respect for the Amankrado.  
Stephen Addai, 41, Male, Current UC member (2006 – present) 
Has finished form four of the old Middle school and did not continue to secondary 
school. He attributes his inability to further his education to the early death of his 
parents. He worked as a pupil teacher in Donkorkrom but was transferred to 
Ntonabomah in 2003 to help with the primary school. Nana Akuamoah Boateng 
assisted him to secure a parcel of land from a community member to start a cashew 
farm in 2004. He was invited to be on the UC by Nana Akuamoah Boateng. He 
agreed to be a member of the UC so was added to the Sukuumu UC as an elected 
member. He actively participates in communal labour and help with other village 
activities anytime he is called upon by Mr. Nketiah or Nana Akuamoah Boateng. He 
thinks that his hardworking nature and always being available anytime he is called 
upon to support with communal activities explains why he was asked to join UC. He 
is also a member of the charcoal task force and a trained fire volunteer. 
  
   The accounts of Osmani Fulani for Sukuumu UC and Michael 
Amponsah, for Ahenbrono UC, illustrate how good social relations with 
village traditional elites served as a resource to get onto new institutional 
spaces as appointed members of the Ahenbrono UC. In Ntonaboma is was 
found out that people who maintained good and stable relationship with 
power brokers in the community served as a  link to domains of power. This 
brings into question the extent to which power relations and participation 
transformed as a result of the introduction of new local government 
structures within the community. The is not to suggest that the poor lack or 
have no kin networks but they engage within such networks on adverse 
terms which limit the possibility for them to use such networks to their 
advantage (Mosse, 2007; Hickey and Bracking, 2005).   
  On the other hand, Micheal Amponsah, 37, by village classification 
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can be said to be poor31 as he does not own land, is not married and live 
together with his father in their resettlement house. He worked as a tailor in 
Kumasi for about five years before returning to Ntonaboma. During the 
period of my study he did not have formal employment and was mostly found 
in the Calypso bar consuming local alcoholic beverage. Village members 
mentioned that they will not have voted for him in any competitive election 
because he is always drunk. However, Mr. Nketia stated that he was put on 
the UC because he is ―a valuable asset to the UC based on his willingness 
to deliver a message at all times without complaining‖.  
   Rosinah Akuamoah also served on the JSS UC for the Yamuoso 
and Supom Villages. She was the women‘s leader in Yamuoso and had 
been co-opted into the UC to help mobilise the activities of the women. She 
was very active and visible in the collective activities of the village especially 
organising the women and mediating in their day-to-day misunderstanding. 
Rosinah Akuamoah, 43, Female, UC member 
 Rosinah Akuamoah is 43 years old with two children. She is married to Francis a 
teacher at the local primary school at Bridgeano. She was born in Ntonabomah but 
left at the age of 13 to live with an uncle who worked as a fire officer in Kumasi in 
the Ashanti Region. Upon passing out as a hairdresser she worked briefly in 
Kumasi before she decided to relocate to Ntonaboma. Back in Ntonaboma she met 
Francis, a teacher, who she married.  Currently she owns the Calipso Bar and sells 
local liquor and gin. She also sells imported used clothing normally referred to as 
„ofos‟ on market days. She is also a member of a group of women who send 
tomatoes, yam and cassava dough to the Digya area in exchange for fish which is 
used for their daily household consumption. She is an elder at Christ Apostolic 
church and a member of the choir group, and serves on the church council. She 
explained that if you respect others and behave well in the community, other 
community members will also respect you. She is very vocal among the women and 
                                                          
31 In this study, no formal assessment was carried out of the subjects‘ income status,  
or of their relative poverty, and in this sense the status of a poor person remains  
opaque. 
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is responsible for mobilising the women of Yamuoso village for communal work. 
She also intervenes and solves petty squabbles or conflict among the women. 
 
   An explanation of the diverse social networks of particular individuals 
offers valuable insights into how their social positioning and relationships 
shape an individual‘s ability to become a village representative. The ability of 
people to develop and draw on an extensive and diverse social network puts 
them in an enabling position to become a village representative. The 
examples illustrate how network and social relationships shape differently 
people‘s ability to access the institutional spaces of representation.  
Beatrice Acheampong, 52, Teacher, Appointed DA member and Elected UC           
Member. 
 Madam Beatrice Acheampong was born in 1953 and has seven children, 3 girls and 
four boys. She is divorced but has a current partner. She completed Ntonaboma 
primary and middle school in 1964 before pursuing her teacher training education at 
Wesley College Kumasi. Her teacher training education was made possible through 
an uncle who supported her. She stared her teaching career at Mpasatia in the 
Ashanti Region where she taught for nine years before being transferred to Kwahu 
Tafo. Currently she teaches at the local Catholic Primary School in Ntonaboma. The 
husband was the former head teacher of the Catholic Junior Secondary School in 
Notonaboma but has become a Catechist for the local Catholic Church on 
retirement.  She is an elected UC member and a government appointed assembly 
woman. She is the chairperson of the Christian Mothers Association of the Catholic 
Church in the town and their representative to the Diocese. She is also the 
chairperson of the ‗Chrismas susu‘ group operated by the Church. Both Catholics 
and non Catholics are members of the credit scheme. As the chairperson of the 
‗susu‘ scheme she is part of the team that accesses financial request for members. 
She is very influential in this group. She is also responsible for providing meals for 
the Parish Priest any time he comes on pastoral visit to the out-station. Mrs. 
Acheampong serves as the Church Secretary and is one of the two representatives 
of the Ntonaboma Catholic Church to the Parish Council at Adeemmra. She is also 
a member of the Prayer group and plays an active role especially visiting members 
who are sick to pray for them at home. During vacations, she goes together with 
other women in the village to Donkorkrom on market days to sell yam from her 
husband‘s farm.  
 
   The example of Mrs. Acheampong the current appointed district 
assembly member for Akroso electoral area in Ntonaboma revealed that the 
dynamics and the overlapping nature of the different arenas in which she 
was embedded provided a useful and enabling resource for her to become 
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an appointed village representative to the DA. Engagement in multiple 
arenas with diverse social actors located in overlapping institutional spaces 
both formal and informal developed Mrs. Acheampong‘s individual relational 
capabilities to access the new political spaces. Her multiple networks 
enabled her to play active role in the local affairs of the community.  
   Mrs. Acheampong‘s example also draws our attention to the role 
social relations and embedded networks played in shaping her ability to act 
in accessing institutional structures. During the interview Mrs. Acheampong 
stated that the Chief and elders impressed on her to accept the nomination 
as an appointed DA member. Initially she was not interested because she 
was of the view that being a DA member will not enable her to perform other 
activities that she was already involved in. She would not have accepted the 
nomination if the chief and elders had not asked her to do so. Even with the 
support of the elite in the village she still had to seek approval from her 
current partner32 before going ahead with the decision to accept the 
appointment. Her reputation as a trusted and respectful village member and 
her work in the church and the ‗susu‘ (local micro-credit scheme run by the 
Catholic Church) project in which she was involved and her links with the 
government in power made her the obvious choice from the village as the 
district assembly wanted to recruit more women as appointed 
representatives. 
   During the interviews she stated that, her decision to accept the 
nomination to be appointed as a DA member was not a strategic decision 
                                                          
32  In this instance I have used partner because the current spouse had not performed the     
necessary customary marriage rite so was not regarded as the legitimate husband. 
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but shaped by obligations to the community and its members. The social 
position of the chief and elders shaped positively the decision to accept the 
appointment as a DA member. For Mrs. Acheampong the honour and 
respect to be earned from being an appointed DA member motivated her to 
accept the position. As she explains this was her contribution to the 
development of the community. She stated how during their tenure they 
have been able to get a new crèche from the district assembly for 
Ntonaboma. The social value placed on ‗doing something for the community‘ 
reflecting in her narratives as well as that of some village representatives, 
demonstrates that her motivation for getting onto these representative 
spaces in Ntonaboma were not self interest driven but underpinned by other 
sets of values which were directed more positively towards a sense of 
commitment to the ‗community‘ than towards the individual gain from the 
position.  
   Let us now draw on the characteristics of the individuals who 
became formal local government representatives in Ntonaboma to illuminate 
the structural factors that shaped individual participation in local government 
structures. As illustrated in Table 5.1, structural factors such as age, wealth, 
gender, social status and power inequalities were essentially dynamic and 
shaped the agency of individuals to access the DA and UC spaces to 
become representatives. The analysis revealed that an individual‘s ability to 
become an elected DA or UC representative was dependent on age. This 
was evident in the fact that majority of the representatives, almost 72% were 
above the age of 35 years. The study also identified only two appointed 
village representatives who were below thirty years of age. The inadequate 
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representation of the youth on the local government structures in Ntonaboma 
could be attributed to the existing cultural norms of respect for elders, the 
right for elders to lead and poor social networks and relations of patronage of 
the youth beyond the village. The example of Mr. John Nketia shows how 
high status professionals retuning home on retirement are seen as agents of 
development and enthusiastically accorded some role in the affairs of the 
village by village elders.    
   The analysis also revealed the extent to which financial and human 
resources shaped access to local government structures in Ntonaboma.  I 
have used financial resources to mean an individual‘s wealth and control 
over certain privileged resources in the community, cash, time and well-
being33. The study identified that, all the elected DA representatives for 
Ntonaboma owned land, belonged to the royal lineage, were formally 
employed and in context of Ntonaboma had cash. In the study, it was noted 
that poorest people were not generally village representatives. Poorest 
individuals on the UC such as Osmani Fulani and Michael Amponsah were 
drafted in to serve on the committee by Nana Akuampah Boateng and had 
little influence on decision-making, yet they used their time and labour to 
compensate for their lack of cash. The village representatives were 
wealthiest individuals within the village. Whilst poverty clearly correlated with 
access to local government structures in the village, the study did not 
undertake a detailed wealth ranking to identify the characteristics of poverty 
in the area and how this shaped access to local government spaces. 
                                                          
33 During the group discussion and interviews well-being in terms of good health was  
mentioned as the most important indicator of wealth. The argument made was that a  
healthy person is not dependent on people for mundane daily activities. 
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   All the DA members including both appointed and elected were 
literates and respected among village members. The examples of Mr. 
Apreku Nkansah, the DA representative for Agyaade Yamuoso, Nana 
Akuamoah Boateng, the DA representative for Akroso revealed how formal 
education and profession shaped access to local government structures. 
This characteristic was more evident among both the appointed and elected 
DA representatives majority of whom were employed in the formal sectors as 
teachers, nurses or administrators.  
   The study also identified poor representation of women in the local 
government structures in Ntonaboma despite government‘s effort to get 
more women onto these local governance spaces. During interviews it was 
noted that time, financial constraints, illiteracy, inexperience and deep rooted 
cultural beliefs accounted for the low representation of women on the local 
government structures in Ntonaboma. Majority of women interviewed 
mentioned time constraints as the single most important factor hampering 
their participation in local government. 
   Significant to the above factors is the variety of institutional channels 
through which DA and UC representatives access local government 
structures in Ntonaboma. In highlighting the characteristics of the elected 
and appointed DA and UC members, I revealed how they used resources 
from institutional channels such as traditional leadership, political and other 
associational spaces to become representatives. These existing institutional 
channels may limit the possibilities for certain people who lack the 
associational and institutional resources needed to conceive action or 
undertake certain strategies to become local government representatives. 
175 
 
The most obvious examples of people who utilized institutional resources to 
become DA and UC representatives were Nana Akuamoah Boateng, Mr. 
Apreku Nkansah and Mr. John Nketiah. 
   Becoming a village DA or UC member, as the examples have shown 
depended on people‘s occupational status, wealth assets, who you are and 
who are in your networks. I will now turn my attention to the complexity of the 
selection process to illuminate the accommodations, negotiations, struggles 
and deferrals taking place. I argue that individuals for a variety of reasons 
may not act in rational strategic ways as expected of them to become formal 
representatives due to cultural, social, historical and contextual factors 
shaping the possibilities for action. 
 
5.3 The complexity of the selection process 
   Decentralisation as a strategy to enhance equity of access and 
overcome social exclusion through formal institutions narrowly focus on 
visible norms and cultural practices that hinder the equitable access of 
disadvantaged individuals into these institutions. Unfortunately, less attention 
is paid by the policy makers to the processes that shape the nature of 
selection and the extent to which the practice offers scope for individual 
agency. Focusing on the actual practice of selecting formal village 
representatives to new governance spaces in Ntonaboma reveals the 
complexity of arenas in which negotiations about who becomes a village 
representative occurs. 
    
176 
 
Table 5.1 Dynamic structure/agency framework for understanding  
  differential participation in local government structures 
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During the district assembly local elections every attempt was made 
to make the selection process seem democratic by involving all village 
members even before the formal process of vetting took place. After all that 
is the intention of democratic decentralisation. When the nomination forms 
for UC and DA candidates were are made available by the electoral 
commission to the community, the village leadership is informed and 
conscious attempts are made by them to identify specific individuals within 
each village who they think are best suited to represent the villages. Since 
the national constitution debars chiefs from active politics, the chiefs 
strategically looked out for members who represent their interests to 
represent their village.  
   On the other hand, if the incumbent assembly member is conceived 
as having done a good job and needs to be allowed to continue as 
representative, every effort is made to dissuade other community members 
with known intentions of contesting to let the incumbent continue with his/her 
existing roles. An example is Nana Akuamoah Boateng who has stood 
unopposed as a DA representative for Akroso for three consecutive elections 
since 1998. No village member had attempted challenging Nana Akuamoah 
Boateng in the local level elections. This is not to suggest that other village 
members would not like to contest, but rather interviews revealed that the 
effect of exercising agency to contest him was normally unsuccessful. Hence 
village members had to either accommodate or defer their intentions to 
contest for the elections. 
   In the last district assembly elections in 2006, seven, and nine 
candidates stood for election as UC members in Akroso and 
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Agyade/Yamuoso respectively34. No competitive elections for UC members 
were held since candidates standing for election in the two electoral areas 
fell short of the legally required number of ten that formally mandated the 
elections to be held35. The last two local level elections in Agyaade/Yamuoso 
have seen competition for the position of DA members but the eventual 
winners were the preferred candidates of the local leaders. The decision to 
vote for a candidate was not influenced by the outcome of the public 
vetting36 to screen prospective candidates although policy statements 
suggest that the public vetting was to provide the platform for village 
members to critically access the candidates and rationally select the best 
among them. 
   In reality, the practice of vetting candidates publicly in each village 
was just symbolic and rarely informed the choices that village members 
made. It was always preceded by private encounters between village leaders 
and various individuals to identify the best possible candidates to represent 
them. Deducing from the narratives of village members, the public vetting 
was to introduce village members who had shown interest to become 
representatives. The decision as to who gets approval to stand for election to 
represent the community was rarely decided through the public vetting but 
                                                          
 
34
 Only three of them were women. 
 
35
 The rules guiding local level elections state that there should be more than ten people    
contesting for positions on the UC before elections can be held. The first ten people to get 
the higher number of votes become elected UC representatives.  
 
36 The non-partisan nature of the local government elections requires the provision of a  
                common platform for all contestants to the DA and UC to campaign and also respond to             
     questions from village members. This activity is officially to be undertaken by the district    
     office of the electoral commission but the role has been taken over by the local chiefs in  
     Ntonaboma. 
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was an outcome of ongoing negotiations occurring among the traditional 
chiefs and other influential members of the villages in overlapping domains. 
Interviews suggested that no village member had ever been disqualified as 
not being eligible to stand for election as a result of the public vetting.  It also 
suggests that the non-politcal nature of local level elections works and leads 
to co-operation at the local level. 
   The informal negotiation illustrates how the legal provision outlined in 
the Local Government Act 462(6[1]) has been re-interpreted to suit the right 
way of doing things within the community. So, in the selection process of 
village representatives to the DA, we see a lot of negotiation, compromise 
and deferrals occurring among diverse social actors including the traditional 
leadership of the four villages. For example, the two villages of Agyaade and 
Yamuoso are fused together as one electoral area necessitating the election 
of one representative from the two villages to the district assembly. In 
practice, the two villages have an ‗unwritten‘ pact whereby they alternate the 
selection of representatives to the district assembly. This was the case for 
the 1998 and 2002 local level elections but a compromise candidate, Mr. 
Apreku Nkansah was elected in the 2006 election to succeed the 
representative from Agyaade. This was contrary to the norm of alternating 
representatives to the assembly. However, the Yamuoso village did not 
contest the nomination of another candidate from Agyaade. This deviation 
from the routine was accepted by both villages because Apreku Nkansah‘s 
father is a native of Yamuoso and so has kin networks there. He was also 
very active in the activities of the two villages. This also illustrates how 
multiple identities of individuals and plurality of institutions provide 
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opportunities and resources for certain people to become a village UC or DA 
representative. 
   In other instances, candidates with ambitions to become DA 
representatives are convinced into deferring or accommodating their 
decisions to contest the elections. In Akroso village, Raymond Suele‘s 
decision to stand for a second term had to be deferred because the chiefs of 
Akroso did not see him as representing their interest. He had moved to 
resettle in his own village limiting his presence in Akroso village as he spent 
most of his time in his hamlet. Through the actions of the traditional 
leadership, Raymond Suele did not contest the DA elections but was 
however appointed as a UC member for Akroso village. The elders 
explained that for most people the motivation for aspiring to become a DA 
member was to facilitate the development of Ntonaboma which could be 
done through other committees such as the UC. The interplay of certain 
subjective values especially solidarity, conflict avoidance and peaceful 
coexistence facilitated the ability of traditional leadership to dissuade other 
members from exercising agency to contest. But at the end of the day these 
same people with intention to become village representative such as Eric 
Agyapong and Raymond Suele were able to negotiate to get appointed to 
the UC and other village bureaucratic committees resulting in multiple village 
leadership. This reinforces the claim that diverse institutions interact to 
shape the outcomes of agency for different individuals. However, the extent 
to which the plurality of institutional channels offer scope for people to realise 
their intentions is minimal as well as partial as reflected in the example of 
Eric Agyapong and Raymond Suele. 
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   Relating the nature of recruiting representatives to other bureaucratic 
committees in the villages revealed how the selection process to the DA and 
UC was re-interpreted to suit the routinised way of selecting members onto 
other village bureaucratic committees. Respondents indicated that 
historically there were other existing village formal organisations such as the 
defunct Village Development Committees (VDC) and the VRA Trust Fund in 
which members were appointed upon consensus from among the four 
villages to constitute such committees. Therefore, adopting a similar 
approach in constituting the UCs was just following precedence. For 
example, community members acknowledged that having more than ten 
representatives to stand for election as UC members as stipulated in the 
Local Government Act was not important, but rather in the villages more 
emphasis was placed on constituting capable individuals to do the work as 
was done for other village committees37.  
   Evidence of the membership for committees such as the tractor 
and the VRA Resettlement Trust Fund committees revealed how they were 
all dully constituted by appointment rather than election. The manner through 
which individuals were appointed to become UC members in all the villages 
reinforces the role of history in shaping the behaviour of community 
members. People‘s habits and routinised behaviour including their beliefs in 
the proper ways of doing things which were shaped by history and local 
norms may be more difficult to change than the form and content of new 
                                                          
37 There are other externally induced formal committees in the community which are not local  
elected bodies but are constituted of selected representatives.  
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institutions of governance implemented at the local level to achieve 
functional goals.  
  
 5.3.1 The role of local norms, history and routines in shaping the  
           selection Process 
 
   Evidence from Ntonaboma suggests how the formal process of 
selection and who gets selected to the UC and DA representative institutions 
were subtlety controlled by the village chiefs and other influential members.38 
This may potentially limit the effects of individual agency in shaping the 
selection process, reproducing the structural inequalities and exclusion 
already prevailing in the community. I draw on Douglas (1987) to illustrate 
how the actions of human beings are shaped by habit, culture and historical 
processes. Douglas writes that people routinely do things over time and 
space. Berry‘s (2004) notion of ‗two different forms of the past‘ offers insights 
into understanding the pervasive role of village traditional leadership in the 
activities of the UC and DA. Reference to tradition as a timeless past, a 
reservoir of how things have always done in the past and also reference to 
the past as made up of actions and transaction are often invoked to justify 
the action of traditional leadership (Berry, 2004 cited in Lund, 2008). 
   The leading role of village leaders in the selection process was very 
apparent in the study. Interviews suggested that village elders not only 
handpicked who stood as UC member but they also influenced the 
nomination process to get people they preferred to be elected 
                                                          
38
These are the wealthy in the community controlling land with external links to community 
individuals in authoritative positions and are influential in shaping the day to day governance 
of the community.  
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representatives. The example of Nana Akuamoah Boateng who stood as a 
DA and got elected supports this argument. The decision to control the 
selection process was informed by earlier contestations between DA 
members and traditional village leaders during the inception of the district 
assembly system in 1998. During the tenure of Raymond Suele, the first DA 
member for Akroso, he purposely abrogated to his office some duties 
performed by the village traditional elite such as settling cases among 
disputing village members and meddling in land disputes which according to 
the chiefs were their responsibility. The first DA member also did not involve 
the traditional leadership in the performance of his activities which resulted in 
tension between the two positions.  
 The traditional leadership‘s negative experience in their transactions 
with the first assembly member, Raymond Suele, shaped their decision to 
get people whom they could trust and coordinate village activities with 
minimal conflict. My speculation is that the power of the traditional leadership 
was challenged by Raymond Suele, acting as the DA member, hence the 
decision to consciously get people to become DA representatives. The 
action of village elders to consciously look out for people in the village with 
whom they could cooperate to become formal representatives were justified 
by moral and customary motivations. Iliffe, (2005) writing on the role of 
leaders in the affairs of their community in Sub-Saharan Africa explains that, 
women and youths were taught that older men had the right to rule because 
of their virility, wisdom and access to other-worldly power. In Africa, leaders 
are believed to ‗mediate[d] the dichotomy between nature and culture‘ (ibid: 
7). All these cultural norms reinforced the dominant positions of the 
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traditional leadership within the social hierarchy. These norms are also 
drawn on to reproduce the existing state of affairs within new interventions.  
   Reasons given by village leadership for guiding the selection 
process for DA representatives suggest they do not deliberately capture the 
process but were just customarily performing their function in the village in 
terms of getting the ‗right individuals‘ to become representatives and also to 
avoid the acrimonious outcomes of competitive elections. The latent tension 
between the natives and the settler farmers in Ntonaboma was attributed to 
political differences. The majority of the natives are Akans most of whom 
belonged to the ruling NPP. The settlers‘ are predominantly Ewes mostly 
belonging to the NDC. This difference in political affiliations has led to a 
precarious coexistence among the two groups which according to interviews 
was more visible during periods closer to national elections39. 
   For the chiefs and other local leaders, local level elections 
constituted an internal issue, the outcomes of which may affect the existing 
levels of cooperation in the village. Though the leaders agreed during the 
interviews that there were political undertones during the local level 
elections, they preferred to moderate the process and get the best for the 
four villages. Akroso village had its own Assemblyman while Agyaade and 
Yamuoso villages together had a representative, bringing the number of 
assembly members in Ntonaboma to two. Therefore, to get a preferred 
candidate for the election involved a lot of negotiations and contestations 
among the various villages which, if not well managed, could lead to 
                                                          
 39 For example during the 2000 national elections a political rally by the NPP in the  
 Ntonaboma led to serious clashes between the NDC and NPP where three youth were 
arrested and about five others also got seriously injured.  
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unintended consequences. According to Nana Asumadu, the Gyasehene of 
Agyaade village, the traditional authorities by virtue of the historical and 
lineage alliance with the area have the right and obligation to ensure 
peaceful coexistence. 
 ―… elections may lead to acrimony and conflict the community leaders in their 
preference for peaceful coexistence also think they have a role to play in the 
elections which is among members of their community who may even come from 
the same family. If we fight among ourselves to elect one resident as a community 
representative to the district assembly what happens after the election and how can 
the individual represent the whole community. (Interview with Nana Asumadu, 
Gyasehene of Aygaade on 11/02/2007). 
 
   For Platteau and Abraham (2002: 112), the principle of majority 
voting in most rural communities ‗is not deemed acceptable‘ nor desirable as 
it may lead to the unintended consequence of conflict and a potential threat 
to effective enforcement of rules and decisions within the locality. This view 
deprives community members the choice to re-interpret the policy of majority 
voting to fall in line with their way of doing things to ensure cooperation. 
These same personalised relations provided the resources for the social 
actors to consult with their leaders to shape the voting process and get 
preferred representatives for the new political spaces. We should also 
acknowledge the multiple channels through which decisions are taken and 
conflicts resolved without getting into the public domain. 
   The selection process in Ntonaboma had some resemblance with 
the routine and historical mode of getting people to represent the community 
on bureaucratic committees. As explained by Douglas (1987), precedents 
and routines shape and guide how individuals do things in their everyday 
interactions. A common feature of the village was for the chiefs to constitute 
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representatives for various committees in consultation with their elders. This 
routine permeated into the formal selection or election process of 
representatives to the district assembly and the unit committee. The method 
normally involved selecting specific individuals to undertake certain functions 
within the village without going through any popular voting mechanisms. This 
has resulted in the community not having elections for UC members. 
Membership for the UC since 1993 has always been unopposed since 
members fall short of the mandatory number required for an election to be 
held. This should not be interpreted to mean that district assembly level 
elections within the villages were not competitive but rather it explains how 
the village members responded to external interventions.  
   Village leadership stated that the normal practice in the selection and 
composition of village structures was to routinely select individuals to 
constitute village committees. This was not to disregard the formal 
mechanisms for recruitment of village representatives to the DA and UC, but 
the village leaders had re-interpreted the regulations to suit their way of 
organising in the village life so that they get ‗someone who can go to 
government to bring development projects for us because other communities 
are also competing for the same resources and the same projects from the 
district assembly‘ (Interview with Nana Asumadu, Gyasehene of Aygaade on 
10/02/2007). This reinforces Long‘s (1996: 47) assertion that, ‗local actors 
never simply adopt technologies and development projects, but, rather, they 
appropriate and transform them to solve the problems they face and to 
advance their own particular needs‘. This goes to illustrate how village actors 
respond to change by drawing on and adapting existing norms and 
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mechanisms in ways that modify or negate the intended outcomes (Barnes 
and Prior, 2009).   
   To understand the current process of selecting village 
representatives, I illustrate briefly to support my argument the historical 
processes of selecting leaders within the community.  
   The routine for selecting traditional rulers in the community involves 
a group of clan leaders who come together to search among individual clan 
members to identify someone capable of leading the community. Mostly, 
prospective individuals are nominated by clan or family heads especially 
individuals who are from the lineage of such families. A consensus mode of 
deliberation and understanding is used to select an individual from the 
various nominees to become a village customary leader. Though such a 
mechanism seems very simple, linear and rid of conflict and politics, 
evidence abounds in Ntonaboma of how the nomination and selection of the 
current paramount chief of Akroso was a contested process ridden with 
conflict. What is important is that all effort is made to avoid conflict. 
   The re-settlement history of Ntonaboma, the routine of elders getting 
things done for the village and the habit of purposively appointing village 
members to serve on the numerous village committees account for the 
leaders over reliance on putting individuals together to achieve certain 
functional ends for the community and preference for elders to lead.   
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―When we were brought to re-settle on this land by the Volta River Authority we had 
to form a lot of committees to undertake development projects and get other 
activities done for us. We put people into groups to form committees to pursue 
everything we had. We had some committees for resettlement and housing 
allocation, compensation, electrification, Village Development Committee that was 
in charge of clinic, schools, markets, toilets and community centres. Each of these 
committees reported to the chief and his elders‖ (Interview with Nana Akuamoah 
Boateng, Mankrado of Akroso on 03/02/2007). 
   The routine and norm for selecting leaders run parallel to the formal 
selection process of representatives to public institutions of the state in the 
village. The intention of village leaders during the interview process was not 
to consciously malign or prevent any individual from becoming a DA or UC 
member but was on doing what was thought to be morally good for the 
village through the selection of capable individuals. The influence of the 
village leadership results in a ‗dual process‘ of governing where the 
traditional chiefs continued to maintain their position and roles within the 
village as informal leaders but also influenced the selection and appointment 
process of DA and UC members to make sure they had their representative 
who they can work with. For example, in Akroso, a sub chief, Nana 
Akuamoah Boateng got democratically elected for three consecutive times 
as the representative to the district assembly for their electoral area.  
Bierschenk and Oliver de Sardan (2003:154) refer to such a dual approach 
for getting other influential members into the political spaces as ‗division of 
political labour‘.  
   This leads me to the discourse of ‗elite capture‘ pervasive in most 
decentralisation literature (Dasgupta, and   Beard, 2007; Mansuri, and Rao, 
2004). Interviews with the village leadership on the selection process of 
village representatives suggested that their having an assemblage of a 
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capable group of individuals to be on the UC or as a DA to represent the 
village and ‗bring development‘ was paramount. Though field evidence 
suggests the capturing of the selection process by the village traditional elite, 
further insights from their practices revealed a process of ‗benevolent 
capture‘ rather than arguments that suggest elite capture as necessarily 
pernicious. The selection process revealed that traditional elites approached 
individuals privately and negotiated with them to offer themselves for election 
or appointment as UC members. Though this may hint at favoritism and the 
selection of preferred allies, narratives of the elites suggested that they 
consciously sought competent people to stand for election to follow up on 
community development needs. During the GD with the Yamuoso Traditional 
Council, the members supported the need for the traditional leadership to be 
at the forefront of development in the village because ‗failing to get people 
who can do the job can lead to perverse consequences as things will not get 
done in the village‘ (GD, with Yamuoso Traditional Council). 
 Foyoo, 37 years, Male and a youth activists 
‗Foyoo is a JSS leaver and currently works as an electrician in the village. He is not 
married and stays with his parents. He is not involved in any farming activities. He 
repairs malfunctioning electronic gadgets for a small fee in the village. A vocation 
he thinks is a God given talent because he has no formal training in electronics. He 
is a member of the tractor and sanitation committee of Yamuoso. He thinks village 
leaders work for the good of the people. Foyoo participates in village activities but 
thinks it is the duty of traditional leadership to select good individuals who can 
manage the affairs of village for development. He cites the road to Ntonaboma 
which was formally very bad as an example of bad leadership but then with good 
leadership and the support of the chiefs the road is now good. Formally the pontoon 
was too old and often broke down and we had to walk to Bridgeano to get lorry to 
Donkorkrom. He thinks the traditional leaders must get people who can facilitate 
cooperation and have the time and ability to get development for the village. He 
thinks he is young and needs to focus on specialising in a skill for his future 
(Interview with Foyoo, 37 years and a Village Influential Youth on 24/02/2007). 
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  Foyoo‘s example tells us that, for the youth as well as other village 
members, the important thing was for decentralisation to result into material 
benefits to either the individual or the entire village. So if consenting to the 
preferred candidate of the village traditional leadership has the potential to 
bring materialistic development then they will not contest the decision of the 
elites. This suggests that individuals may have the right to stand as elected 
candidates but they may consent to the choice or preferences of elected 
leaders because the outcome favours their expectations. Therefore, if new 
political spaces bring limited or no benefits to the livelihoods of the poor they 
will make no conscious effort to undertake any sociopolitical practices to 
become representative. Their focus will rather be on the more important 
aspects of their live - their day-to-day survival - much of which is mediated 
through existing traditional leadership. Therefore, becoming a village 
representative was not as important as being in the ‗good books‘ of the 
traditional leadership or other individuals up the village hierarchy. Such 
‗process of elite dominance in the affairs of the community does not obviate 
all progressive change but they do cast doubt on the potential for dramatic 
transformation‘ (Cleaver 2004:27). 
  The role played by the village traditional leaders in the selection of 
representatives especially the DA members has resulted in the ‗self 
disciplining of individuals‘ especially the youth not to contest DA elections 
but to cooperate with the older leadership to get good representatives for the 
villages. If even this reproduced existing inequalities, disadvantaged groups 
internalised these adverse terms and ‗get by‘ with their daily livelihood 
concerns of survival. Negotiations over individual decisions to access the DA 
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spaces were strongly influenced by the traditional values of showing respect 
to elders, the right of elders to lead, the desirability of cooperation among 
village members, the ability of elected representatives and traditional 
leadership to deliver infrastructure.  
   However, it was not very clear from the interviews whether 
consenting to the preference of village elders was as a result of ‗culturally 
patterned behaviour‘, the powerful nature of the elders‘ position within the 
community or expectations from material development. Drawing insights 
from Mosse‘s (2007: 30), argument that ―perceptions, judgments and actions 
are always made within structures of choices that are already constituted 
socially‘‖ provides insights as to why the preferred candidates of the elites 
get elected without any overly contestation or conflict. Far from being ‗false 
consciousness‘, my findings revealed that the interest of the majority of 
village members such as Foyoo lay somewhere else and so had no problem 
with traditional chiefs leading the development process, which they had done 
since the resettlement period. Their agency was harnessed in finding 
alternatives to better their own life within or outside Ntonaboma. Thus, 
―people mobilise around practices and institutions that are particularly 
meaningful to them‖ rather than on those that that does not impinge upon 
their livelihoods (Bebbington et. al., 2004: 190). 
   Within the village ‗the right of leaders‘ to manage village functions 
was a decision that was rarely put under any discursive scrutiny by some 
members, yet others reflexively used this same excuse to enable them 
pursue their livelihood concerns. The narratives of Matilda Akuamoah and 
Akwasi Fosu illustrate how blurred and thin the difference between 
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conscious discursive scrutiny and non-reflexive acceptance on things that 
happen around us. While some villagers will accept the right of elders to lead 
without seeing it as a problem; others reflectively draw from it to exclude 
themselves from engaging in village activities. Not getting involved was a 
strategy to enable certain people to undertake their daily livelihood activities 
while blaming the village elders for being undemocratic.  
Matilda Akuamoah, 28, Female, Supports the role of village elders to lead 
 Matilda Mensah is divorced with one child. She is the niece of the Akroso chief and 
has completed vocational school in Agormanya in 2002.  She was employed as a 
master apprentice normally referred to as ‗work and pay‘ with a renowned 
seamstress in Koforidua before deciding to come back to Ntonaboma. She also 
trades in household items which she normally sells to her clients on credit. She 
thinks it is morally right to be participating in village activities because no outsider 
will come to develop the village. Matilda has no problem with the role of the chiefs 
and elders in the affairs of the village. She thinks that in every locality there are 
people who are responsible for the day to day activities and that was exactly the 
role been performed by the village leadership. 
  
 ‘Akwasi Fosu, 38, Male non-participant in local government structures 
 Akwasi Fosu is a pupil teacher at the local primary school. He is a native of 
Agyaade and is married with four kids. He participates in village activities such as 
communal labour and other collective activities. He will not contest elections 
because the chiefs have their own pekmmmmmmmmmmmmghople they prefer. He 
thinks challenging such individuals will lead to so many problems.  He accuses the 
traditional leadership of putting ‗unfit‘ individuals as UC members. He claims the 
village leadership has their own favourites with whom they work.  He cited the 
example of how the Amankrado, Nana Akuamoah Boateng has simultaneously 
taken over the position of Assembly member and all the customary responsibilities 
in Akroso village. Akwasi Fosu thinks that to get appointed or elected in Akroso 
village as a DA or UC member depends of the influence of the Amankrado. He 
claims the DA and UC members are not efficient. He cites the example of UC 
members employing individuals to burn trees for charcoal in contravention of village 
bye-laws, yet nothing was being done to stop them.  
 
  
   The majority of village members who did not put the pervasive role of 
leaders in village activities under any scrutiny were not so passive to accept 
whoever the elders preferred but interviews suggested that there existed 
some scope for negotiating or even possibly contesting the preference of 
village elders. For example, Opananin Afriyie (48 years and a local leader) in 
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an earlier discussion mentioned that, he challenged the nomination of 
Obofour (UC member for Akroso Village) as a UC representative. However, 
he stated that he did not do this openly but had to meet Nana Akuamoah 
Boateng privately to discuss the issue with him. Other village members also 
indicated in their account how they have made known their preferences for 
village representative to the village leadership. This evidence suggests that 
village members had some ‗room to maneuver‘ by using existing channels to 
negotiate with the elders on the individuals they preferred as DA or UC 
members. The elders also informally sought the opinions of village members 
on the representative they preferred to be on the UCs (Dairy notes). 
However, focusing on the process of these interventions made by village 
members to get the traditional leadership to change their preferred 
representative reveals that, it was done in a more subtle way so as not to 
imply contesting the choice of village leadership. It is also important to point 
out that the outcomes of these interventions made by some village members 
did not make any difference to the choices already made by the traditional 
leadership. 
 
 5.4 Effects of exercising agency to access new institutional spaces 
   In this section, I argue that despite the nominal formal legal rules 
stipulating equitable access to representative institutions at the local level, 
evidence from Ntonaboma suggests that progress made towards equitable 
election and appointment of marginal local actors to the multiple institutional 
spaces at both the district and village level was patchy. The regulatory 
arrangements for selection or election onto the DA or UC, espouse equity 
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whereby individuals are conceived of as autonomous and equally positioned 
to exercise agency to become village representative. My argument is that the 
effects of getting elected vary for different individuals despite the recognition 
of individuals in policy as capable of exercising agency to change the 
existing state of affairs.  
   Understanding individual agency as shaped by social relations and 
framed by the peculiarities of context within which social actors act, 
negotiate and struggle reveal it‘s enabling and constraining effects on them. 
Using evidence from Ntonaboma, I argue that the selection process for 
representatives reproduce the existing hierarchical social order pertaining in 
Ntonaboma and resulted in varied outcomes for the agency of different 
individuals. For individual agency to be transformative, the choices made 
should reflect real changes in outcomes. Yet, only a few village members 
were identified in the four villages as having contested the choice and 
imposition of candidates by traditional leadership. However, the outcomes of 
the selection process for individuals who reflexively contested local level 
elections varied and were at times insignificant. I draw on the example of Big 
Sam to support my argument. 
   There have been other instances where attempts by certain 
individuals to get nominated were unsuccessful. It was difficult getting 
respondents within the four villages who had competed in district assembly 
elections and lost since 1993. For example, Nana Akuamoah Boateng had 
stood for three consecutive terms as unopposed and the pact between 
Agyaade and Yamuoso also makes competition negligible. Based on thses 
occurances people such as Mr. Suele and Eric Agyapong had to defer their 
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decision to contest local government elections. Mr. Eric Agyapong‘s decision 
to become a DA member was deferred upon the advice of the village 
leadership of Yamuoso. I interviewed Mr. Eric Agyapong in which he 
narrated reasons for the persuasion by of the village leadership. However, 
he was of the view that he could have won the elections if he was allowed to 
compete. 
 ―The elders told me of their intention to let Mr. Apraku Nkansah the new head 
teacher to stand as the assemblyman for the Agyaade/Yamuoso electoral area. I 
was therefore tasked to rescind my intentions and support Mr.Apraku Nkansah. 
Although the chiefs acknowledged that I was capable of doing the DA work they 
were of the view that Mr. Apreku Nkansah was more capable. A meeting was 
convened for the two of us and we discussed the decision for me to stand down 
thoroughly although some of the leadership present supported me but further 
discussions led to consensus on teacher Apraku‘s nomination‖ (Interview with Eric 
Agyapong, 18/05/07). 
 
   When we conceive of agency as not episodic but a continuous social 
action in much of our everyday social life then it is reasonable to understand 
Eric Agyepong‘s decision to accept the advice of the Yamuoso village 
leadership not to contest the elections. Eric Agyepong‘s acceptance of the 
leaders‘ decision and the subsequent deferral of his intentions to stand for 
election explain the fact that he will neither want to be seen as being over 
ambitious in his desire to become an elected representative nor go against 
the decision of the village elders that be used against him in future 
transactions. 
   I also located Sammy, popularly referred to as Big Sam, who lost in 
his bid to become an assembly member for Agyaade/Yamuoso electoral 
area. Big Sam‘s decision to contest the elections was to exercise strategic or 
reflexive agency to ‗get out‘ and challenge the elders in positions of power 
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within the village, yet he had to negotiate and pursue his intention within both 
power relations and structural constraints. This demonstrates how even 
within the bounds of structural and cultural constraints individuals can 
exercise agency but the extent to which this reflexive action can lead to 
transformative outcomes is very important.  
 Sammy‘s decision to break bounds with the Village chief and contest the 
elections illustrate how individuals can exercise agency to overcome the 
constraints of ‗habitus‘ (Bourdieu, 1977). Similarly, Long (2001) suggests 
that individuals are hardly ever fully enrolled in the project of others and that 
individuals can choose different levels of enrolment in the project of others.  
 
 Sammy; 35, Unsuccessful District Assembly Contestant for 
Agyaade/Yamuoso 
 Sammy popularly called ‗Big Sam‘ is a native of the Agyaade and had completed 
basic education at Ntonaboma Catholic Primary. He is not married but has a 12 
year old son who lives in Koforidua. He migrated to Koforidua to trade but things 
became very difficult for him so had to return to the village in 2001 to seek financial 
for assistance from his father. However, the difficulty in getting support from his 
father has continuously kept him in the village for the past five years. This has led to 
some quarrel between him and his father which ended up in a serious 
misunderstanding. At the moment he burns charcoal for sale during market days 
and is thinking of saving some funds to go back to Koforidua. He is currently a 
member of the tractor committee of the village and plays an active role in the affairs 
of the youth in the town. He saw the district assembly elections in 2006 as a 
platform to become the DA member. He decided to contest as an assembly 
member for Agyaade/Yamuoso electoral area. Subsequently, he informed his 
immediate family members who then asked him to inform the Agyaade Chief of his 
intentions. The chief told him that another candidate had already informed him of 
his decision to stand for election as the assembly representative. The chief 
suggested that he abandoned his decision since the other candidate who was a 
teacher was in a good stead to help the community with development projects as he 
belonged to and was well known in the ruling party. Sammy was advised that he 
could support the village in other ways. Irrespective of the chiefs advice he still went 
ahead with his decision to stand for election since the youth in the town urged him 
on despite the objection of his father and the elders in the town. He lost the election 
to the candidate who had the backing of the chief, and the DCE. According to him, 
while the other candidate had enough resources to print more posters and 
campaign for support he derived his support from the youth in the town.  
 
197 
 
   Sammy did contest the election to become an elected village 
representative but the effects of his actions and choices made were not 
substantially beneficial to him. Sammy‘s ambition to become a village 
representative was very clear in his narratives, yet inadequate resources and 
opportunities cut short his ambition to challenge the role of the chiefs in 
recruiting candidates for the UC and DA. This supports Lister‘s (2004) 
argument that ‗ambition is not always absent‘ but the resources on which to 
draw to translate this ambition into reality weaken the effects of individual 
strategic agency (Lister 2004: 146).  
   Having the formal rights to contest the elections had little 
significance in shaping the outcomes of the elections for Sammy. He had to 
enact the ‗right‘ and support this ‗right‘ to contest the election with social 
relations by informing people who were important within the village 
hierarchy. This demonstrates how power relations and existing institutions 
may shape the range of possible actions for individuals in their choice to 
become village representatives. The decision to stand for the elections was 
based on the support he had from the youth which may be characterised as 
his social resources but he lacked adequate financial resources to contest 
the elections.   
   Seeking informal endorsement from traditional leadership and from 
other relations in which an individual was embedded may constrain the 
agency of specific individuals in assessing the DA and or UC spaces. So, 
access to new spaces is negotiated through ‗sanctioned social 
arrangements‘ that may end up reproducing existing inequalities. For 
example, village members mentioned that if they decided to stand for 
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election, they had to inform certain opinion leaders in the village who will 
then have to support their bid before they can even go ahead to make their 
intentions known to the general community. This process connotes the ‗right 
procedure‘ when an individual purposively decides to exercise his or her 
right to become a village representative. Deviating from this ‗right way of 
knocking‘40 by contesting a representative position in the village means 
going contrary to laid down norms or being disrespectful to village elders.  
   Sammy‘s decision to contest the election was first made in 
consultation with other individuals illuminating the relational nature of 
agency. Accessing these spaces was more than just getting a nomination 
form from the Electoral Commission (EC). It involved interactions that were 
more complex than simply stated in the Act. The requirement of getting 
nominations from ten village members involves engaging a variety of actors 
in multiple processes. Individuals have to negotiate their intentions to stand 
for elections to become representatives with village leaders or elites who 
must give their consent. Family members and friends need to support such a 
personal intention.  
   Sammy stated that he had to inform the Agyaade and Yamuoso 
chiefs of his intentions to contest the DA elections without putting it into 
much conscious scrutiny. He drew on the analogy of politicians routinely 
seeking the endorsement of certain influential traditional rulers any time they 
decided to contest for elections as shaping his decision to first inform the two 
chiefs. Continuously securing the initial consent of people located up the 
                                                          
40  Knocking rites is the local norm for making intentions to acquire a position or something  
  known to others.  
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village hierarchy, in Sammy‘s example from the Agyaade and Yamuoso 
chiefs, reinforces the reproduction of the existing structures of inequality.  
    Sammy‘s example also illustrates the problem of separating agency 
in political spaces from other domains of social life. Though the right to 
contest the elections had been introduced externally by the state through 
legal provisions, it had to be renegotiated within the locality through multiple 
actors and diverse spaces each with its own logics. Engberg-Pedersen and 
Webster (2002) explain that unequal progress in transforming representation 
to benefit the poor within the locality is due to the neglect of the 
―pervasiveness of local politics‖ in which social interaction is excluded from 
the sphere of politics. They argue that the two are inextricably linked in which 
―local politics encompasses many spheres‖ (ibid: 21). Sammy intended to 
access the new political spaces as a citizen yet he had to re-negotiate within 
existing social norms based on his identity as a native of Yamuoso. 
   Exploring Sammy‘s motivation for contesting the elections to become 
a village representative to the DA revealed that his decision was shaped by 
mixed motivation. Sammy explains that he wanted to be a DA member to 
enable him to represent Agyaade/Yamuoso, work for the village to bring 
more development and pursue other intentions whiles at the district 
assembly. Pushed further to highlight some of the intentions that he would 
have pursued at the district assembly, Sammy stated that he will be able to 
probably pursue his dream of becoming a building contractor when he gets 
closer to both the locus of decision-making and the corridors of influential 
people in the district. Sammy‘s intentions of becoming a village 
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representative illustrate the complexity of motivations that shapes particular 
actions. 
   The youth in Agyaade and Yamouso did not vote for Sammy in the 
elections because they perceived him as a bully and ‗unfit‘ to be a formal 
village representative. This highlights the importance of social reputation in 
shaping access to institutions. Sammy‘s ongoing misunderstanding with his 
father and his disregard for internal village rules such as his continuous 
burning of dry wood for charcoal with some other village youth which was a 
bye-law41 in Ntonaboma did not make him ideal for an assembly man. 
Though Big Sam‘s was perceived as not been ideal to be an external 
representative of the village due to his disregard for village rules, the local 
government structural arrangements made it possible for the local leaders to 
channel him into the decision making arena of the village. As Sammy‘s 
example illustrates, negotiating access through existing village elders should 
not be seen as only constraining, but also facilitated the bids of certain 
village members such as Apreku-Nkansah of Yamuoso village to become 
formal village DA representatives. Thus, while social structure may be 
constraining for some people, it was enabling for others within the same 
context. 
 
 5.4.1 The undesirable nature of public disagreement  
   Local government structures are supposed to facilitate the exercise 
of ‗voice‘ by the poor and the hearing of those voices by those in authority. 
                                                          
41
 Bye laws are formal rules within the community but emanating from the district assembly. 
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However, social relations and the specificity of context make such actions 
problematic on the part of the poor. The key question in this section is that, if 
voice constitutes ‗the variety of ways in which people express beliefs, 
articulate preferences and advance their interests‘, then, how do social 
relations and structural conditions shape the agency of individuals in getting 
their voices heard during public decision making (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005: 
29). Data from my study revealed the undesirable nature of contesting 
village public decisions which end up reproducing the dominant voices of 
traditional leadership and other village elites. 
   The reliance on representatives to deliberate and make final 
decisions before submitting it to the whole village was problematic. This was 
because some village members were reluctant to voice or make any 
alteration to decisions submitted by the formal leadership for discussion. 
Most suggestions made to village decisions were to approve of what the 
representatives had already decided with minimal changes here and there. 
During the field work it was observed that outcomes of public meetings of the 
villages were more of ‗rubber stamping‘ the decisions made by the ‗town 
committee‟ (Diary Notes, 05/02/2006). This made all village meetings more 
of a ‗symbolic‘ arena where no conscious effort was made to put already 
made decisions into conscious scrutiny. Village members rarely spoke 
during village meetings. Members were informed of the final decision made 
to which further clarifications were sought. Village members made no 
conscious effort to publicly contest or challenge final decisions in order not to 
undermine existing relations of cooperation. Just attending village decision-
making meetings was not synonymous with exercising agency to bargain or 
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negotiate final decisions where such decisions were already determined in 
the committee spaces of the town committee. 
   I will draw on the sitting arrangements observed during all village 
meetings to illustrate how tradition may be reinvented to reproduce existing 
power relations. During village meetings I observed that the front seats were 
still vacant and that all women who were present occupied seats at the rear. 
My initial speculation was that either the women were shy to sit in the front or 
will want to leave early before the completion of the meeting. I was proved 
wrong when later an informant mentioned that by the custom of the village 
women were not supposed to take a seat in the front row which was 
reserved for the male members of the village. According the informant 
though no woman had attempted occupying a front seat, she will see such 
an attempt by any women as contrary to the tradition of the village. A woman 
occupying any of the reserved front seats will be categorised as a „playman‟, 
meaning someone who lacks moral value and manners and, has associated 
with foreign culture that lacks respect for the elders.  
   Sitting separately in public was not only during village meetings but 
also during funerals and other village gatherings where men sat separately 
from women (Diary notes 08/04/2007 during the Ntonaboma Easter 
Harvest). However, during committee meetings such sitting arrangements 
were not observed but women showed the desire to sit nearer to their 
women colleagues. When asked why they have not challenged such a sitting 
arrangement some women during the GD with the women, they explained 
that sitting separately in public does not change the status quo within the 
village because ―within our homes we do not sit separately‟‖ As another 
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woman stated ―changing the way we sit in public will not lead to anything‖. 
This suggests that women have internalised the traditional way of sitting in 
public which is taken for granted though it shapes the possibilities for 
exercising agency to dialogically negotiate final decision-making. During all 
village meetings I observed that women sitting separately among themselves 
were not very attentive to the issues being discussed (Diary notes). This 
always made the DA member who chaired these meetings to prompt the 
women to be attentive and listen when an important issue that concerned the 
women was being discussed. 
   However, other village members interviewed mentioned that they will 
not contest decisions in public because they believed that it was undesirable 
to challenge elders in public. Moreover, they were able to draw on other 
existing channels to negotiate final decisions in the village. For example, the 
decision to collect a five hundred cedi toll during market day was not 
challenged by women during the public village decision making meeting but 
they refused to pay during the market day. The women told the toll collectors 
to first collect the toll from the merchants who had come from other areas 
while they pay their toll later after the day‘s market activities.  
 
 ‗We told the toll collectors that we are now selling our foodstuffs and yet to collect 
money from our customers. So we ask them to go and come later after the market 
day. After all we are all in the village and will not be going anywhere‘ (Interview with 
Mrs. Mary Addae Konadu, 15/04/2007). 
 
   Drawing on their positive social relationship with the toll collectors as 
a resource, some women could strategically negotiate the timing of the 
payment of the tolls with the collectors. However, the same village women 
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after the market day refused to pay the toll and rather insisted that the toll 
should be paid by the merchants who had come to the market. Their 
decision not to pay was based on what pertained in other neighbouring 
market villages in the district. The argument of the women was that as 
residents of the village, who pay village dues, maintain the market and pay 
development levy they should be exempted from paying the market toll. The 
decision by the women not to collectively pay the market toll made the Area 
Council (AC) to rescind its final decision. The outcome was that outside 
merchants and trucks were levied to pay tolls during the market days in 
Ntonaboma.  
   The decision by the women not to pay the market toll was made 
informally among the women after the AC had communicated their decision 
to them. The irony is that the market women who mentioned that they had 
difficulty in voicing their concerns in the public presence of the AC members 
and the traditional leadership were the same women who were vocal in 
challenging the toll collectors at the market. Openly dissenting or contesting 
decisions in the presence of village leadership by insisting not to pay the 
market levy meant being labelled as disrespectful which may not be 
compatible with the shared ways of engaging the traditional village 
leadership in public. The transcripts of an interview with one of the market 
women reinforces my argument 
  
 ‗I am a respectful person and always do not challenge the elders in public or say 
something contrary to what they say in public. My husband will not be happy… The 
fact that we kept quiet at the meeting does not mean we had to pay the toll…We 
know how to do our things as women in this village...you see men do not want to be 
challenged in public. They do not like that ... when elders finish speaking we do not 
speak again but there are ways to get them change their decisions. They also 
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slept42 over their decision and so may be willing to change decisions…so we 
allowed them to have their way during the public village meeting... for those who 
came to collect the money we always encountered them during market days and 
knew how to deal with them. It wasn‘t difficult at all (Transcripts of Interview with 
Mrs. Mary Addae Konadu 16/04/07). 
 
 
   Publicly telling the AC, DA and the UC members in the presence of 
the traditional village leadership that they will not pay the market levy may be 
re-interpreted to mean that they were disrespectful. However, it was not 
difficult telling the toll collectors that they will not pay. The reason given was 
that the toll collectors were just ordinary village members with no authority 
though they had to show them some respect but not to the extent to which 
they could not purposively object to their demands especially once it was in 
the market and women were in the majority. This example highlights the fluid 
nature of agency where some individuals are able to exercise agency within 
the back stages that are hidden and distant from the gaze of legitimate 
authority. Other women stated how they were insolent to the toll collectors 
making the toll collectors avoid them any time they came to collect market 
levy. Upperman (2000) explains that for women to exercise their right 
required ‗determination, influence and strength‘ though such qualities were 
exhibited outside the gaze of public authorities (ibid: 372). Upperman 
explains further that other forms of agency may be anti-social such as the 
conscious acts deployed by some of the market women at the market to 
achieve their intended outcome of not paying the market levy. 
   The above example also shows how the decision making process 
was shaped by moral concerns of respect and also by the nature of the 
                                                          
42
 The is a local proverb that the pillow gives more thought because people whiles sleeping  
 thought about certain issues that will make them change their mind on certain decisions. 
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power relations between the multiple actors involved in the decision making 
process in the village. The AC, DA and UC members are elders of the village 
and have informal personal networks with the market women through 
kinship, family and livelihood. Since Ntonaboma is predominantly a farming 
village, almost all members of the village were involved in some form of 
interdependent activity during their daily interaction. The market women did 
not want to be seen as disrespectful to authority and as such did not put the 
decision to levy them to any discursive scrutiny during the public decision 
making process. However, they reflexively contested it during the actual 
collection process which to them was more insulated from the gaze of village 
leaders. As the women mentioned, they knew that the elders will certainly 
invite them to state their case concerning their decision not to pay the levy 
since that was the pattern for resolving disagreement on village issues. 
Hence, there was no need to publicly challenge such decisions. In these 
socially embedded spaces they can better state their case and achieve 
outcomes that were more favourable to them than negotiating with the 
village leaders in public. Muting and not contesting the final decision during 
the public decision-making process was not to suggest that these women 
lacked agency within these public spaces but they preferred to consciously 
use other informal spaces to shape such final decisions. 
   Considering their subjective values and reflexivity in negotiating the 
final decision on the payment of the market levy these women realised that 
they do not undertake their day-to-day interactions in two distinct spaces. 
The interdependent nature of social life suggests that exercising agency to 
radically negotiate the decisions of village elders was not undertaken in 
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isolation from other spaces where they had to engage village leadership in a 
more subordinate position divorced from their active citizenship status. As 
one respondent said ―…we know how to do our things as women in this 
village‖, meaning they will reflexively not contest the final decisions in public 
which was undesirable and could damage the social relationships in which 
they were embedded. They preferred to maintain their existing networks and 
relationships which may end up reproducing the substance of the existing 
decision-making arena.  
   Evidence from my study also suggests that the ability to negotiate 
the dialogical process of public decision-making varied for different 
individuals depending on the context as well as the individual‘s personal 
characteristics and life history. As shown in the example of the market 
women, some village individuals were able to negotiate final decisions in 
village public spaces while others preferred to draw on social relations to 
shape the decision making process. Interestingly, some individuals who did 
not contribute to public decisions but went to these meetings to listen to 
deliberations mentioned that their inability to speak or continuous muteness 
during such meetings was due to their ―sense of fear on how people will 
perceive their contribution or not being capable of saying something of value 
to shape final decisions‖. The anticipated reaction from other members of the 
village of their contributions as making sense shaped their ability to speak in 
public spaces to negotiate decision outcomes.  
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Adwoah Serwaa, 27 year old lady 
 ―There are moments in village meetings that something tells me to speak on what 
was being discussed but I always think of how to present it or say it in public. I 
wonder whether what I say will make sense. When people start laughing after 
someone had finished contributing during village meetings it makes you feel that the 
individual has not made any meaningful contribution to the discussion. If it happens 
that people laugh at me after my contribution, I may get offended and insult 
somebody that will also lead to futher troubles or problems for me in this town. They 
already want me as they say I do not respect but I am careful these days. At times I 
also feel shy for those who speak when all the people present stare at them when 
they are speaking... not all the eyes that look at you in this village are good. Some 
are witches and I do not want them to look at me so I will not even speak‖ 
(Interview with Adwoah Serwaa on the 21/05/2007). 
 
   The anxiety of being ridiculed or rubbished by other peers on the 
basis of one‘s contribution during public meetings shaped negatively 
individuals ability to negotiate final decisions. Varying shades of that sense 
of self competency abounds in the narratives of interviewees which seek to 
suggest that certain members of the village kept mute during public 
decisions just because they felt other village members ‗perceived them as 
having nothing reasonable to contribute or say during these meetings‘. As 
Gaventa (2002) explains how people perceived themselves have 
consequences on their ability to shape decision-making processes. I will use 
the example of Ms. Adwoah Serwaa, a 27 year old lady with two kids and 
divorced to support my argument that contrary to the idea in institutional 
theories that individuals can purposively bargain and negotiate final 
decisions, she consciously muted herself during public decision-making due 
to the ‗sense of fear and negative perception about herself.  
 
 5.5 Rethinking agency and accountability in new political spaces 
   Proponent s of decentralisation place greater emphasis on the fact 
that when government is closer to people, it is easier for citizens to know 
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what is happening, to have input into decision-making and management, and 
to hold representatives accountable for their actions (World Bank, 2004). 
The previous sections considered the issue of participation in representative 
local government structures. This section explores the extent to which the 
participation of citizens in local government structures exposed local 
representatives to a more continuous form of scrutiny.  
   The literature on decentralisation and local government suggests 
that, democratic decentralisation requires for its success a civil society 
capable of holding the state agencies that have gained devolved powers 
downwardly accountable. Decentralisation reforms place emphasis on 
individual actors to purposely hold local level representatives accountable 
(Ribot, 2002a). Implicit in this assumption is a ‗specific variety of power‘ 
located in the capacity of autonomous individuals to engage someone in 
representative position to justify his or her behaviour and the capacity to 
impose sanctions on representatives for poor performance (Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2005). 
   My intention in this section is to illustrate how social relations and 
interdependent nature of livelihood shapes individuals ability to demand 
accountability at the community level. My main task in this section is to 
explore the scope and effects of exercising agency at the individual level to 
demand accountability from representatives especially the DA members. I 
limit my discussion to vertical accountability mechanisms in local governance 
focusing primarily on accountability relationships among the DA and UC 
representatives and village members to illuminate the variations in agency. 
Focusing on social relation and relations of interdependence, I will use data 
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from Ntonaboma to illuminate the scope for agency on the part of poor 
village members to consciously demand accountability from elected or 
appointed village leaders of both the UC and the DA as local government 
mechanisms . 
 
 5.5.1 Who demands accountability at the local level? 
   My fieldwork data shows that village members routinely relied on 
village traditional leadership and other influential members within the village 
to demand accountability on their behalf. The process of demanding 
accountability from village representatives was mediated through existing 
authority structures that were conceived as capable and legitimate to do so. 
By law the UCs are to demand accountability formally from the DA on behalf 
of village members, yet in practice the UC members fail to exercise this 
power as mandated in the decentralisation Act. They leave this function to 
other existing village structures to demand accountability on their behalf. The 
UC members mentioned that they left this function to the village traditional 
hierarchy due to the social positioning of the latter in the village which 
legitimises them to demand accountability from elected or appointed leaders 
on behalf of the village members. As the UC chairman said 
 
 ‗The chief and his elders have their own way of demanding accountability from 
village members or representatives. When the chief asks individuals to account for 
their stewardship they comply and rarely get offended but when other people even 
through the appropriate authorities ask representatives to render account they feel 
otherwise. So to demand accountability you have to go through a respected person 
in the village who is also respected by the person involved‘ (Interview with Opayin 
Addae, 20/05/2007).  
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   The interview highlights the cautious manner in which village 
members approached the accountability process in order not to incur the 
displeasure of the representatives involved. The process may even end at 
the chief‘s palace without linking it to the formal institutions in which 
individuals can be named and shamed which may not be desirable. The 
perception that no action will be taken against the representatives who 
misappropriated funds did not motivate local actors to consciously exercise 
agency to demand accountability from local representatives. The belief 
among some village actors was that demanding accountability from 
representatives was not desirable. According to these individuals, 
representatives are accountable to a higher moral authority, a process of 
accountability beyond the bounds imposed by formal rules. So if, even they 
do not exercise agency to demand accountability from them, they are 
answerable to a higher authority that can even let some misfortune happen 
to them as a form of punishment for embezzling collective village funds. This 
resonates with Douglas‘ (1987: 74) explanation that cooperation abounds in 
the community since ―the transactions balance out because when the 
accounts are audited and the debts are collected by the way that God or 
nature furnishes defaulters with disease and death‖. 
   The belief of a supernatural authority demanding accountability on 
behalf of individuals shapes the actors‘ intentions to hold leaders to 
accounts.  Village members by reflexively not demanding accountability from 
representatives may be motivated by the belief in a higher moral authority to 
act on behalf of individuals in sanctioning offenders. Though respondents will 
not state categorically that misfortunes happened to individuals because of 
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embezzling village funds they were of the view that such a retribution can 
occur as a result of some acts on the part of the individual that might not only 
be related to misappropriating village funds .  
   Similarly interviews with DA and UC members in Ntonaboma 
illustrate how they are obliged to consult and answer to the village chief on 
all their activities and inform them of both village and DA decisions.  
  
―We are all answerable to the chief who is the custodian of the land. Even aside 
from my current position as an Assembly Member I am a subject of the chief. 
Before I even became an assembly member there have been instances where the 
chief had summoned other village leaders to his palace to respond to some issues 
concerning village funds. Also I depend on the goodwill of the local chief to get 
village members to provide communal labour for DA and other donor projects. The 
chief even sanctions individuals who fail to attend village works so I have to be 
truthful to him and let him know whatever is going on. Finally, the ‗gong gong‘ used 
for mobilising village members for village meeting and collective work is also 
collected from the chief‘s palace and he has to give me his permission before a 
gong-gong can be beaten in the village. so I am accountable to him both as a 
community individual and through my position as an Assembly member‖ (Interview 
with Mr. Apraku Nkansah, Agyaade/Yamuoso DA member, 14/03/07). 
 
   The above interview with Mr. Nkansah, the DA member for 
Agyaade/Yamouso illuminates the position and authority of the local chief in 
demanding accountability on behalf of his citizens. However the 
decentralisation or local government Act fails to recognise such a function of 
the traditional leadership in village life. Rather, the authority to monitor 
representatives of the DA and bring them into account is vested in the UCs 
which is unworkable in the day to day practice at the village level. My 
observation during the field work shows that most village members channel 
all their complaints to the village chief and his elders and prefer the chief to 
intervene on their behalf on village issues and even sometimes on individual 
social problems.  
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   Similarly, empirical evidence from Ntonaboma also suggested that 
assembly members preferentially opted to be vertically accountable upwards 
to the District Assembly rather than to their local constituents. During the GD 
with the assembly members some members suggested that most often it is 
the DA that provided them with funds to undertake projects in the villages on 
behalf of their constituents. According to the DA members they are made to 
sign for whatever funds and materials they collect from the District Finance 
Office (DFO) and the store supervisor respectively. Since the DA holds them 
responsible for the utilisation of all funds and materials collected they owe it 
as a duty to meet all the financial reporting requirements of the DA than to 
be responsive to village members. This point is well illustrated by Mr. 
Nkanasah, assembly member for Agyaade/Yamuoso. He stated that, as the 
DA member in charge of the maintenance of the Ntonaboma clinic, he had 
the obligation to formally account to the community members on all funds 
and resources used for the project. Though the local government Act 642 
states that, the DA member shall provide adequate information about their 
district assembly development projects to their community members. His 
dilemma was that the source of funds and materials for the project was from 
the DA rather than the community. His priority was to render accounts to the 
district assembly who can sanction him if he misappropriates the funds or 
any of the materials for the project than to village members. He noted that he 
periodically informed village members about the stage of the project 
including the funds and materials that he received from the DA but this falls 
short of accountability as espoused in the rhetoric of good governance. Why 
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then do village members fail to individually exercise agency to demand 
accountability from representatives? 
  
 5.5.2 Fear of the consequences for demanding accountability 
    The fear of the negative social outcomes on relationships and 
livelihoods for demanding accountability from local leaders renders such an 
activity untenable to the individual members of the village. To avoid conflict 
situations among kin networks and family members, individuals will 
consciously not exercise agency to demand accountability from local 
representatives. I will use the statements of Opanyin Addae from Agyaade 
village to demonstrate that the anticipated reaction of acting individually to 
demand accountability from local leaders shapes negatively their ability to 
demand accountability.   
 ‗By not stating your claim very well, demanding accountability from village leaders 
may mean accusing them of embezzlement. Asking someone to render accounts is 
very good but it may be re-interpreted to mean individual embezzlement or putting a 
charge on the representative which has the potential of leading to conflict. In this 
village we are not plenty so we have to deal with such accusations very carefully so 
that leaders will be able to do their work‘ (Interview with Opanyin Addae 
14/02/2007). 
 
  
   The fear of the unintended consequences of demanding 
accountability from people whether at the level constrained village actors 
from consciously exercising agency to hold leaders accountable. Evidence 
from my interviews suggested that there have been instances where 
demanding accountability resulted in quarrels ensuing between individuals 
which widened to involve their immediate family members.  A case was cited 
where the two families brawled due to one accusing a family member of the 
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other as allegedly responsible for him being accused of embezzling village 
funds. 
 
 ‗when the former UC chairman43 was accused of having embezzled the pontoon 
funds, the UC chairman blamed the appointed DA member for telling lies about him 
to other village members that he has misappropriated village funds… when the UC 
chairman eventually absconded his wife and siblings engaged the DA member and 
his family in a serious quarrel… their wives are both Christian mothers yet they 
were not on talking terms‘ (Interview with Nana Akuamoah Boateng, DA 
member for Akroso). 
 
   The  fear of straining or damaging long enduring social relationships 
that have been either reflexively or unconsciously built over the years limit 
the ability to act to hold leaders to account. The fact that village members 
encounter mostly each other in their daily social life limits the ability to 
exercise agency to demand accountability. Even for individuals equally 
positioned within the village hierarchy demand accountability from the other 
within the public spaces if not done with caution may lead to hostilities which 
have the possibility of spilling over into private and informal domains in which 
the individuals are interact.  
   Personalised interactions among village members solidify over time 
making acting otherwise to demand accountability very difficult at the local 
level. The example of Obofour illustrates how he was able to act publicly to 
demand accountability form village representatives though such occurrences 
were rare within the village. Village members perceived Oborfour as a 
drunkard enabling him to make those allegations in public without any 
remarkable consequences. He mentioned that his action was intentional 
rather than accidental and was purposely meant to let the DA officials 
                                                          
43
 Name withheld for ethical reasons because I do not have the informed consent to  
use the real name of the person. 
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become aware that some members of the village hierarchy were corrupt. 
Naming the leaders during the public meeting was a conscious act and that 
though he had taken in alcohol in the morning he was conscious of his 
actions. 
 
 ‘Obofour’ Michael, 39, Village Member, Akroso 
 Michael normally referred to as „Obofuor‟ meaning angel is seen as a drunkard 
hence commands little social recognition in the village.  Based on his drunkeness 
Obofuor‘s contributions on village issues are deemed relevant. During a meeting 
between the District Assembly and the entire village members on a proposed 
Millennium Development Challenge Account (MCA) Oboufour publicly revealed how 
some village leaders are corrupt. He mentioned the embezzlement of PTA funds by 
the local School Management Committee (SMC) and misappropriation of tractor 
funds by the tractor committee. Nana Akuamoah Boateng who chaired the function 
stopped Obofuor midway through his allegations and informed the gathering that 
Obofour was drunk and there was no iota of truth in what he was saying. He was 
subsequently not allowed to conclude his allegation. However after the meeting 
some village members congratulated Obofour on his ability to publicly reveal the 
corrupt practices of the village leaders. Obofour stated that if he was allowed to 
continue with his accusations he would have revealed a host of corrupt practices 
that were going on in the village.  
 
 
   There are various strands that can be drawn from this example to 
support my argument. It is clear from the account of Obofour that though 
most of the village members especially the youth were aware of these 
perceived corrupt practices on the part of village leaders, they were not 
prepared to come out individually to voice out these concerns within the 
public arena. Their inability to come out publicly on these corrupt practices 
was due to the fear of incurring the displeasure of village leaders which may 
be interpreted as showing disrespect to elders or acting in a ways that were 
inconsistent with the existing common practices of loyalty and acquiescence. 
Fear in this sense makes rational action to question traditional leadership 
undesirable (Cleaver 2004; Engberg-Perderson, 2002). 
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   Actions aimed at publicly exposing alleged misdeeds of 
representative‘s risk incurring the displeasure of village leaders and 
damaging existing networks. The dilemma is whether agency can be 
exercised at the individual level taking into consideration the dense network 
that pertains in Ntonaboma. Such ‗moral rationalities‘ existing at the village 
level affects the agency of individuals to name and shame public officials for 
perceived corruption. Reporting village leaders in the public to outsiders as 
corrupt is not the ‗right thing to do‘ as the outcomes of such actions may be 
problematic for the individual. Such individuals may be ‗labeled‘ which may 
affect their relationships with other village actors.  
   The second issue is that powerful local leaders positioned up the 
village hierarchy insulate their colleagues from public disgrace through their 
actions which shapes what is said and done within the public space. The 
truncating of Obofuor‘s story in public was to avoid disgracing the leadership 
in the presence of outsiders. The notion is reinforced by the local proverb 
that „it is not good to wash your dirty linen in public‟. These common moral 
principles and the power of those in charge of village affairs shape the 
accountability relationships within the village. 
  
 5.5.3 The unequal interdependence of connected livelihoods  
   Putting livelihood44 relationships into agency illuminates the many 
important reasons why exercising agency by individual village members to 
                                                          
44 Drawing on Bebbington et. al., livelihood refers to the ―diverse types of  assets – human,   
financial, physical, cultural and social- that can be transformed by individuals into  livelihood  
outcomes to make a living‖ (2006: 1962). 
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demand accountability from leaders may seem undesirable especially for 
poor village members. My observations and interviews during the field study 
demonstrate that poor village members depended on powerful members in 
their daily interactions. However, such interdependence existed alongside 
structural inequality which they will not put under any discursive scrutiny. 
Recent studies suggest that existing relations of unequal interdependence 
between the poor and non-poor resist efforts to generate accountability, yet 
more confrontational approaches seem undesirable especially on the part of 
the poor whose chronic insecurity aligns them to the interests of the more 
powerful social actors (Mosse, 2007; CPRC, 2005; Cleaver, 2005). 
   Evidence of asymmetrical relationship abounds in Ntonaboma, but it 
served as the basis for which individual interactions took place. Putting such 
unequal social relationships into perspective illustrates how certain 
individuals such Fredrick, a farm labourer, depended on his landlord in a 
patronage relationship constraining him to positively act to demand 
accountability from him. Apart from his dependence on the patronage of the 
more powerful actors within the village the powerful individuals were the 
same people who mediated their access to other social resources. 
Therefore, his relationship with his landlord was so important to him that he 
would hardly want to make it fragile. The case of Fredrick below highlights 
the unequal livelihood interdependencies that exist between him and his 
landlord made it impossible for him to act otherwise to strain the relationship. 
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Fredrick, 40 a labourer, UC representative and tenant farmer  
 Fredrick is about 40 and is a member of the UC. He is married with two small sons, 
and his household lies within the zongo side of the village. The social relationships 
on which he draws is very thin. He mentions that he came to settle in Ntonaboma 
upon the encouragement of his brother Mohammed to work as a farm labourer for 
Mr. Nketia, the town committee chairman for Akroso village Fredrick‘s brother, 
Mohammed is also a sharecropper with no land of his own. Fredrick‘s primary 
contact is with his land lord and brother upon whom he depends for access to the 
supply of agricultural materials, small household commodities, small loans, 
occasional health care and support especially when he has to return to his 
hometown. Fredrick also maintains a series of relationships with other households 
within the zongo area, mainly covering labour sharing and mutual assistance with 
marriages and bereavement. He works additionally as a labourer on other people‘s 
farm especially during the main farming season to earn more income for the upkeep 
of the family. Though his land lord in principle does not agree to him working on 
other people‘s farm during the farming season, he manages to do so. However, he 
is very careful not to incur the wrath of his landlord as that might lead to him being 
dismissed from the farm. He normally accepts these jobs as contract but informs his 
landlord about them. Though, he states that this is not always the case. Fredrick 
believes that village leaders should manage the affairs of the village because they 
are the traditional leaders of the community and hence owe it as an obligation to the 
community to make sure things is rightly done. He thinks it is not his immediate 
concern to demand accountability from elected or appointed representatives 
because he came to Ntonaboma to work. He cites instances where they heard 
some representatives had embezzled finances but nothing happened.  
 
   Fredrick‘s example reveals that, though he is a village representative 
on the UC, he maintains an unequal relationship with his landlord Mr. Nketia, 
the town committee chairman for Akroso village. This relationship provides 
Fredrick with the possibility to interact with his landlord and even run errands 
for him. However, their different social positioning within the village structure 
and the difference in the resources at their disposal make Fredrick unable to 
shape positively their relationship. Transplanting such a relationship 
informed by livelihood security into the public domain where Fredrick is 
supposed to act purposively based on his rights bearing identity as a citizen 
to demand accountability becomes a daunting task. Fredrick‘s suggestion of 
an external actor may be interpreted to mean someone from outside the 
village, autonomous and not embedded in any social relationship and 
equally powerful.  
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   Exercising active agency within such unequal relationships is shaped 
by both ‗short-term purposes and long term projects‘ which may not be 
compatible with the transformative ideals of active citizenship espoused in 
the participatory governance literature (Giddens. 1995: 35).  For the poor 
and other people in subordinate positions such as Fredrick, it is the ‗state‘ 
that can hold village leaders to account and not ordinary people. For Fredrick 
securing a stable livelihood is more paramount to them than being able to 
equally negotiate in the new governance spaces to transform inequitable 
relationships. Reflexively, Fredrick will not want to act in any form to alter the 
existing ‗relation of subordination‘ since such an act may lead to negative 
consequences for him especially that of his livelihoods. His decision to 
maintain the status quo reproduces the unequal power relationship in which 
he is embedded. For Fredrick, the ‗ebb and flow‘ of daily social interaction 
that stabilises future transactions is more paramount than acting otherwise to 
transform existing unequal relationship. 
 
5.5.4 Getting village representatives to account through ‘off stage’ 
practices 
  
  In this section, I highlight how village members were able to act within 
the structural constrains in which they were positioned to bring village 
representatives to account. Drawing on Scott‘s (1985) notion of ‗off-stages‘ 
practices, I illustrate how village members in exercising agency to demand 
accountability collectively relied on gossip and withdrawal of labour to 
achieve their outcomes. Lister (2004) writes that these ‗back stage‘ acts 
were neither for personal gain nor for anti social purposes but were 
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consciously used to ‗get back‘ at village leaders who were perceived to be 
corrupt or unresponsive to the needs of the village. 
  The location of certain people up the village hierarchy imbued with 
power does not suppose that they are insulated from the effects of the action 
of others. For example, certain ‗off-stage‘ practices of ordinary members in 
the village, such as gossiping about a village representative‘s perceived 
corrupt behaviour ended up getting such leaders to publicly render account. 
When such gossips got into the public domain and leaders concerned got to 
know they made every effort to address the issue raised even though 
nobody had categorically requested them to respond to such allegations of 
misappropriation. Though such gossips were not consciously focused on 
removing village representatives from office they sometimes ended up 
unintendedly doing so.  
   Thus, understanding gossip as a part of village life reveals the 
unconscious nature of that action. Instances where gossips held committee 
representatives to account abound in the narratives of village members 
though such acts did not result in leaders either refunding embezzled funds 
but in other instances some individuals were reported to the police. The 
example of the former village water committee responsible for collecting 
water levies revealed how the ‗off stage‘ practices of village members such 
as gossips had the potential for achieving some important outcomes 
manifesting in the water committee members resigning their position. 
   Evidence from my study also revealed that not only does gossiping 
bring leaders to account but also withdrawing labour or making the work of 
village leaders very difficult was a reflexive way of acting within the village to 
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bring leaders to account. Using the renovation of the Ntonaboma community 
clinic as an example, I will demonstrate how by withdrawing their labour the 
skilled youth in the village were able to get the Area Council (AC) chairman 
to render accounts for funds utilised and provide information on the 
budgeted funds for hiring skilled labour for the project.  
   During the renovation works on the Ntonaboma clinic, the Area 
Council (AC) chairman and the DA member for Agyaade were responsible 
for the day-to-day management of the ongoing construction work such as 
taking deliveries from the Assembly and other private supplier and releasing 
these inputs to the workers on site. The AC chairman drawing on the notion 
of community ownership requested village members who were artisans to 
provide free labour for the project as the amount of money budgeted for the 
project was not sufficient. However, the artisans majority of whom were 
among the village youth rejected the proposal of the AC chairman and 
demanded that the AC chairman briefed them of the total funds budgeted for 
the project and the proportion meant to be used to pay for skilled labour. 
   According to the skilled artisans, if all village members were 
providing labour they will do theirs as a village member, but when they are 
providing their skills while others are at their work places, then they have to 
be paid for the services rendered. As regards the village skilled artisans, if 
the AC chairman had employed individuals from outside villages to do the 
work he would have paid them wages for their services. The AC chairman 
failed to accept the demands of the skilled artisans, hence the youth decided 
to withdraw their services from the project. The AC chairman reported the 
matter to the Akroso and Agyaade village chiefs and the District Technical 
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Officer (DTO). The DTO requested that a meeting be convened for all village 
members. At the said meeting, the DTO mentioned the funds budgeted and 
the amount spent on the renovation works. The DTO negotiated with the 
skilled youth on the daily wage to be paid them but fixed the rate below the 
prevailing market price at that time for the fact that they were village 
members and could not be paid as outsiders. 
  As the example of the clinic renovation shows, the village youth by 
coming together were able to exercise agency to get the village DA 
representative to account for the funds meant for the project and also 
negotiate for their services to be paid. The example also demonstrates that 
exercising agency to exert accountability from representatives is a relational 
activity, yet mainstream views on decentralisation assume that autonomous 
individuals are capable of exercising agency independently of one another to 
bring leaders to account. If even certain practices such as withdrawing 
village labour in a public manner are done to bring village representatives to 
account it takes place within the existing unequal power relationships. 
  
 5.6 Conclusion 
   This chapter questioned the overly optimistic view of human agency 
in decentralisation thinking and practice. Drawing on the manifestations of 
decentralisation and local governance within a specific context, I argued that 
the conception of individual agency as purposeful is problematic. The 
chapter demonstrated that in exercising agency in the new local governance 
spaces of decentralisation, individuals were not only motivated by self-
interest alone but were informed by diverse and mixed motives much of 
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which bothered on social concerns. I provided deep insights into how culture, 
routine, precedence, social relations and moral reasoning shape the 
strategies and actions of individuals in the spatial arenas of decentralisation. 
The study also highlighted how certain structural constraints made certain 
individual acts to transform existing relations of inequality difficult. In 
questioning the simplistic and optimistic notion of agency in institutional 
decentralisation, this chapter illuminated the effects of local norms, social 
positioning in village hierarchy, gender, age and wealth in shaping the 
agency of village members at the micro-level.  
   This chapter also highlighted the recursive relationship between 
agency and structure. I argued that the assumption regarding local 
participation in decentralisation policy inadequately fails to embrace the role 
of social structure in shaping the outcomes of decentralisation for different 
individuals. I illuminated how individual agency was dependent on social 
relations, culture, local norms, human capacity, economic factors and the 
position of the individual within the village hierarchy.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
SOCIAL EMBEDDED PRACTICES AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
  In the previous chapter, I questioned the scope for active agency in 
the new local government structures of decentralisation. This chapter follows 
up on the arguments in the previous chapter to interrogate the extent to 
which the institutional approach to decentralisation transforms social 
organisation. This chapter unpacks the dynamics of local governance in 
Ntonaboma by studying the interactions between formal and socially 
embedded institutions and how this interaction shapes local governance. In 
this chapter, my main argument is that, putting too much emphasis on 
crafting local government structures risk separating formal village level 
governance from other aspects of social life (Agrawal, 2005; Mosse, 2003).  
  Decentralisation policy and practice strongly focus on crafting formal 
local organisations to promote good governance at the local level. The 
tendency is to consciously design formal local government structures in 
decentralisation reforms to promote community participation in local 
governance. However, local governance is a complex and contested site 
where formal and socially embedded institutions complement and in some 
instances challenge each other. The failure of decentralisation reforms to 
weave new local government structures into the organising practices of the 
locality diminishes its potential for improved levels of local governance. In 
practice outcomes of decentralisation reforms are shaped by diverse 
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institutions of varying shades of formality and transparency mediating 
interactions within the community.  
  This chapter presents a more holistic picture of UCs in local 
governance, especially the way in which the UC interacts with existing 
community governance arrangements by adopting some practices 
embedded in the community. The chapter also demonstrates how the 
decentralisation process in Ghana provides a framework for synergies 
between existing institutions and local government structures. 
  This chapter draws on post-institutionalist thinking to explore how the 
over reliance on formal local government structures such as the UCs to 
govern interactions challenges or complements decentralisation outcomes 
(Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002; Cleaver, 2002; Metha et al, 1999). Post 
institutionalist theorists argue that institutions normally elude design, 
evolving in the dynamic process of social life (Franks and Cleaver, 2005). 
They argue further that, the mechanisms for local governance are enacted 
through a complex mix of bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions 
(Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002; Cleaver, 2002).    
  The first part of the chapter highlights the complex and multipurpose 
nature of institutions for local governance. I demonstrate that institutions that 
shape governance at the community level are ad hoc, intermittent and fragile 
and may be tinkered by community members to suit the local context. The 
chapter demonstrates further that, decentralised local government structures 
such as the UCs coexist with socially embedded institutions and often 
interact to shape daily interaction and cooperation at the local level. The 
chapter also highlights how the interaction between the UCs and existing 
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institutions shapes service delivery. To further illustrate the complex 
dynamics of institutional crafting, the chapter draws on the delimitation of 
explicit boundaries to illustrate the gap between the reality of 
decentralisation reforms and local diversity.  
 
6.2 Does the crafting of new local government structures take local  
        heterogeneity for granted? 
 
  The tendency to design local government structures to formalise 
community participation is persistent in decentralisation policy and practice 
(Ostrom, 2005; Ribot, 2002b). The concern with the over-reliance on formal 
local government structures in mainstream decentralisation discourse is its 
oversimplification of complex local realities. Emerging thinking about 
institutions in local governance suggests that, community level institutions 
are less purposeful, ad hoc, historically embedded and mostly elude design 
(Metha et. al., 1999; Douglas, 1987). The argument made by post 
institutionalist is that, the process of institutional formation in local 
governance is a messy and complex endeavor (Mosse, 2008).  
  The key argument in this section is that, decentralisation reforms 
focus on addressing the deficiencies of local government structures thereby 
neglecting the complexity of context. The inadequate consideration of the 
local context in local government reforms is due to the application of 
institutional design principles to shape community management. My concern 
is that, an inadequate understanding of the existing norms and patterns of 
interaction that shape cooperation at the local level and the different 
meanings attached to institutions may lead to unintended outcomes. 
Specifically, I use the problems arising out of attempts to consciously design 
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administrative boundaries for the purpose of decentralisation to support my 
argument that, institutional crafting is messier and complex in reality and 
often manifest in unintended consequences than decentralisation policies 
tend to suggest. First, I will illustrate how the lack of fit between new local 
government boundaries under Act 642 in Ghana‘s decentralisation 
framework and existing traditional boundaries affects the activities of local 
government structures. Secondly, I will demonstrate that the creation of local 
government administrative boundaries is a negotiated process that has the 
propensity to result in conflict and other unintended outcomes due to the 
diverse motivations, strategies and actors involved. 
 
6.2.1 Improvisation of local government structures for effective         
governance  
  Decentralisation reforms devolve political power to local communities 
by reforming and formalising local government structures to achieve certain 
desired functional objectives. These reforms are underpinned by mainstream 
institutional thinking that suggests that, institutional change proceeds 
through a combination of evolution and conscious crafting (Ostrom, 2005). 
The creation of administrative boundaries in decentralisation policy and 
practice is to make local governance efficient and have the possibility of 
organising and structuring the public actions needed, and to assure that 
decision-making processes are effective, reliable and legitimate. Mainstream 
views on decentralisation also highly recommend that area and population 
must be delimited in order to break problems into manageable size and to 
encourage individuals to work with one another over time to resolve these 
229 
 
problems (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Ostrom, 1990). For example, the 
Ghana, Constitution states in Article 241 (2) that ―Parliament may by law 
make provision for the redrawing of the boundaries of districts or for 
reconstituting the districts.‖ In the Local Government Act, the President has 
the dominant role in creating districts (Local Government Act 642, Article 1 
[2]). The President considers the advice of the Electoral Commission45 (EC) 
of Ghana in creating new districts in Ghana (Local Government Act 642, 
Article 1 [3]). The EC applies criteria contained in Local Government Act 
642, Article 1 [4] such as area and population to demarcate new boundaries. 
  However, Owusu (2009) argues that the focus on administrative 
boundaries inadequately considers the consequences of local government 
boundaries for local development, especially, in communities where the 
influence of socially embedded institutions on governance is pervasive. In 
reality, local level governance institutions often turn out to be deeply 
embedded in localised social process and in practice may be adapted in 
ways that suit the locally-specific institutional environment (Lowndes and 
Wilson, 2003). This section analyse these interconnections between local 
government structures and socially embedded institutions, and argue that 
there is more depth and variation, and more structure and patterning, 
between these two institutions than has been generally recognised so far in 
the mainstream discourse on decentralisation. 
                                                          
45 In Article 2, the LGA gives the following task to the Electoral Commission: ―review areas of  
authority of unit committees, town, area zonal, urban and sub-metropolitan district councils  
and district, municipal and metropolitan assemblies and make such recommendation as it  
considers appropriate to the President.‖ 
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  This section draws on the patching of the two UCs with the TDC for 
the purpose of local governance in Akroso village to support my argument 
that, new local governance institutions are adapted to reflect the normal ‗way 
of doing things‘ within the locality. This view suggests that local level 
institutions may be improvised and applied in certain other desirable ways 
within the community than those functions specified in policy documents 
(Long, 2001).  
  In Ntonaboma the UCs became operational after the 1994 local level 
elections with clearly defined administrative boundaries for each UC. The 
delimitation of boundaries is consistent with decentralisation policy and 
practice. As shown in Figure 5, Supom and part of Yamuoso constituted the 
JSS UC while Agyaade and part of Yamuoso formed the Agyaade/Yamuoso 
UC. Akroso village had two UCs namely Sukuumu and Ahenbrono UCs. 
Field evidence from Ntonaboma revealed that all the four villages preferred 
to work through their own existing village governance arrangements when it 
came to individual village collective activities due to the unworkable nature of 
the rigid administrative boundaries that tends to separate them. The 
demarcation of the boundaries of the UC in the three villages of Supom, 
Aygaade and Yamuoso gives cause for concern if local governance is to be 
considered operational. The views of community members were not elicited 
during the demarcation of boundaries for decentralisation. The logic of the 
whole exercise was to simplistically make people, space and resources 
legible to govern without considering the specificity of context.  
  The demarcation was done in such a way that the JSS unit 
committee area was a combination of portions of both Supom and Agyaade 
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villages which made coordination very difficult. Similarly, the 
Yamuoso/Aygaade UC area also had some portions of Agyaade village 
fused into Yamuoso village. With the exception of Akroso village in which the 
boundaries of the two UCs were co-terminus with the existing traditional 
boundaries of the village, the JSS and Agyaade/Yamuso UCs, redefined the 
exiting traditional boundaries for Ayaade, Yamuso and Supom villages 
respectively. Due to the misunderstanding between the Supom and Aygaade 
villages the UC was named JSS Unit Committee in reference to the school 
building that does not bear the name of any of the two villages to avoid 
giving different meanings and interpretations to the exercise. In all the four 
villages, the authority and legitimacy of the town committees were further 
bolstered by their recognition by the traditional authorities. This enabled the 
town committee to draw on existing local norms, rules and practices to 
govern numerous village activities.   
  In practice both Agyaade and Supom villages maintained their 
existing organisation for village management that is the TDCs, but also 
maintained a link with the JSS UC by putting some village members on the 
JSS UC. The official boundaries of the UCs did not determine membership 
to the new institutions. The fluid and permeable nature of boundaries and the 
dynamic nature of individual identities enabled people not living within a 
respective boundary to serve on a particular UC. An example is Nana Saaka 
who was the chairman of the Agyaade/Supom UC but had left his original 
resettlement home for his children to join the wife at Akroso. This example 
shows the fluid nature of boundaries. Nana Saaka administratively lived in 
Agyaade/Supom UC but had moved to live in Akroso village.  
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Figure 4: Existing traditional boundaries for Ntonaboma  
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     Figure 5: New Administrative boundaries for Ntonaboma  
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Combining the Sukuumu and Ahenbrono Unit Committees in Akroso Village 
The elders of Ntonaboma merged the Sukuumu and Ahenbrono unit committees to enable 
them save time on operating two institutions simultaneously.  The decision by the 
community elders to merge the two UCs was due to the fact that the Akroso electoral area 
of Ntonoaboma was not spatially big enough to demand the use of two UCs. The two UCs 
were operated for about seven months in 1994 resulting in coordination problems between 
them. This brought a lot of confusion in regulating the activities of the community. People 
were not attending communal labour activities. Collecting community levy was a problem. 
Moreover there were not enough people to serve on the two committees so the leaders of 
Akroso village decided to merge it. Hence for the purpose of effectively managing the day-
to-day activities of the community and reducing the transaction cost of operating two UCs a 
single structural arrangement was put in place to management village activities.  
  The two UCs were merged into one UC for practical purposes whiles officially for 
administrative purposes the electoral area had two UCs. The merger of the two UCs did not 
involve higher levels of the local government administration but was a community decision 
that was not made known to the district assembly. The UC elections resulted in two distinct 
UCs with their respective members for the Akroso area of Ntonaboma with Nana Osei Afram 
and Mr. Nketia as the chairman for the Ahenbrono and Sukuumu UCs respectively. 
However, the decision to combine the UCs by the community elders had Mr. Nketia and 
Nana Osei Afram as the chairman and deputy chairman respectively for the combined 
committee. Other positions had Mr. Samuel Opoku, the secretary for Sukuumu UC as the 
new secretary for the combined UC with Mr. S. K. Tano as his deputy. Similarly, Madam 
Akosua Akyaa became the treasurer while Rosinah Akuamoah was the deputy treasurer.  
      
 The formal division of Akroso village into two UCs made it very 
difficult for the village representatives on the committee to organise and 
monitor village activities such as communal labour and effectively collect 
ntokuatoo46. The fluid and dynamic nature of social life coupled with the 
permeable nature of boundaries made governing everyday village activities 
separately between the two UCs problematic. For example, each village had 
its own set of forage opportunities and restrictions that were not within the 
remit of the new local government structures introduced in the villages.  
 Instances were also cited in Akroso Village when on the eve of 
communal labour some people stayed overnight in the cottage built on their 
farms which fell within the jurisdiction of Sukuumu UC and return later to 
                                                          
46 A village levy paid by all individuals who are more than eighteen years old. This levy is  
used for village development activities. 
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their home which were within the jurisdiction of the Ahenbrono UC. They 
always explained that, they were not present in the village the day before the 
communal labour. By the rules shaping communal labour, if any person is 
not in the village on the day preceding communal labour, the person was not 
deemed to have been absent from communal labour. Also the collection of 
the ntokuatoo became a complex issue because of the difficulty in identifying 
individuals with particular dwelling units in the village due to extended family 
and kin networks. The town committee members also highlighted how 
difficult their job was and the extreme burden it puts on their day-to-day 
livelihood activities. For example, in the collection of community levies they 
had to go from house to house which was time consuming and difficult 
especially if it had to do with recalcitrant village members. 
 The new UCs had difficulty in fitting into village practices as some 
village members perceived the UC as external and had been put in the 
village by the district to do the work of the district assembly. The UCs were 
conceived by both the representatives on the committee and the village 
members as a local government institutions that linked the villages with 
higher official spaces of the district. However, the UCs in reality were 
reformulated within the four villages constituting Ntonaboma to suit the 
routine of village public management and local practice due to their 
ambiguous role within the villages. Motivation to tinker with the UC was 
shaped by precedence and the sense of the right way of doing things. In 
Akroso village and in almost all the four villages in Ntonaboma, the UC was 
embedded in the town committees because the representatives were also 
leaders and members of the town committee in the various communities. 
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The town committee members are people who were born in the locality, 
have lived there most parts of their lives, and, in many cases, also derive 
their livelihood from there. Therefore, town committee members are so much 
part of local society that they can neither escape censure if they are seen to 
be not conspicuously performing poorly, nor ignore representations made to 
them by village.  
 When questioned whether the district assembly was informed of the 
improvisation of the UCs, the town committee members mentioned that this 
improvisation had not been made known to officials of the district assembly. 
According to one village representative in Akroso, ―on paper there are two 
UCs but in reality there is one local government unit in Akroso village‖. 
Metha et. al‘s (1999: 21) argument that ―new conditions provoke active 
agency which may lead to new sets of more regularised practices‖ supports 
the decision of the village traditional elders to purposively alter the UC to suit 
their way of doing things. According to Nana Akuamoah Boateng having two 
UCs was irrelevant as Akroso village had always been managed as a single 
spatial unit and all other committees were not double but rather single. This 
was not to suggest that the community was rid of conflict or was 
homogeneous that there was no need for diverse institutions to manage 
numerous community activities. Rather, his comments go to illustrate how 
local government structures are open to alteration where appropriate to suit 
the local context. This explains why some institutions may be stable over 
their life course while others may be flexible and improvised to meet 
mundane daily community governance functions. This also reveals how 
social actors within a particular locality shape external interventions. 
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Despite the desire of the PNDC government to replace existing 
village organisations in 1988 with new local government structures due to 
claims that these organisations were generally inefficient and undemocratic, 
village organisations continued to play an important role in local governance. 
Within Ntonaboma the local structure for managing village activities were 
normally referred to as the ‗town committee‘47. This committee has been in 
existence for a long time since their re-location to Ntonaboma.  Maintaining 
the name of the existing structure arrangements for village governance 
suggests that decentralisation reforms when it encounters complex village 
realities are re-interpreted to suit the local context. This re-interpretation 
derives from existing local practices as shown in the interview with the 
Yamuoso UC Chairman which highlights the frustrations and struggles in 
using the UCs to mediate numerous village activities.  
Inetrview with Yamuoso town committee Chairman 
Before 1994 the work of the Unit Committees was performed by the Town Development 
Committee (TDC).  We operated both simultaneously in Akroso village and realised that 
people responded to the call of the TDC better than the Unit Committees. Those days of the 
TDC people came with their own implements like shovels and cutlasses for communal work, 
but nowadays people expect the Unit Committees to provide the working tools for communal 
labour which is non existence.  The chief also played a very important role in the TDC but 
that was not the same for the Unit Committees. The TDC at that time was for all the 
Ntonaboma community and so it was not for any particular community as it became with the 
Unit Committee concept.  We had four Unit Committees that involved different sections of 
the villages. Though Akroso village which is the biggest has merged their two UCs it is not 
the same for the other UCs. Each village operates a oman (village) committee that includes 
the UC.  So if one sector of the Unit Committee such as Yamuso decides on something, it 
does not apply to Supom and the rest. If it is a project from the DA for all Ntonaboma then 
we work together but through separate structures. We have two paramouncies here and it is 
also part of the problem retarding development in the area here. When both paramouncies 
had one single TDC things worked smoothly.  We prefer the TDC to the Unit Committee 
concept   
 
 The above interview with the Yamuoso village UC/Town Committee 
chairman reveals that, rather than the new UCs reducing the transaction cost 
                                                          
47 The town committee was the name given to institutional arrangements for village governance in  
Ntonaboma. 
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of the management of community activities, the time and effort in managing 
the two new institutions increased. Since the modalities of the new UCs 
replacing the old Town Development Committee was ineffective in practice 
they had to remould the formal institutional arrangement in the new 
decentralisation policy framework to suit the local context. Though this may 
sound functionalist in nature, the improvisation of the UC was to allow the 
four villages adapt the new institutions to the existing and common mode of 
village governance (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002).   
 I observed that the improvised UC was referred to by both 
community members as ‗town or oman48 committee‘. The ‗town committee‘ 
drew its name and meaning from the oman but still adopted some of the 
attributes of the UC such as chairman and secretary which were stipulated in 
LI 1589 [26(1)]. The town committees was drawn upon by the village 
members to solve all community development problems and managing all 
collective activities such as communal labour and collecting community 
levies. The town committee was drawn upon by the village members to solve 
all community development problems and managing all collective activities 
such as communal labour and collecting community levies. This put a lot of 
pressure on elected and appointed leaders who spent more time and energy 
in attending to the myriad community problems. This observation reveals 
that the UCs alone as local government structures did not possess the 
resources needed to promote community participation and sustainable local 
governance. Rather, the synergies between the UCs and existing community 
                                                          
48
 Oman in local parlance signifies the nation which in this case means the entire village. It is  
important to note that oman refers to the collective and draws on the social capital inherent in 
the village. 
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management institutions produced more positive outcomes for the village‘s 
social organisation. For example, in Akroso village, the power to enforce 
implementation and impose punishments for offending village members were 
still undertaken by the town committee despite the implementation of the 
new local government structures 
  The improvisation of the UC in Akroso village suggests that 
structural arrangements to govern community activities must move beyond 
the over optimistic faith placed in formal institutions to govern community 
activities. More attention needs to be placed on fully understanding how 
existing socially embedded principles and practices have continuously been 
drawn upon to shape community management. I will use communal labour in 
Akroso village to show more explicitly that the Town Committee worked 
because it overlapped with local authority structures of each village. I also 
demonstrate further that, the functions of the town committee were shaped 
by the socially embedded principles of peaceful coexistence, conflict 
avoidance and desirability of cooperation existing in the villages. However, 
the use of communal labour is to highlight the extent to which improvisation 
of new formal institutions to suit local arrangements may also be opaque 
limiting transparency and reinforcing existing inequality. 
  The activities of the town committee were very visible through 
communal labour. There was a clear overlap between the various 
committees in Akroso village and the town committee. The town committee 
was mostly called upon to organise communal labour for ongoing projects 
being undertaken by the various formal committees. These activities took the 
form of mobilising the community to provide labour such as weeding around 
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the community clinic, the local school, the cemetery, the public toilet or on 
the main road that leads to Ntonaboma. These communal projects were 
intermittent and undertaken to solve routine community problems or other 
uncertainties that occurred. I draw on the management principles and on the 
rules governing communal labour to demonstrate the desirability of solidarity 
in replacing strict rule enforcement, sanctions and legible authority 
structures.  
Communal Labour in Ntonaboma 
Communal labour was normally organised on different days normally referred to as fofieda 
for each of the four communities. Whiles Akroso and Agyaade had their fofieda on every 
Friday, Supom and Yamuoso had theirs on Thursdays.  Communal labour was normally 
organised to weed around the public areas within the various townships to keep the 
community very clean and also to provide labour for ongoing projects. There were times that 
the two villages worked together on their respective fofieda if the communal work had to do 
with the entire Ntonaboma community. For example during the renovation of the Ntonaboma 
clinic which was for the entire community they had to provide free labour on every 
Thursdays and Fridays on their fofieda whiles the remaining days were shared among the 
various villages. The routine practice was that the ‗dawuruboni‘ (gong-gong beater) went 
round the day before the communal labour informing community members where communal 
labour was to take place the next day and what ought to be done. The practice of  providing 
information to community members on where the communal labour was taking place and 
the nature of the work to be done enabled people to do their part with little or no supervision. 
 
 
  The convention governing communal labour was not too rigidly 
enforced but was structured in such a way that it fitted into people‘s daily 
activities. The underlying feature of communal labour was the belief that 
other community members will do their fair share of communal work 
(Interview with Nana Akuamoah Boateng). For example, individuals who 
wanted to do their share of the communal labour very early enough to 
enable them attend to other issues were permitted to do so, while others 
could come later in the morning to do their share of communal labour. Such 
informal practices provided the poor with a certain freedom and liberty in 
participating in communal activities.  
240 
 
   The flexible nature of communal labour enabled more individuals to 
do their part very early without the presence of any of the human authority 
figures and leave. According to Mr. Nketiah, ‗if you come early and do just a 
little bit your own self conscience will haunt you. This and will make you feel 
guilty, with time your behaviour will be noticed by other village members who 
will complain to us‘ (Interview Mr. Nketiah, Town committee chairman, 
Akroso village). Such informal arrangements also limited the need for 
continuous monitoring of individuals and clear authority structures during 
communal labour.  
  I noticed that the communal work lasted from about six o‘clock to ten 
o‘clock in the morning. Attendance to the communal labour was higher. In 
one instance during communal labour in Akroso village, I counted more than 
ninety eight males while about fifty females participated (Diary notes, 
16/02/2007). The norms and rules that guided communal labour in Akroso 
village were not interpreted with the same intensity.  
  Compliance to these rules was not rigid due to the social values of 
dialogue, consultation and consensus. The flexible nature of communal 
labour and the generous application of operational rules by the town 
committee were reflected in the acceptance of children below the age of 
eighteen to do communal labour on behalf of their parents who were not able 
to attend. The rules shaping communal labour allowed children to stay away 
from communal labour yet these same children were allowed to work for 
their absentee parents. Though the use of children to do communal labour 
on behalf of their parents was accepted, I noticed it was not always the case 
as a few individuals drew on that norm. While some children were accepted 
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to work for their parents others were not allowed. The reason giving was that 
when some particular children came to work for their parents they refused to 
listen to simple instructions. This had resulted in conflict among some 
parents who attempted to reprimand these children.  
  Others who did not attend communal labour also refused to pay their 
fines when they were sanctioned. When discussed with the town committee 
chairman he mentioned that the assembly bye-law allowed individuals who 
will want to pay for communal labour to do so in order not to attend but this 
put extra burden on those who have to work during communal labour to 
compensate for those who do not attend. When asked whether children 
could represent their parents, village members mentioned that they will not 
accept a parent always sending children to do communal labour for them but 
on a few occasions they will accept. Their response also revealed that the 
nature and depth of the individual‘s involvement in communal labour will be 
taken into consideration when allowing children to work on the behalf of their 
parents.  
  There were other instances where individuals who did not attend 
communal labour would negotiate to have their turn later without paying the 
fine. Berry argues that negotiability of rules and relationships is one of the 
fundamental characteristics of African societies (Berry 1993).The issue of an 
offender showing remorse for not attending communal labour was also very 
important in determining whether to sanction or not. However, the factors 
that were taken into account in defining ‗remorse‘ were open to the 
subjective interpretation of Mr. Nketiah, the Akroso village town committee 
chairperson. 
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  During one fofieda (literally meaning off farm day) in which I had 
gone informally to observe communal labour in Akroso, I heard a woman 
informing Madam Beatrice Acheampong that her neighbors‘ (Abena Adade) 
daughter had convulsion at dawn and had requested her to seek permission 
for her. After communal labour the explicit nature of community solidarity 
became evident when I noticed five women (two were family members 
whiles three were friends) going to Abena Adade‘s home to visit her to find 
out the well being of her little daughter. Abena Adade was exempted from 
communal labour for that day, yet she later went personally to inform Mr. 
Nketia, the town committee chairman of reasons for not attending communal 
labour (Diary notes).  
  The approximate acceptance of children to undertake communal 
labour on behalf of their parents demonstrates that the principles and 
practices underlying the management of communal labour embraced the 
dynamic and fluid nature of social life and changing nature of individual 
circumstances. Drawing on Abena Adade‘s case (the parent whose daughter 
was poorly and so could not attend communal labour), the Akroso village 
members mentioned that anything could happen to someone, such as 
illness, bereavement and sometimes the need to travel unplanned may 
inhibit people from attending communal labour but such an individual will 
have to inform the leaders so that they get to know what was happening.  
  The complex, mutual and interdependent nature of social 
relationships arising as a result of associational activities and diverse 
livelihood networks such as existing labour sharing arrangements, attending 
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church49 together on Sundays, the communal and absolute nature of 
individual involvement in funerals, weddings or naming ceremonies and 
shared values occurring as a result of living together all play more important 
roles in shaping interactions around communal labour. The important thing 
as Mr. Nketia mentioned was to ‗get all people in the village attending 
communal labour which was very difficult, but we want to work in the village 
as a family by having everybody doing his/her part and the work being 
done…When we all do our bit the work gets done (obiaa be ye ne diee)‘. 
This deviated from the notion of efficiency underlying most mainstream 
institutional approaches and the explicit use of sanctions as the mechanism 
to ensure cooperation.  
  My data revealed that community management through local 
government structures is not so easy and simple as the mainstream views 
on decentralisation suggest. It is rather a complex process partially deriving 
its principles from existing local arrangements. This re-echoes Chanock‘s 
(2000:  xxiii) introduction to ‗Law as a Process‘, that centrally inspired legal 
change when understood through its processual characteristics, and not 
through its apparent structures‘ illuminates how ―proposed changes in the 
larger system might not translate into the kinds of effects and compliance 
that had been anticipated‘ within a particular locality‖.  
  In the next section, I will explore the actual practices of the town 
committee in Akroso village to illuminate how local government structures 
interact with socially embedded institutions at the community level to 
                                                          
49
 I noticed three dominant churches, the Catholic, Methodist and Pentecost churches and  
then others such as the Christ apostolic Church, Seventh Day Adventist and the Mosama 
Disco Christo Church. 
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undertake a variety of functions that were spontaneous and solved a host of 
mundane problems within the communities. 
 
6.3 The socially-embedded nature of village governance 
  In this section, I focused on the organising practices of the town 
committee in Akroso village to find out the extent to which it was consistent 
with those stipulated in the Local Government Act 462. I also used the 
concept of ‗organising practices‘ to illuminate the centrality of these practices 
to daily life especially when people have to be mobilised to respond to 
numerous village problems, how these functions are undertaken and through 
what mechanisms (Jeppesen, 1998; Nuitjen, 1992). I also questioned the 
faith placed in the conscious crafting of local government structures to 
achieve desirable goals in decentralisation reforms. I demonstrate that, local 
government structures interacted with existing socially embedded institutions 
to undertake multiple functions within the community. 
  This section illustrates how the town committee in Akroso village as 
a ‗socially sanctioned‘ organisation was drawn upon to perform multiple 
functions in the village, both formal and others based on the existing 
relations of cooperation. These multiple functions undertaken by the town 
committee were spontaneous and were shaped by socially embedded 
principles. As I have stated in Chapter two, the UCs are by law the pivot on 
which all district development activities emanate and their specific mandate 
is to mobilise their various communities for development activities. In the 
Local Government Act 642, the UCs are supposed to organise communal 
labour, undertake revenue collection, ensure environmental cleanliness, 
245 
 
registration of births and deaths, enforcement of district assembly bye-laws, 
revenue generation and implementation and monitoring of self-help projects 
(Ministry of Local Government, 1994). How do these functions stated in 
policy documents relate to other village practices and conventions for social 
organisation?  
  The management functions of the town committee in Akroso 
crosscut the collective and individual domains. Since the UCs in Akroso 
were improvised to form the town committee, I examined the minutes of the 
town committee meetings held between 2002 and 2007 to enable me to 
identify issues discussed during these meetings. This was to examine 
whether the functions of the UC stated in policy prescriptions reflected the 
activities of the town committee in the villages. Though their functions are 
explicitly stated in policy documents, the reality is that, the town committee 
undertook a host of village functions that are not laid down in the Local 
Government Act 64250. 
  These minutes of meetings of the town committee showed that such 
meetings were not on specific issues or related to only their mandated 
functions but were ad hoc deliberations on issues that occurred in the 
village. Even though the Local Government Act 642 states that the UCs 
should meet at least once a month, the dates of the minutes showed that the 
meetings did not occur regularly but were held whenever the need arose and 
were mostly follow-ups on ‗all village meetings‘ where final decisions could 
                                                          
50 Article 10 (3) (4)(5)(6) provide the general functions and responsibilities of the District  
Assembly. The Local Government Act, Article 15(1) allows the DA to ―delegate any of its 
functions to such sub-Metropolitan District Council, Town, Area, or Urban Council or Unit 
Committee or such other body or person as it may determine.‖ 
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not be made. A lot of meetings occurred whenever there was an ongoing 
project in the community in which the town committee played a major role. 
For example, six meetings were held in the month of September, 2005 while 
no meetings were convened for the following two months. The high 
frequency of meetings within that month was due to the ongoing re-roofing of 
the local primary school in which the town committee played an instrumental 
role in mobilising resources for the project.  
  Members present during these ‗town committee‘ meetings comprised 
not only the members of the improvised UC but other representatives such 
as members of the traditional authorities, the assembly members and other 
members of other formal bureaucratic committees that had something to do 
with the issues being discussed. The membership of the ‗town committee‘ 
was diverse with certain core members. Other individuals invited to attend 
the meeting of the ‗town committee‘ depended on the nature of the issue or 
the problem at stake. According to Mr. Nketia, the UC chairman,  
‗When there is a problem in the community we invited town elders so meet to find solution to 
the problem. If it demands meeting the whole community we inform Nana [local chief] and 
then we call for a village meeting but most often we[the town committee members] would 
have met before we call for the entire village meeting. If it has occurred before in the affairs 
of the village then we find out how that particular problem was solved and the strategy for 
solving it. If it requires re-constituting a sub-committee for the issue we do that. Normally 
what to do depends on the nature of the problem‘. 
 
 In Akroso village, the functions of the ‗town committee‘ were more ad 
hoc in nature playing different roles within the village. The institutional 
arrangements for village management were identified to be highly flexible 
and entailed constant decisions and responses to ‗here‘ and now 
contingencies. The scope of the town committee‘s functions ranged from 
representing the village at DA programmes, collecting tolls during market 
247 
 
days, sanctioning people who did not attend communal labour, monitoring 
the implementation of district assembly projects to arresting civil offenders 
and collecting community levies (ntokuatoo). As shown in Table 6.1, the 
‗town committee‘ was multifunctional in nature. For example while the UCs 
were by law responsible for registering any birth and death in their unit, in 
practice the ‗town committee‘ in Ntonaboma did not perform these functions. 
This was a continuation of the existing practice in the Ntonaboma where 
Traditional Birth Attendants (TBA) and the clinic recorded all births whiles the 
funeral committee recorded all deaths in the community. The reason given 
was that the funeral committee collects all funeral levies and gives out dates 
for organising funerals; hence it is the first point of call whenever someone 
dies in the village and can easily record deaths in the village (Diary notes, 
12/02007). This demonstrates that although it is a good practice to provide a 
frame for the roles and functions of the UCs, these functions stated in policy 
instruments may be sidestepped in favour of non-DA roles which are 
embedded in existing social practices. 
  The Akroso village town committee members during the GD 
mentioned that their formal functions were organising members for 
communal labour, sanctioning individuals who failed to attend communal 
labour and collecting ntokuatoo (community levies), collecting fines and a 
host of other mundane day–to–day functions emanating from community and 
individual needs. These mundane functions were ad hoc in nature. The 
narratives of some of the ‗town committee‘ members regarding their 
functions suggested that they performed other activities that were often 
ambiguous and at variance with those spelt out in policy documents. The 
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roles performed were dynamic and fluid combining specified roles in policy 
documents with other roles that continued with existing functions or solved 
uncertainties. The existing roles were regularised practices that were 
reproduced when similar problems occurred. Other roles were not any fixed 
set of functions but were dynamic, changing over time as uncertainties 
occurred.  
 
Table 6.1: Activities undertaken by the Akroso Town Committee 
Issues Subjects discussed 
 
Health Construction of a new clinic 
Request to the district assembly for a community nurse 
to be posted to the clinic 
Education Construction of new primacy block for the  Catholic 
Junior  
School Management  
Transport Repair of the pontoon and main road 
Deciding on the operating times for the pontoon 
Weeding of the edges of the main transport route to the 
village 
Collecting pontoon fare 
Environment Sanitation issues 
Preventing erosion  
Charcoal burning 
Grazing of cattle or farm lands 
Conflict 
resolution 
Settlement of disputes 
sanctioning free riders 
Other issues Community levies (oman too or ntokuatoo) 
Setting of bye-laws 
Organisation of community Easter dubars 
Labour mobilization 
 Source: Fieldwork, 2007 
  
  Interviews also suggested that some functions of the UC stated in 
policy documents such as recommending names for streets were irrelevant 
to the daily needs of the village. For the UC/town committee to become more 
relevant to the expectations of village members it undertook other mundane 
functions less consciously some of which were spontaneous in nature. This 
highlights the dynamic nature of the town committee‘s involvement in the 
daily affairs of the village. For example, the town committees in Ntonaboma 
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facilitated the transportation of sick people to the district hospital. In times of 
emergencies, the town committees were informed to mobilise people to 
attend to the issue. There were instances that they also served as gate 
keepers to the village. This happened during my entry to Ntonaboma to do 
my fieldwork. I was sent to the town committee chairman who welcomed and 
introduced me to the town committee members informing them of my 
mission to the town. I was later sent to the Amankrado for Akroso village, 
Nana Akuamoah Boateng who also acted as the assembly member for 
Akroso village.  
  There were other instances when the town committee had to 
mobilise members to perform new tasks in response to problems that arose 
in the village. It was clear for the study that community members were able 
to organise around activities that involved extracting benefits from 
government. The needs around which they organised were largely tangible 
and related to works that could be accomplished in relatively short time 
period. For example, during 2004 when the district assembly failed to repair 
the pontoon linking Ntonaboma to the district for about six months, all the 
four town committees in consultation with the traditional councils had to 
mobilise funds to purchase a new boat to be used in crossing the Obosom 
River to and from Ntonaboma. The boat operated unscheduled, charging a 
minimal fee to enable village members to cross the lake at any time of the 
day to attend to their everyday issues.  
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Mobilising resources to repair the local primary school 
During a school vacation in July, 2002 when the roof of the district assembly primary school 
building in Ntonaboma was blown off by a heavy storm the town committee had to work 
together with the School Management Committee and the Traditional Council to get the roof 
of the school repaired before the school year started. The town committee had to mobilize 
some youth to cut trees from the Digya Forest Reserve to be sawn into lumber for the re-
roof the building. The assembly member who is also a sub-chief had to go to the district 
assembly and the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO) to request for 
roofing sheets for the school. Since the roofing sheets provided by NADMO were 
inadequate other prominent citizens of Ntonaboma living in the city were contacted for 
support.  
 
  The above example demonstrates that whenever there was an 
unexpected problem in the any of the villages, there was a complex interplay 
among diverse stakeholders and multiple institutions in the village to respond 
to these uncertainties. The competing demands on the resources of the 
district assembly resulted in delays in responding adequately to uncertainties 
in most villages in their jurisdiction. In the above example, though the school 
was built by the district assembly but owned by the Ntonaboma community, 
yet they did not rely only on the district assembly to solve the problem.  
  Returning to the functions of the Akroso village town committee, I 
have demonstrated that their functions or tasks were fluid and dynamic 
occurring at anytime that an uncertainty or mundane problems occurred in 
any of the villages. The multiple functions undertaken by the town committee 
were based on the exigencies of daily life and were aimed at responding to 
the complexities and dynamics of the locality and individual problems. The 
spontaneous nature of the functions of the town committee most of them 
unconsciously driven was evident during the period of the study.  
 I observed how the town committee mobilised village members to 
undertake certain functions such as helping in arresting a civil offender who 
had stolen farm products from a farm and helping a family to transport a sick 
woman to the district hospital (Diary Notes) The town committee acted as 
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the ‗police‘ of the community since there was no police station in the 
Ntonaboma. Arresting civil offenders was not the duty of the UCs, yet the 
town committee performed this function. During my stay in the community I 
observed after one heavy downpour how the town committee chairpersons 
for Yamuoso and Akroso village mobilised some youth to repair the road 
leading to Ntonaboma. The heavy rain had created a big gully in the middle 
of the road making it unmotorable. At that time the only vehicle that plied the 
town was seen loading passengers for Donkorkrom the district capital. 
Though repairing the road was not the function of the ‗town committee‘ they 
still mobilised village members to do it (Diary notes, 16/05/2007).  
  Also, during immunisation programmes such as the polio vaccination 
exercise, the town committee mobilised the community members for the 
exercise. On a visit to the local clinic during a post-natal service I saw 
Madam Beatrice Acheampong, 52, a teacher and a member of the town 
committee who also served on the clinic committee was there supporting the 
nurses. She mentioned that if she was on vacation and in town she helped 
the nurses with both antenatal and post natal services because these 
services were arranged in an alternating pattern at the clinic on every 
Tuesday which happens to be market days. Women in the catchment area of 
the clinic combined their market activities with antenatal or post natal 
attendance. According to her the district had not responded to the 
communities request for additional nurses hence her decision as a TC 
member to help the nurses. Other women were also observed fetching water 
and weeding around the clinic.  
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 Deducing from the narratives of the town committee members during 
the GD it became evident that though their official functions were stipulated 
in LI 1689 (Paragraph 25), in practice majority of their functions were both 
spontaneous and routinised including solving everyday problems and issues 
ranging from that of the district assembly and community to individual 
problems. The flexible nature of the functions of the town committee enabled 
it to respond to the different and changing village circumstances. However, 
the nature of the functioned performed by UC or town committe members 
varied for the different villages. These functions performed by the UC were 
not stated among their official functions but had attained some form of 
regularity within the villages. The observation was that immediately some 
problem occurred in the village, people knew the institution on which to draw 
to get the problem rectified.  
  The multiple and ad hoc functions performed by the town committee 
in Akroso village should not be simply conceived of as the efficient 
functioning of the committee but may be seen as partially emanating from 
some socially embedded principles and values inherent in social 
relationships and pervasive traditional leadership. The strong sense of 
appeal for the elders to attend to village problems and the principle of 
solidarity pervasive among village members as far back as the resettlement 
period made it possible for the town committee to perform these functions. 
This was evident in how the town committee members mobilised collectively 
in responding to village problems. These social values were reflected in the 
interview with Mr. Nketia.   
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‗…immediately something occurs in this village you will see people both young and old 
hurriedly coming out of their homes to find out what is happening. If they come to the scene 
of the incident and find out that they can do something …why not…they will help. Or if there 
is a problem to do with the entire community who ever noticed or identified the problem 
come over to inform the committee and we go to see what has happened then find ways to 
solve it. If it needs time to solve the problem we call for a meeting and then decide on what 
to do. We have an obligation to mobilise the community to find solutions to our problems. 
That is why we [elders] are there‘ (Interview with Mr. Nketia). 
  
 The social obligation generated by village membership drove the 
town committee members to respond spontaneously to these problems. The 
resettlement history of Ntonaboma also suggests that their displacement 
beyond the banks of the Volta Lake made them lonely and detached from 
other villages51. So they have always worked collectively and relied on their 
elders to solve communal problems. Similarly the affinity that exists among 
them leads to spontaneous responses to individual or community problems. 
These functions occurred more in family and kinship obligations but 
extended into other spheres of village life due to a lot of relationships 
emanating from participation in associational activities, especially church 
membership, funerals and labour sharing arrangements, collective travelling 
to market centre among the market women which made individuals to 
responded spontaneously to such sudden occurrences. 
  In practice this complex web of relationships drawn upon in times of 
‗uncertainties‘, be it at the individual or collective level, should not be 
interpreted as instrumental or a ‗reciprocal obligation‘ as used by Scott 
                                                          
51
 During a conversation with one of the village traditional leadership that sought to trace the  
resettlement history of Ntonaboma, he mentioned that they had to move more than hundred 
kilometers from their original settlements near the banks of the Volta Lake during the 
construction of the lake. According to him the resettling period was very painful and difficult 
because they had to leave most of their cash crop, animals and belongings behind. Some 
family members did not resettle to Ntonaboma but rather moved to other areas. According to 
him this brought the various families very close together as they had to depend on one 
another. 
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(1976: 167) but rather as form of ontological security for village members‘ 
uncertainty. For example, interviews illustrated how people consciously and 
unconsciously reacted spontaneously to unforeseen occurrences. Such 
principles of responding unconsciously to these occurrences were 
embedded in community mindednesses, the care for one another, mutuality 
and reciprocity. It is to do with the social values of shared ways of thinking 
and community responsibility. I will use the obligation of funerals to 
individuals to illustrate my point that village members supported one another 
both in terms of uncertainties. 
 
Absolute nature of cooperation  
During funerals you notice poor village members always at the bereaved residence offering 
social support. Individuals provided diverse forms of support, both social and economic 
which were unequal in nature. Some women provided the widow with firewood and foodstuff 
whiles others came to keep her company spending greater part of the day the home of the 
bereaved family. Such instances also favoured the poor who came to support the bereaved 
family as they were also provided with food during their entire stay. Whiles some accepted 
the meal others rejected it. The funeral of Opanin Asiamah illustrates how village members 
both poor and rich provided diverse form of assistance such as weeding around the house, 
putting up tents and arrangement of chairs. The poor members undertook the menial jobs. 
During the funeral itself, members of the town funeral committee who were not family 
members sat at the table for the collection of donations from sympathisers. All these are 
embedded in existing social relationships that conjunct over time 
 
  Responding to some of these uncertainties was not a conscious 
investment in social relations based on preferences but as a routine 
occurring across life courses, sometimes enduring till death. By consciously 
refusing to eat food served while at the same time donating to reduce the 
cost incurred by the bereaved family signifies the extent to which 
cooperation is not much about direct exchange of anticipation of benefit. 
Cleaver (2000), explains that the reciprocal action that occurred in social 
exchange and interaction among social actors are ‗unequal, diffuse and less 
direct occurring over long periods of time‘. 
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  The existing cooperation in Akroso village does not suggest that the 
Akroso village town committee did not encounter problems from members in 
their activities. It is important to note that village practices built on strong 
communal norms of solidarity and reciprocity do not suggest the absence of 
conflict and contestations. Evidence on inter and intra village conflict abound 
in Ntonaboma (I illustrate this in detail in the next chapter). I have shown in 
the previous chapter how the search for a successor for the demised chief of 
Akroso led to a ten year conflict and contestation among two families that 
had to be resolved by the court of appeal. 
  Though most policy documents and studies render the UCs as non 
functional and in some cases nonexistent, evidence especially from Akroso 
village indicates contrary that the dynamics of the UCs through their 
improvisation and flexibility made it possible for the representatives to 
undertake a variety of routine and spontaneous functions in the village. The 
solidarity and the cooperation enjoyed by members in both their collective 
activities and daily interactions shaped positively the activities of the town 
committee. While the criteria for the evaluation of the UC may look out for 
indicators based on the bureaucratic roles, attention is not paid to how local 
governance structures are consciously tinkered with to reflect the village‘s 
own pattern of organisation which may not reflect the bureaucratic intensions 
and purposes of the new local government structure (Villareal, 2002; Long, 
2001).  
  All the ad hoc functions undertaken by the town committee were 
spontaneous, transient in nature and drew on village conventions and beliefs 
which may be ‗invisible‘ to external agents who evaluate these committees 
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without understanding the everyday organising practices that are used to 
resolve community problems. In Mary Douglas‘ (1987) words ―institutions are 
invisible and they do all the thinking‖. 
 
6.4 Meaning of boundaries and ongoing negotiations 
  In this section, I query the over reliance on rigid and static 
administrative boundaries in institutionalised decentralisation that overlook 
the dynamic and fluid character of rural life and existing social relationships 
to advocate for a design view of boundaries as permeable and negotiable. 
Also, decentralisation may become arenas of debate and struggles over the 
boundaries of community (Lentz, 2006). I also illustrate how the meaning of 
boundaries may be re-interpreted within the local arena to mean differing 
claims to the right to resource use.  
  The functional approach to decentralisation requires the demarcation 
of a country into distinct single spatial units that are nested to higher levels of 
authority to enhance the process of governance administration and service 
delivery (Ostrom 2005; Shale, 2005). Legally defined boundaries provide an 
idea about who is included in a jurisdiction; define local arrangements for 
service provision and production, patterns of economic development, and 
the exercise of political power (Owusu, 2009). Ostrom suggests that ‗the 
boundaries of the resource system and the individuals or households with 
rights to harvest the units are clearly defined‘ (2005:259). Robust 
governance institutions should therefore have clearly defined boundaries 
and authority structures to shape the interaction between members.  
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  Critics highlight the permeable, fluid and negotiable nature of 
boundaries (Wong, 2008; Cleaver, 2002, Berry, 1997; 2004), and the 
different meanings that individuals attach to new boundaries (Peters et al, 
1998). Also the unilinear and conscious crafting of institutional arrangements 
for governance purpose may be in dissonance with existing patterns of 
cooperation weakening the new governance arrangements. Franks and 
Cleaver (2005) suggest that people‘s lives are organised and constructed 
through multiple cultural and social networks rather than through 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
  Using evidence from Ntonaboma, I will illustrate in this section how 
the creation of the Digya electoral area out of Ntonaboma resulted in conflict 
between the Traditional councils in Ntonaboma and some settler villages in 
and around Digya. This resulted in fracturing the existing network of trust 
and cooperation among the natives of Agyaade and Akroso villages and the 
settler communities. I also demonstrate that mapping of administrative 
boundaries without giving due attention to the existing patterns of interaction 
could lead to disincentives for cooperation undermining the existing 
livelihood arrangements. The key argument is that drawing on universal 
design principles, in this case clear boundaries, may ignore local sensitivities 
and ‗existing negotiated social practices that are located in wider contexts of 
history, politics and economy‘ (Cleaver and Toner, 2006: 209). 
 
6.4.2 A case of boundary demarcation 
  Before the decentralisation programme in 1988, Ntonaboma and 
surrounding settler villages were part of the Atebubu Local Government in 
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the Brong Ahafo Region. All development issues for the area passed through 
the Ntonaboma Council before being forwarded to Atebubu. Other issues 
such as land were dealt with by the respective traditional Councils52. To 
reduce the transaction cost of doing assembly activities and pursuing all 
developmental needs in Atebubu which was in the Brong Ahafo region, the 
new decentralisation policy framework sought to integrate Ntonaboma and 
its surrounding villages into the administrative set up of the Eastern region. 
This resulted in Ntonaboma Council being made part of Afram Plains district 
which was easily accessible and nearer. The decentralisation programme 
created three assembly member positions for Ntonaboma Area Council 
inclusive of the surrounding settler villages of Aboabo, Friipon, Dodi 
Agyaade, Zikpo and Digya. Two of these positions were located in 
Ntoanaboma (Agyaade/Yamuoso and Akroso) while the other position 
(Digya) was for the other settler villages that farmed on Ntonaboma lands. 
Ntonaboma then became the Area Council (AC) for all the electoral areas. 
  The creation of administrative boundaries that separated Digya and 
its surrounding villages from Ntonaboma resulted in misunderstanding 
between the new representatives of the Digya electoral area and the chiefs 
and elders of Ntonaboma. Prior to the creation of a new administrative area 
for Digya, the chiefs of Ntonaboma collected land rent from the settler 
farmers in the Digya area while they performed all necessary customary rites 
as the custodians of the land around the Volta lake. Having their own 
structural arrangements of local governance that enabled their 
                                                          
52
 Agyaade and Akroso traditional councils continue to be part of the Brong Ahafo Regional  
House of Chiefs though they are officially in Eastern region of Ghana. 
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representative to attend DA meetings and having a local UC that enabled 
them to meet and take decisions was misinterpreted as recognition by state 
authorities of their rights and entitlements to settle on their existing lands.  
  For example, the new assembly member for Digya in 1992 was a 
village headman for Aboabo village along the Volta Lake. On assumption of 
office and the subsequent attendance of DA meetings at Donkorkrom, the 
new DA member together with other headmen decided to sever their links 
with the Ntonaboma Traditional Council and pursue all their development 
needs directly at the district assembly in Donkorkrom. The people of Digya 
strategically stopped paying annual royalties on all land occupied to the 
chiefs of Ntonaboma.  
  In one instance when the Nifahene, a sub-chief of Agyaade village, 
went to one of the settler villages in Digya to collect annual royalties but the 
settlers refused to pay. Their reason for not paying was that as Ghanaians 
they had the right to settle on the land without paying any royalties. The 
settler farmers later gave some charcoal they had packed for sale to the 
Nifahene as part of the royalty to which the Nifahene agreed and accepted.  
 However, the assembly member for Digya upon hearing the incident 
went to the police station in Donkorkrom to lodge a report that the sub-chief 
had forcefully seized charcoal belonging to some settler farmers because 
they declined to pay land rent. The next day the Nifahene of Agyaade village 
was subsequently arrested in Ntonaboma and sent to Donkorkrom for 
prosecution. This occurrence heightened the tension between the two 
contesting Digya area and the chiefs of Agyaade village. Reporting the case 
to the police and the subsequent arrest of the Nifahene by the police was to 
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reinforce the claim by the sellers that they had ceded their relations with 
Agyaade Traditional Council. 
  The internal conflict between the settler villages of Digya and the 
Agyaade traditional council had links with wider relations of conflict between 
Kwahu natives and the Ewes settlers occurring in the Afram plains district 
during the period preceding the decentralisation programme in 1988. The 
historical narratives of the Agyaade Traditional council during the GD 
suggested that the land belongs to them and they had given some portions 
of their lands, the Digya area, to the settler farmers in 1973. According to the 
elders during the resettlement period they became an isolated community 
and as result they decided to accept settler farmers most of whom were 
Ewes on their land. Some of the settlers rented land to start their own farms 
while others were employed by the natives of Ntonaboma to undertake share 
cropping preferably called Abusa or worked as labourers on their farms. A 
minority of the settlers also worked as fishermen on the lake. Contracts 
made between the settlers and the land owners were mostly by word of 
mouth and reinforced by the planting of trees or flowers to serve as visible 
manifestation of the land arrangements (GD with Agyaade Traditional 
Council). 
 The Ntonaboma chiefs and people based on claims to tradition and 
history regarded themselves as the rightful customary owners of the Afram 
Plains land. The Ewes on the other hand, were of the idea that the creation 
of an electoral area with an assembly man and unit committee entitled them 
as Ghanaians to settle on any land in Ghana without paying royalty. Such 
thinking had links to politics at the national level. The claim is that events at 
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the national level, though distant, condition local politics in several possible 
ways (Lund, 2006; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2003). For example, 
the naming of the district as the Afram Plains by the PNDC government in 
contrast to the Kwahu North district, as suggested by the Kwahu chiefs gave 
a wrong impression to the Ewe communities in the Afram Plains. Their 
thinking was that the failure of the Kwahu chiefs‘ to reassert their ownership 
on the lands in Afram Plains had been unsuccessful due to the selection of a 
neutral name by the PNDC administration. The choice of Afram Plains as the 
name of the district reinforced the belief among the Ewe settler villages that 
they could own the land. Various authors write on the inclination of the 
PNDC government towards the Ewe tribe in Ghana because they relied on 
the ewe community for votes during the national elections (Gyimah–Boadi, 
1999; Aryee, 1998). Aryee writes that certain pronouncements of PNDC 
government headed by Rawlings from 1981 to 1992, that ‗nobody brought 
land by birth‘ further deepened the native-settler differences in several parts 
of the country including Ntonaboma.  
 Drawing on such statements, the Ewes villages that formed part of 
the Akroso Yamuoso and Agyaade Traditional councils contested the right of 
these traditional councils to collect royalties from them. The contestations 
and struggles around the demand for payment of royalties by the traditional 
authorities from the Ewe settlers resulted in tension, conflict and severing of 
relations. The Agyaade traditional council after exhausting all ‗informal‘ 
channels at the local level for `resolving the conflict through dialogue sent 
the case to the Brong Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs. However, the Brong 
262 
 
Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs asked that the case be forward to the 
Koforidua High court in the Eastern Region of Ghana.  
  During the protracted court case between the settlers and natives, a 
boat accident occurred on the Digya area of the Volta Lake in which four 
lives were lost. The custom of the area required the chiefs and elders of 
Agyaade traditional council to perform some customary rites as a result of 
the accident on the lake. Due to the ongoing contestations between the 
Traditional councils in Ntonaboma and the settler farmers, the latter failed to 
inform the former to enable them perform the ‗apayee‘ (customary rites) to 
the gods to forestall such future occurrences on the lake. This was because 
inviting the chiefs of Ntonaboma meant accepting that they were the 
custodians and owners of the land hence the need to pay royalties. 
However, when a tragedy re-occurred on the lake within that same period 
that led to a greater number of deaths, the Digya villages recognised the 
need to inform the chiefs of Ntonaboma to perform the necessary customary 
rites to forestall any future disasters on the lake which was central to their 
fishing and transport activities.  
  Through the intervention of the DCE of the Afram Plains District, The 
headmen of Digya apologised to the chiefs and elders of Ntonaboma. The 
apology was accepted after the imposition of a fine on the Digya headmen. 
The headmen paid the fine and also agreed to pay royalties on the land they 
occupied. Subsequently, the necessary rites were performed on the Obosom 
river area of the Volta Lake. Rather than pursuing the case at the formal 
courts of law the chiefs of Ntonaboma withdrew the case and rather sent it to 
the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) for an amicable 
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settlement. The OASL fixed annual royalties that had to be paid by the Digya 
settler villages to which both parties agreed. During the period of the 
fieldwork the Traditional council mentioned that the settler villages upon 
further education by the OASL have consented fully to the payment of 
royalties. 
  Nana Akuamoa Boateng mentioned that ever since resolving the 
problem of royalties the Traditional Council always invited the headmen of 
Digya and the surrounding villages to their Akwaesidae53 festival and the 
Easter harvest. During the annual Easter harvest in Ntonaboma, I noticed 
that the headmen of some settler villages in Digya brought sheep, charcoal 
and yam separately to the chiefs of Akroso, Yamuso and Agyaade to use to 
serve their guests (Field diary). All these activities of exchange illustrate how 
existing institutions shaping cooperation between the natives and settlers 
were taken for granted during the conscious process of institutional crafting 
to delimit the area.  Now, let me pull out the main issues that are significant 
for the purposes of my discussion. 
  The historical narratives and existing management arrangements 
regarding the ownership of land and on-going negotiations that shaped the 
existing resource use arrangements between the natives and the settler 
villages were ignored during the demarcation exercise in favour of a rational 
cost-benefit analysis which revolved around issues of efficiency in 
administration. During the national demarcation exercise in 1988 in which 
the number of district assemblies were increased from 65 to 110 by the then 
Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), three main criteria were used 
                                                          
53 A festival for Akan speaking tribes in Ghana  
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(Owusu, 2005). These criteria were population size, economic viability and 
available infrastructure54 (Wardell and Lund, 2006; Aryee, 2008). Population 
size was the most important factor influencing the demarcation of electoral 
areas for district assembly members and unit committees (Lentz, 2006). The 
formulae for creating boundaries were divorced from village life and existing 
social relationships. 
  Drawing on the contestations and struggles between the Ewe 
settlers and the natives of Agyaade village demonstrate that over relying on 
rigid and inflexible boundaries in order to reduce ‗uncertainty‘ and provide 
clarity in government provisioning of infrastructure and other facilities 
inadequately considers the existing management arrangements and the 
livelihood networks that are at play within the area. Boundaries according to 
Walker et al (1998 :19), ―may not lie so much in the ways that they divide 
people and landscapes as in the ways they constitute an arena where these 
groups struggle to define their respective rights and obligation‘‖.  
  The existing cooperation witnessed in the area was a reflection of a 
series of historical negotiations over access and rights to resource use. So, 
by putting in place an institutional arrangement that focused explicitly on 
legal administrative boundaries gave little attention to the history of the 
relationship between the natives and the migrant settlers. According to 
Dejene (2004), the most basic weakness of delimiting administrative 
boundaries for decentralisation purposes is that it neglects the complex form 
of rights that exist in traditional societies. This may displace the historical 
                                                          
54 Article 1(4) of Act 462 specifically stipulates the use of population, economic viability and  
land size as the determining factors in the creation of new districts. See Aryee (2008) for 
detailed discussion. 
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resource use pattern in such communities resulting in the breakdown of the 
socially embedded arrangements that govern interaction over resource use.  
  We see in the area an existing multiple and overlapping 
management arrangements which are outcomes of ‗a constellation of social 
interactions‘ (Berry, 1997: 1228). For example, the Ntonaboma traditional 
council had ongoing relations with the people of Digya that shaped the 
access and distribution of resources which were critical to the livelihood 
concerns of both the natives of Ntonaboma and the settlers of Digya. While 
some of the natives had employed settlers as farm labourers on their farms, 
others had given out land for share cropping that fell within the territory of the 
new Digya electoral area. Other individuals from Digya were fishermen on 
the Volta Lake whose wives also processed the fish for other markets in the 
Ntonaboma area. There were other individuals both natives and settlers who 
owned cattle and so grazed their animals on lands that belong to 
Ntonaboma. The demarcation exercise was blind to these ethnic differences, 
movements, negotiations livelihood networks and the management 
arrangement that existed between Ntonaboma and the surrounding villages.  
  It also sidestepped the diverse institutional arrangements that 
supported different people‘s entitlement and endowments to resources 
resulting in tension (Leach et al, 1999). The headmen who contested the 
payment of royalties were all located beyond the Obosom River and had 
their own farms and villages. However, there were other settlers who either 
lived closer to Ntonaboma or worked as share croppers for the natives of 
Ntonaboma. Such individuals were put in an intricate position concerning 
their simultaneous interactions with their land owners and their own kinsmen.  
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  The boundary demarcation exercise for electoral areas for the 
purposes of decentralisation was re-interpreted by the settlers to mean the 
overthrow of all the rules in use. Berry (2004: 85) suggests that official 
recognition of the rights of certain marginalised groups through governance 
reforms may lead to ‗heightened ethnic tensions‘ exacerbating any conflict 
among people who peacefully coexisted before the reforms. For example, 
after the headman who was elected as an assembly man participated in 
assembly meetings, he perceived the new institutional arrangements as 
giving them the entitlement and endowment to the existing resources without 
recourse to the payment of royalties. The claim by the Digya headmen was 
that, ‗the state had carved out their own land for them; hence there was no 
need to pay royalties to the land owners of Ntonaboma‘. Such claims were 
inferred from the neutral name given to the district and the statement 
attributed to the president of the country at that ‗no one own land by birth‘. 
Their contestation based on this notion sought to push the intentions of the 
mapping exercise into new paths which did not reflect the intensions and 
purposes of the decentralisation exercise. This illustrates how planned 
interventions may lead to unpredictable outcomes as state policies enmesh 
with local actors and their projects and the relations of power in which they 
are structured (Long, 2001; Long and Long, 1992). 
  The stability that existed before the demarcation exercise was taken 
for granted, yet it was shaped by diverse social arrangements which were 
the outcome of bargaining and negotiations occurring over life time. Hence 
putting in a clearly defined boundary to help in decision-making and the 
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provision of social amenities may end up promoting uncertainty and conflict 
over claims to resource undermining rather than increasing cooperation. 
  On the remote side of the discussion, the example also highlights the 
use of multiple channels to peacefully resolve conflict (Maganga, 2002; 
Benjaminsen and Lund, 2002). Both the traditional authorities and the settler 
headmen relied on the use of formal channels to resolve their claim to 
resources. Whiles the traditional council drew on the formal court system to 
settle the conflict, the settler villages used the law enforcement institution 
that is the police, to settle their difference with the traditional authority. We 
noticed that the settler villages avoided the traditional council during the first 
boat disaster due to the ongoing conflict and the breakdown of normal 
relations between them. However, when the boat disaster reoccurred they 
had to draw on an existing institution to renegotiate with the traditional 
council to perform the required customary rites on the Obosom River to 
forestall any future occurrences of boat disasters. The traditional council also 
had to draw on another formal institution to support the informal agreement 
reached on the resolution of the conflict. This reinforces the assertion in the 
post-instiutional literature that people draw on a variety of institutional 
channels, both traditional and modern to legitimise their claim to resources 
(Benjaminsen and Lund 2002; Odgaard‘s 2002). 
  Drawing on culture to mend their fragile relations with the Agyaade 
traditional council and to foster future cooperation, the headmen of the Digya 
settler villages approached the Agyaade Traditional council to negotiate for 
the pouring of libation on the Obosom River. Their decision to negotiate for 
the peaceful resolution of the conflict was premised on a belief that a 
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supernatural being was punishing them for contesting the rightful claim of the 
Ntonaboma traditional council to the land. The belief among the settler 
villages that without the performance of necessary rituals by the custodians 
of the land, in this case Ntonaboma traditional council, other uncertainties in 
the form of another boat disaster, deaths, or sickness may befall them. Such 
a negative occurrence will have negative consequences on their livelihood 
and well being. Such thinking made the headmen of the settler villages to re-
negotiate with the Akroso and Agyaade traditional councils. This illustrates 
the extent to which deeply embedded social arrangements and principles 
could be drawn upon to shape cooperation. 
  The institutional design principles advocate for rigorous, enforced 
and impartial sanctions applied against non co-operators (Ostrom, 1990, 
1992), yet in the accounts of both settlers and natives we see the desire for 
compromise and reconciliation.  Though the settlers were fined an amount of 
money in addition to a sheep and schnapps by the Agyaade traditional 
council this was meant to foster reconciliation and peaceful coexistence 
rather than as a form of punishment. The schnapps were used to pour 
libation and offer prayers to both ancestors and those present to bear 
witness to the resolution of the conflict and celebrate reconciliation. 
  Significant to this is the public consumption of the schnapps from the 
Digya headmen by everyone present. This process served as a sign of 
bearing witness to the reconciliation process. This also provided the platform 
for these individuals to be called upon to testify as witness in future 
269 
 
contestations concerning competing claims land ownership55 among 
between the Digya settlers and the traditional council in Ntonaboma. All the 
individuals present are requested to pass it on to future generation so that 
they or the generation yet unborn could be called upon to testify during 
future conflicts. As Berry (1997) explains narratives of past transactions 
constitute important evidence to substantiate or challenge contemporary 
claims to land (1235).  
  The example also illustrates the relationship between people‘s 
social, natural and the supernatural worlds which are of prime importance to 
people‘s cosmology. The human, natural and spiritual worlds are in dynamic 
interaction with one another and shape the way individuals interact. 
Cosmology gives shape to cultural values, ethics, and basic norms and rules 
of a society (Berkes and Folke, 1998). In Ghana, people perceive a link 
between ancestors, the living and generations unborn, so libation is offered 
to invoke the spirits of the ancestors to bear witness to the peaceful 
resolution of the problem and the agreement reached. The belief in the 
existence of a supernatural authority facilitated the decision of the Digya 
chiefs to settle the dispute and have the traditional authorities to pour the 
libation. The normative sacred significance attributed to land and water 
influenced the settler Ewe villages in the Digya area to believe that the 
ongoing conflict with the natives resulted in the calamities occurring to their 
                                                          
55  Once the individual drinks the schnapp it signifies the desire to be a truthful witness in  
times of future contestations between the two parties on the same issue. Traditionally the 
schnapp is similar in colour to water; therefore drinking the contents signifies your ability to 
separate the truth from falsehood and to always say the truth anytime you are called upon as 
a witness to the case. 
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kinsmen on the Obosom river section of the Volta Lake. All these processes 
and interactions shaped outcomes for local governance. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
  This chapter has illuminated the non-functional nature of institutions 
in local governance practice within a specific context. The chapter has 
emphasised on the interplay between bureaucratic and socially embedded 
institutions to shape the outcomes of decentralisation. The key issue 
highlighted in the chapter was the diversity of institutions of various forms in 
local governance. I argued that consciously crafting local government 
structures to shape community organisation was problematic as everyday 
village interactions occur in diverse arenas and shaped by multiple 
institutions channels.  Arrangements for community governance as shown in 
the chapter were less conscious and less functional in nature, occurring 
spontaneously to solve uncertainties within the community.  
  Specifically, the chapter demonstrated that flexible and adaptive 
institutions are very important in the day-to-day management of the 
community in spite of the marginality of the area. I also demonstrated that 
the over-reliance on consciously crafting new organisations to formalise 
community participation in institutionalised decentralisation is inconsistent 
with the realities of social life as these new organisations fail to provide 
individuals especially the poor with any ontological security in times of 
uncertainties. It is difficult to design formal organisations for local 
governance due to the flexible and dynamic nature of rural life where a lot of 
interactions occur through socially embedded institutions. Individuals rarely 
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only depended on specific institutional arrangements to shape their 
interactions. Rather, they relied on both bureaucratic and socially embedded 
channels in their everyday interactions. The chapter demonstrated that 
standard procedures that shape the practice of decentralisation oversimplify 
the social world and the processes within it. I argued that village boundaries 
are not static but rather permeable and fluid.  Also, the different meanings 
that people attached to spatial boundaries lead to unintended outcomes for 
the practice of decentralisation.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE COMPLEXITY OF AUTHORITY IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 7.1 Introduction 
   This chapter continues with the critique of the ‗technocratic‘ 
approach to institutional decentralisation. Having discussed the over 
romanticisation of active citizenship in chapter five and the overreliance on 
formal local government structures in chapter six, I now shift my attention to 
the narrow conceptions of authority and power in institutionalised 
decentralisation. The theoretical literature on decentralisation provides 
normative discussions on the standard procedures for devolving authority 
and power to local level communities (Agrawal and Ribot, 2000). Devolving 
power through citizenship rights to the locality is a top-down managerial 
process and may not transform the existing power relations that shape 
interaction and cause social exclusion within a particular context. 
   In chapter six, the complexity of institutions at play at the local level 
was illuminated. I demonstrated the complex nature of institutions involved in 
village governance, many of which were socially embedded, as well as their 
dynamic and often contested nature. Berry (1993: 20) writes that, institutions 
―constitute a contested terrain in which different interests are played out, 
subject to power and authority relations‖. Yet, institutionalised 
decentralisation policy couches authority in simplistic terms, as putting in 
place within a delimited space a new authority structure ―to coordinate 
individual decisions and regulate their implementation‖ (Plateau and 
Abraham, 2002: 109). The assertion that institutions are subject to multiple 
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interpretations and frequent redefinition in the course of daily practice, 
makes it very important for the processes through which authority is enacted 
and legitimated in daily practice to be explored. Furthermore, the state 
bureaucracy at the rural areas in Ghana is perceived to be weak (Boafo-
Arthur, 2001).  
   Concerns are also raised about the use of authority in institutional 
literatures as over simplistic and failing to take into account the different 
claims to tradition and custom as sources of authority (Moore, 2000; 
Cleaver, 2000). A further argument made in this chapter is that, it is difficult 
to identify and define simple authority structures that can take overall 
responsibility for community activities (Franks et. al, 2005). Another obvious 
problem is the de-politicisation of decentralisation (Geiser and Rist, 2009; 
Mohan and Stoke, 2000). 
   I intend to build on the gaps above to demonstrate that the local 
arena is not so harmonious and devoid of politics and power making it 
possible for authority to be simply enacted based on legal statutes derived 
from the state. Rather authority is socially enacted and legitimated through 
practice often involving negotiation and contestation leading to competing 
claims to legitimacy and authority. The key issue in this chapter is that 
decentralisation by its very basic intentions is a political concept hence it is 
important to re-politicise the practice of decentralisation to highlight the 
contestations, struggles and negotiations that take place at the local level.  
   The chapter begins by highlighting the inadequate conceptualisation 
of the political within the decentralisation framework. The section that follows 
questions the narrow emphasis placed on roles and positions in local 
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government arrangements by arguing that just creating roles or templates for 
action does not constitute the actual capacity to govern. The discussion on 
differences in authority relations leads me to the issue of legitimacy in 
decentralisation.  
  Governments all over the world are transferring power from the 
central state to local level institutions. For example in Ghana, the local 
Government Act 642, 1993, transferred the power and authority from the 
central government to various local government structures for the purpose of 
improving service delivery, local development and management. 
Decentralisation discourse simplistically conceives representative authority 
as legitimised through legal instruments of the state. For example, the mode 
of implementing authority or local government structures at the community 
level is through legal administrative instruments of the state. Also, local 
government structures at the community level are meant to meet the narrow 
economic and political interest of the state. However, I argue that such a 
conceptualisation of authority within decentralisation policy and practice is 
problematic because authority in reality is not fixed and static but a dynamic 
societal practice that is continuously enacted through everyday encounters 
among diverse social actors. The chapter continues by highlighting the 
shifting, dynamic and complex nature of authority in local governance. 
  
275 
 
7.2 Putting Power and Politics back into Institutionalised 
Decentralisation 
 
   Inadequate attention has been given to the dynamics of politics, 
power and conflict within local governance, and to the ways in which 
decentralisation processes intersect with such dynamics (Bebbington et. al, 
2004). The issue of politics in decentralisation debates is narrowly focused 
on elections which inadequately capture politics as essentially being about 
governing. The political dimension of decentralisation relates to how various 
stakeholders with diversity of interest, preferences, values and ideas, 
consciously sort out their differences through cooperation, conflict and 
negotiation (Leftwich, 2000). Conceptualising politics as a process of 
governing provides useful insights into the day-to-day accommodation, 
negotiation and contestation that take place in the decision-making arena 
which is often sidestepped in decentralisation which is rather benignly 
conceived as a neutral ‗technology of government‘ maintaining the existing 
power relations within the community. The examples in this section illustrate 
how decentralisation did not affect the local power structure and access to 
resources in Ntonaboma.  
   In this section, I will first demonstrate that local government 
arrangements fail to represent the interest of the people down the social 
hierarchy in the village. Secondly, the conflict over land among the four 
villages in Ntonaboma favours those who are already powerful within the 
locality. I finally highlight how the UCs and DAs may further the interest of 
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the more powerful using the case of regulating charcoal production in 
Ntonaboma. 
 
 7.2.1 Internal struggles over village decisions 
   In this section, I attempt to illustrate how negotiations about general 
issues that affect Ntonaboma community are handled differently in each of 
the four villages leading to variations in outcomes. Evidence from the study 
revealed how the disbursement of funds from the Volta River Authority 
(VRA) resettlement trust fund meant to rehabilitate old resettlement houses 
in 2008 resulted in different outcomes for each of the four villages. The 
outcomes of decisions were mostly influenced by the local power structures 
through which negotiation occurred within each village. 
   The resettlement contract between the Government of Ghana and 
the four resettlement villages in Ntonaboma required the state to renovate 
their resettlement houses after every 15 years. However, for the last thirty 
years the state has not provided the funds for the renovation of these 
resettlement houses. In December, 2007, the state through the VRA 
resettlement Fund initiated arrangements to pay all outstanding areas to the 
four villages.  In May 2008, the VRA Trust Fund paid all outstanding arrears 
for the renovation of the resettlement houses allocated to them by the state 
in 1958 to all the four villages in Ntonaboma. The outstanding arrears for 
each resettlement village were paid in full to the respective chief of the four 
resettlement villages. 
   While all members of the four villages wanted the funds to be shared 
individually among the current owners to renovate their houses, the village 
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hierarchy in Ntonaboma on the other hand, wanted the money to either go 
into the construction of a police station in Ntonaboma or be shared partially 
among the original and the current owners. However, the Akroso village 
leadership failed in their bid to get the leadership of the other three villages 
to commit to the use of the funds for the construction of a police station. In 
the two villages of Yamuoso and Agyaade, the funds were shared partly 
among the original and current owners of the resettlement houses because 
few of the resettlement houses had gone over to new owners. In Supom 
village the funds were given to only the current owners because the majority 
of original owners of the resettlement homes had migrated to re-settle at 
bridgeano56 due to the continuous flooding of their homes during heavy 
rains. The majority of the people who constituted the authority structure in 
Supom village were the current occupiers facilitating the distribution of the 
funds among only the current occupiers.  
   In Akroso village, the inability of the assembly man, traditional 
council, the town committee, and some influential village members to arrive 
at a consensus on how the funds were to be distributed resulted in ongoing 
struggles and contestations. This issue was deliberately removed from the 
agenda of Akroso village town committee meetings on two occasions by 
Nana Akuamoah Boateng in March and June, 2008 respectively with the 
explanation that the funds had already been invested in treasury bills for a 
period of one year. The funds were invested to enable the traditional council 
accrue interest for other developmental projects in the Akroso village.  
                                                          
56
 This is the new settlement where the people of supom had moved to the banks of the Obosom river  
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   Nana Akuamoah Boateng of Akroso village mentioned that the 
decision to invest the money in treasury bills was not discussed with the 
village members because that would have taken a longer time. Delaying in 
investing the funds would have affected the high interest rate prevailing at 
the time when the decision to invest the funds was made by the village 
leadership. He explained that the village leadership of Akroso will share the 
money with only the original owners of the resettlement houses when the 
Treasury bill matures. Others who bought the houses from original owners 
will not benefit. This decision has caused tension and resentment among 
Akroso village members especially those who bought their resettlement 
houses and have spent some money to renovate their houses.  
   Another important issue that has been deliberately avoided by the 
other village leadership is the continuous flooding of the Supom village 
during heavy rains. The members of the VRA resettlement fund had agreed 
in principle to support a project to re-house families whose structures get 
flooded but the paramount chiefs of the other villages whose members 
constitute the majority on the VRA Resettlement Fund Committee are yet to 
discuss it and make subsequent follow ups. According to the Supom village 
chief, before the resettlement they were the first village along the linear 
settlement but during the resettlement they became the last village situating 
them at the lower part of the village. Their present position was due to the 
delay in moving from their earlier village. When they finally resettled at 
Ntonaboma the other villages had occupied houses on the upper 
topography. Despite efforts to get the issue resolved by the VRA Trust Fund, 
they are yet to have the commitment and support of the other three villages. 
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To avoid any conflict, majority of the indigenous people of Supom village 
have moved out to re-settle on the banks of the Obosom River though they 
still maintain contact with relatives in Supom village. 
    
 7.2.2 Power struggles over ownership rights and entitlement to lands  
   In this section, I argue that decentralisation is more than just the 
introduction of new reforms and mechanisms for governance but about 
negotiation and contestation over resources (May the reader please turn to 
appendix II, page 350 to read the full interview with Nana Adade Bekoe II, 
the paramount chief of Yamuoso traditional area, to fully understand the 
contestations and struggles over land in Ntonaboma and how tension among 
the four villages shaped the outcome of local government structures). 
Understanding property, in this case land, ―as the relationship between 
people about things‖ helps illuminate the intricate networks that exist 
between ‗property relations, family obligation, community life and power 
relations‘ (Nuijten and Lorenzo, 2009: 82). Therefore conflict over aspects of 
property such as the differing claims to land ownership as pertains in 
Ntonaboma has consequences for multiple dimensions of social life.  
   My argument is that, local government reforms in Ghana have failed 
to holistically address other important issues that affect the local political 
context. Whereas in other countries such as West Bengal, decentralisation 
reforms were introduced alongside other reforms (Crook and Sverrisson, 
2001), in Ghana, decentralisation reforms are normally implemented as a 
single coherent policy to address issues of governance and service delivery 
without giving adequate attention to other issues that shape governance 
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within the locality. Decentralisation reforms in Ghana since 1972 have failed 
to address the differing claims to land ownership in Ntonaboma. 
Decentralisation reforms in Ghana are experienced at the local level through 
the inauguration of local government structures and elections but no 
conscious effort is made to address the fundamental questions of power, 
hierarchy and exclusion shaping community participation in the locality. My 
arguments is that, implementing local government structures such as the 
UCs without adequate attention to the existing structural factors carries the 
risk of simply reinforcing existing power hierarchies and generating further 
frustrations among the general populace of the locality. 
   For administrative and policy purposes, Ntonaboma has always 
been regarded as a coherent and homogeneous unit of local government 
with little attention paid to power, conflict and or perhaps politics among the 
four villages. However, interviews with traditional authority figures from all 
the four villages clearly revealed fault lines among the traditional leadership, 
ongoing contestation and differing claims to control over resources. The full 
interview with the local chief of Yamuoso village, Nana Adade Bekoe II 
reveals how the competing claims to land ownership among the four chiefs 
in Ntonamboma has the potential to lead to conflict if not properly addressed. 
This misunderstanding on various claims to ownership of unused 
government acquired lands in Digya among the four villages and the 
disregard for their concerns has led to some people of Supom village moving 
out of Ntonaboma to the banks of the Obosom River.  
   These ongoing struggles have also affected the performance of the 
local government structures in Ntonaboma. Evidence from Ntonaboma 
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revealed that all four villages will want to have their own institutional 
arrangement to manage their respective village activities in contravention to 
the local government structure implmented by the decentralisation reforms. 
For example participation among the four villages occurred when it involved 
petitioning the district assembly for resources or attention to particular issues 
affecting the entire Ntonaboma villages. 
   For the purposes of administrative convenience the PNDC 
government added Ntonaboma to Afram Plains. The Agyaade and Akroso 
village chiefs are paramount chiefs because customarily they owned the 
Digya lands. The Supom and Yamuoso village chiefs by custom are subjects 
of the Kwahu Omanhene. Therefore, they are custodians of the lands that 
belonged to the Kwahu Omanhene.  During the Acheampong government in 
1976 the lands in Digya were acquired for the state and compensations paid 
to the chiefs in Akroso and Agyaade (COHRE, 2006).  However, the Akroso 
and Agyaade chiefs claim the state had not paid full compensation for their 
lands acquired so customarily and legally they still have control over 
ownership and entitlements of the lands. This has been a controversial and 
contested issue among the four village chiefs in Ntonaboma since the 1970s. 
   Despite several attempts by the chiefs of Yamuoso and Supom 
villages to deliberate and settle the claim to ownership of land and other 
resources, the chiefs from Akroso and Agyaade villages have failed to get 
the issue discussed by the Ntonaboma Traditional Council. The chief of 
Yamuoso village during the interview suggested that he may have to go to 
court one day if the government fails to respond to their request for a 
clarification on payment of royalties to the land owners. The chief mentioned 
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that at the moment the case was with his lawyers but was yet to be filed in 
court. We see some principle of conflict avoidance shaping the action of the 
Yamuoso chief to formally send the issue to court. 
   Though power struggles are imminent in social life, the four chiefs 
will not overtly contest each other over control or ownership rights over land 
within the Ntonaboma community; such a process of contestation took place 
in other arenas outside Ntonaboma. The principle of conflict avoidance 
shapes how the various chiefs pursue the matter within the spatial confines 
of Ntonaboma. The chiefs of Yamuoso and Supom villages have sent a 
petition to both the government through the Eastern Regional Coordinating 
Council and the Brong Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs for an interpretation 
of the law on payment of royalties. At the time of the field study in 2007, no 
response had been received from the government. The Yamuoso and 
Supom village chiefs accused the paramount chief of Akroso of using his 
position and knowledge as a lawyer to re-interpret the issue of land 
acquisition and payment of royalties in his favour.  
   The interviews with certain sub-chiefs suggested that the people of 
Supom and Yamuoso villages want the government to ―interpret the meaning 
of government acquisition, payment of compensation and how it relates to 
land rights. But up till now no government official has come to explain all 
these meanings of acquisition, stool land and payment of compensation to 
us‖ (Interview on 13/04/2007 with Nana Adae Frimpong, Sub Chief of 
Yamuoso village). This demonstrates the inability of the Yamuoso village 
chief to link up with a ‗politico-legal institutions‘ at the state level to support 
his claim to land. Not until the contestations over land is settled by a 
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recognised and competent institutions, the tension over land right and 
ownership will continue to persist eventually ending up in conflict. 
   The struggles for power through the contestation over claims to land 
ownership affected the local governance process in Ntonaboma. Sikor and 
Lund (2009) explain that the control and ownership over land and other 
resources have consequences for the nature of power and authority; yet 
successive local government reforms pay inadequate attention to these 
issues. The polarised relationship among the four chiefs permeated into the 
nature of cooperation for collective action among the four villages. Clear 
examples are the ban imposed on charcoal burning for commercial purposes 
and on the indiscriminate grazing of cattle on people‘s farm. 
 
 Disregard for community rules by the powerful 
 Some of the chiefs have bought cows and employed Fulani herdsmen to rear the cows for 
them. The cows destroy people‘s farm and pollute sources of drinking water. The authorities 
are aware but nothing is being done to stop the menace. There are four chiefs in 
Ntonaboma but agreeing on how to solve the charcoal problem is a challenge. At least two 
of the chiefs from Supom and Yamuoso villages have met to discuss the charcoal problem 
and prohibited their people from engaging in charcoal production. However, the other chiefs 
disagree with the ban making it difficult to enforce the ban. Recently, one of the chiefs 
engaged Sisala people from the Northern region to go into commercial charcoal production 
opening the gate for everybody to do likewise. Community members now do not observe the 
ban on charcoal production because they don‘t understand why strangers who do not 
belong to the community are busily into charcoal production to earn income whilst local 
people are not allowed to do so. However, village members look up to the District Assembly 
to enforce the ban through the assembly men and the area councils.  The area councils are 
non-existent and the assembly members will not want to challenge the chiefs. Even if the 
chiefs agree to the ban, it is the DA and UC members who have to enforce it but they also 
have their children and nephews into the charcoal business so how do they enforce the ban 
(Interview with Seth Ofori, Resident of Akroso Village on the 12/02/2007).  
  
 More so, the current land ownership also favours the people of 
Akroso village who are in the majority and perpetuate their dominance in the 
community. For example, the Akroso chief who had ownership of some of 
the lands in the Digya area had mobilised some settlers to produce charcoal 
on his land against the bye-laws of the district assembly. This has also 
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enabled other village members to partake in the charcoal business. Though 
the other chiefs are against the continuous degrading of the forest by cutting 
down trees for charcoal production, they have failed in their attempt to 
enforce the bye-law or get the issue onto the decision-making agenda due to 
the active involvement of the Akroso village chief. The Akroso village chief is 
a paramount chief with other sub-chiefs under his jurisdiction. Among the 
four chiefs in Ntonaboma it is only Akroso and Agyaade chiefs who are 
members of the Brong-Ahafo Traditional Council.  
   Also the administrative delimitation for decentralisation in 
Ntonaboma reveals the reproduction of the existing unequal power 
relationships among the four villages. Out of the four UCs in Ntonaboma, 
Akroso village had two whiles Supom, Yamuoso, and Agyaade villages 
shared the remaining two units. Akroso village elected their own DA member 
whilst the three other villages combined had one representative to the district 
assembly. Though rational factors were used to delimit the current 
boundaries in Ntonaboma, different meanings were deduced from the 
process to reinforce the power and authority of the already powerful villages. 
Since institutions are highly interrelated a change within one institution, 
without a corresponding change in the others has little impact in the overall 
structure of authority. This implies that focusing on the managerial and 
technical aspects of decentralisation seen in blue print procedures does little 
to engage with the existing unequal access to resources and the unequal 
dynamics of power at the ‗local‘ level (Corbridge, 2008; Mohan and Stoke, 
2000).  
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 7.3 Do explicit roles or blueprints for action equal power to govern? 
  Programs to devolve governance to the community level are 
generally based on the assumption that local people will take on the roles 
and positions formerly assigned to the state. According to Uphoff (2000) for 
people to become organised and act collectively, they need to have some 
recognised roles, formal or informal, along with supporting rules, precedents 
and procedures to enable them to perform their basic functions57. For Lopez 
and Scott (2000: 30), …‗roles are definitions of those things that people are 
expected to do…They are blueprints or templates for action…They specify 
the rights and obligations that are entailed in social positions, and tell us 
what is expected of us and what we should expect others to do‘ (ibid: 30). 
The concentration on roles and the characteristics of the interlocutors 
occupying these role positions in institutional decentralisation suggest that 
more emphasis is placed on fixed managerial and technical aspects in 
constituting authority than on the capability of the role incumbent to 
undertake these functions in reality.   
   My concern is with the functions to be enacted by persons who 
assume these role positions and their ability to act these normative role 
functions in practice. The claim in most decentralisation policy that local 
government structures will necessarily be capable of performing the roles 
and responsibilities assigned to them under devolution programs in the 
institutional literature is overly simplistic and naive. Simply creating local 
authority structures and assigning them roles and responsibilities to manage 
                                                          
57
 These functions include decision-making, resource mobilisation and management,  
communication and coordination, and conflict resolution that are essential for any  
organisation and collective action. 
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decentralised programmes is unlikely to succeed unless there are sufficient 
support services to build the local institutional capacity of the authority 
system to function effectively (Cleaver and Franks, 2005; Larson, 2002). The 
narrow focus on the technical capacities of committee members mask the 
power dynamics shaping relations of authority. I will use field evidence from 
Ntonaboma to demonstrate that the UCs and DA as formal authority 
structures for local government within Ghana‘s decentralisation programme 
lack the prerequisite capacity and resources to perform their functions.  
   During the period of the field study a new UC had been elected into 
office but the inability of the District Assembly to agree on the election of a 
presiding member delayed the inauguration of the UCs to enable them to 
formally operate. However, the new members of the UC were invariably 
existing representatives, so they were able to undertake their functions even 
though they were yet to be officially inaugurated. These new members who 
were few58 and were not expected to affect significantly the activities of the 
UCs in their respective villages. Evidence from my study confirmed the 
dearth of human resources available within the local authority structures. 
This manifested in the paucity in the number of qualified or educated 
individuals who served on the UCs and DA. As shown in Chapter Four, 
professionals such as Mr. Nketia, Mr. Apreku Nkanasah and Nana 
Akuamoah Boateng who had knowledge of the workings of government 
dominated these institutions. The professional members of the UC were a 
source of information and advised the village members on a range of issues.  
                                                          
   58  Four from Sukuumu and Ahenbono UCs in Akroso village , two from JSS UC and  
               three from Agyaade/Yamuoso UCs.  
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  In spite of the usefulness of the few professionals among the UCs, their 
narratives suggested that they continued to lack core competencies in local 
government. For example, during the preparation of the five year 
development plan for the district in 2001, all the four villages in Ntonaboma 
had to rely on an external consultant hired by the district assemblies to 
support the UCs in the preparation of development plans and other activities 
that needed specialist know how. Interviewees cited a host of external 
consultants who were either engaged by the district assembly or other NGOs 
to perform certain activities within the villages. Examples of consultants 
mentioned during the GD were the consultants who undertook the 
participatory needs assessment for the Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA) including the consultant who undertook the Urban II Water Project 
mapping exercise. The paradox of the whole issue is that the government is 
required by law to appoint five members who possess technocratic skills to 
the UC in the event that popular election of the majority of UC members 
failed to produce technocratic competent persons, yet the government 
appointees to the DAs have tended to be political activists and local notables 
but hardly technocrats.   
   Within the authority structure, I observed a process of a ‗competent 
minority‘ at the helm of affairs of the UC and the ‗majority others‘ who were 
less educated and had limited knowledge of the functions of the UC. This 
categorisation of the committee members is for the purpose of analysis and 
clarity of discussion. The asymmetrical nature of individual resources and 
skills among committee members reinforced existing inequalities both within 
the town committees and among village members. The argument is that if 
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individual exercise of agency is tied into relations of power and authority 
then, certain individuals with allocative or authoritative resources are 
advantaged to shape the outcomes of interaction among the committee 
members. 
   The ‗majority others‘ had very low educational backgrounds and 
professional experience. Hence individuals with ‗authoritative‘ resources 
such as the Chairmen of the UCs, in the case of Akroso, the town 
committee, have absolute control of the activities of the committee, thereby 
shaping the involvement of the other members in the daily management of 
the activities of the committee. For example, in the town committee of 
Akroso village you could notice the subordinate positions of some of these 
members, especially Michael Ampoma and Kwasi Owusu who usually come 
to Mr. Nketia‘s house in the morning to take instructions to undertake certain 
functions on his behalf. As a former head of the Eastern Regional 
Presbyterian Education Unit you could notice the bureaucratic characteristics 
inhered in his mode of management and the unequal nature of their relations 
with the chairman. Meetings were either held in Mr. Nketiah‘s compound or 
at the Akroso chief‘s palace. In Agyaade village, the chairman of the UC was 
Nana Agyei Boateng, Adontehene who worked at the district education office 
at Donkorkrom. All these reinforced the dominant position of the chairmen of 
the various committees. 
   Within the authority structure of the town committee, and other 
village formal spaces the selection of certain individuals into leadership 
positions was partly informed by the perception that these individuals had 
appropriate managerial skills and adequate technical knowledge of the 
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workings of the state which they could draw on to get ‗development‘ for the 
village. These factors were also bolstered by the position of these individuals 
up the village hierarchy. These factors, however, provided the resources for 
the UC leadership to usurp the activities of the committee. Authoritative and 
allocative power structures give specific power to some which are denied to 
others. Some individuals become more powerful in the UC. This tendency 
contradicts the egalitarian principle that underlies institutionalised 
decentralisation which advocates for devolution of power to local 
communities so that decision-making among heterogeneous individuals 
could be done through open deliberations without the powerful strategically 
manipulating the other. It is important to note that the new formal structures 
of authority at the village level were captured by the more powerful local 
actors who got on to these committees or perpetuated the existing relations 
of patronage. 
   Further discussion with the retired village leaders like Mr. Nketia 
revealed their preference to go it alone in order to achieve tangible results 
rather than spending much time on arriving at final consensus decision. 
According to him bringing the entire village together to deliberate on trivial 
issues was not necessary and only wastes time. These ‗elitist conservatives‘ 
always do it alone and call for village meetings when they had to inform 
village members of the outcome of the decision on a project. For them their 
tenure will be accessed based on the tangible projects they brought to 
township. However, getting things done in their own ways and relying on 
informal channels of decisions making had negative consequences for the 
poor and disadvantaged within the village who were less capable of 
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negotiating the outcomes of decision-making. The key issue here was the 
quality of representation which according to village members was really able 
to get them their developmental needs. 
   The example of how beneficiaries were selected to benefit from the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) demonstrates that people who 
benefitted from external funds were negotiated in a manner that made it 
opaque eventually benefitting a few people. Commenting on the selection 
process for beneficiaries, some village members explained that, during the 
scheduled meeting with the DA member and the MCA official when 
information about the project was made known, only selected members from 
the four villages were invited. It was after the meeting that the leadership in 
each of the four villages informed members in respective village meetings 
about a fund that will soon be available to village members and they need to 
form cooperatives in order to benefit. Information on how to form the groups 
and the procedure for accessing the loans were not well explained. Evidence 
from the village members revealed that village leaders quickly formed groups 
with their immediate family members as constituting the members of the 
groups and registered these groups with a constitution at the Registrars 
General‘s office in Koforidua, the regional capital. People with little resources 
and who lacked the means to engage actively with the application process 
did not benefit from the MCA loan. Thus, village members who did not have 
the right connections to the spaces of power were less likely to be included.  
This reinforces a problem that is well recognised in the literature on 
decentralisation that the devolution of power will not necessarily lead to 
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transparency and accountability as in many instances empowered local 
elites capture a large share of resources often at the expense of the poor. 
   During village meetings I noticed the village elders especially those 
of Agyaade were very authoritative in which their ‗bureaucratic way of doing 
things‘ acquired while working in the civil service was brought to bear in 
chairing these village meetings. For example during a village meeting in 
Agyaade the chairperson shouted at a young man for interrupting him in the 
middle of his speech. The young man quietly walked away from the meeting 
murmuring as a form of protest to the way he was handled by the 
chairperson (Field notes, village meeting 13/02/07).  
   The structure of relations that develops between the ‗competent 
minority‘ and the ‗majority others‘ within the UC is that of a structure of 
subordination and inequality where the former were able to consciously 
shape the character and nature of the UC. So focusing on implementing 
local government structures in decentralisation reforms by constituting 
authority structures at the local level blinds the relational differences and the 
capacity to act among those who may assume these role positions. There 
may be a tendency for the will of the minority who are the powerful in the 
committee to reign in the daily deliberations and practices of the committee.
  Thus, exercising agency within the UC was of course tied to power 
and authority. So we see the less educated members of the UCs willingly 
acquiescing to their subordinated positions within the structure of relations in 
the committee. The less capable members acknowledged that some 
members of the UC were more knowledgeable and powerful than them. 
However, they saw the powerful members within the UC as very 
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instrumental in getting things done for the committee. But my observations 
revealed some trappings attached to their subordinate position which made 
them to accept their subordinate positions. The less capable members of the 
UC were those who went to the market to collect tolls and performed other 
functions in the village as may be prescribed by the chairman of the 
commitee. For example, Mr. Michael Ampomah manages the public toilet 
and collects payment for the public use of the toilet in Akroso village. As I 
explained in chapter four, these individuals are less respected in the 
Ntonaboma and that was why the women could tell them that they were not 
going to pay the market toll. 
   In an interview with Michael Ampomah, he explained that they were 
learning from the current leaders who had much to offer the village than 
them59. This suggests that human authority figures may learn on the job. He 
used the following proverb to support his argument „akora nkyere opanyin 
nyame...na akoko ba oben oni no na enya abeben sre ewi‟, literally meaning 
a toddler does not show an adult where God is, and also a chick that is 
closer to the mother hen will get that larger part of the meal. The meanings 
deduced from the first proverb reinforce the notion that social actors are not 
necessarily transformative agents who will want to alter the unequal 
structure of relations in which they are embedded but were also prepared to 
accept their subordinate positions due to the inadequate resource 
endowments. They were also prepared to learn from the knowledgeable 
individuals with whom they inter relate. We can also infer from the proverb 
the reproduction of relations of patronage which does not encourage Michael 
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 Referring to other less educated members of the UC 
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Ampomah to challenge the existing power relations. This may account for 
the reason why the UCs and the DA membership seem to be dominated by 
the powerful members of the community. Though the decentralisation 
discourse mentions transformation of the structures of community 
management, we notice that the existing structures of power were re-
affirmed. Ribot (2009) writes that most decentralisation powers devolved to 
the local level end up in the hands of a few patrons or village elite. 
   Drawing insights from the second proverb suggests that though 
within the authority structure the knowledgeable minority interpreted the 
rules and enforced sanctions, whereas the majority others were those who 
actually performed these roles within the villages. For example during 
communal labour in Akroso village, I observed on several occasions Michael 
Ampomah giving out individual portions to be weeded which was often 
contested. Some individuals did not always weed the entire portion allotted 
to them but were not sanctioned. I have also demonstrated that other 
functions performed by majority others on the town committee in Akroso 
village, such as the collection of market levies, were challenged and 
contested. The example of the women‘s refusal to pay the market toll 
illustrates the fragile nature of the power of these individuals to implement 
village decisions and rules. The Akroso village town committee chairman 
mentioned that there were instances that he had to report certain individuals 
to the chief to make sure such people adhered to community rules.  
   The relationship among the members of the Akroso village town 
committee reveals the working of multiple intertwined institutions to reinforce 
the existing power relations among the members. The skewed authoritative 
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and allocative resources among the diverse committee members resulted in 
a practice whereby the less technically endowed members routinely received 
instructions from the powerful members of the committee that may end up 
producing ‗durable inequalities‘ (Tilly, 1998 quoted in Bebbington et. al., 
2008). For Bebbington et. al., the reproduction of the daily practices that 
shape the unequal relationship within the committee will perpetuate the 
inequality among group members.  
  
 7.3.1. Inadequate Financial Resources 
   Claims are made for the devolution of adequate and secure financial 
resources from the state to new authority structures (Ribbot, 2005; Jutting et. 
al., 2005). The narratives of the UC and DA members interviewed suggested 
inadequate financial resources at their disposal to support their activities.  
This was noted to be a major challenge to the UCs. During the GD for the 
assembly members, both appointed and elected, they mentioned the 
financial cost of community organising in areas that are far from their 
dwelling places. For example the DA member for Agyaade/Supom whose 
administrative area includes some settler villages near Digya mentioned that 
„he walks seven miles to some settlements in the Digya Electoral Area to 
work. The District Assembly should motivate us with money so as to make 
us work effectively‟. The resultant outcome is that he rarely visited the 
villages outside Ntonaboma and relied on individuals whom he encounters in 
his daily interactions to pass on assembly information to the headmen in 
these villages that fall under his administrative area.  
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   Due to the burden of undertaking village functions without any 
motivation from the state, a lot of individuals who were less endowed with 
human and financial resources will want to pursue their livelihood without 
bothering much about being part of the authority structure of the UC. Hence 
we see in Ntonaboma teachers, other professionals in government 
departments and returnee pensioners taking up most of the positions of 
district assembly and UC roles. In the UC other less endowed members 
were invited to join the committee due to the constraint of getting all the 
requisite members of the committee. So once the more endowed individuals 
of the various villages are gotten onto the UC, the less endowed members of 
the villages are enlisted to join them. Due to the difficulty in getting the 
required number of individuals to work on the various UCs, the appointed 
members were not removed from the UC even when the there was a change 
in government and their appointment was revoked60. So within the UC we 
notice the enduring nature of the membership of some individuals such as 
Mr. Nketiah. 
   Usually the expectations bestowed on UC members to team up with 
the DA members to bring development to the community became a major 
challenge to these representatives. Interviews revealed a myriad of 
developmental problems that needed state support, yet the DA members 
and the UC members could not offer any hope of getting those development 
projects for the village61. In most cases villagers had to be levied through the 
                                                          
60 Article 249 of the Ghanaian Constitution allows the President to revoke the appointment of      
appointed assembly representatives and unit committee members. This provision is exercised  
by new governments upon assumption of office. 
 
61
 In a study by Crook and Manor (1998: 260) in Ghana they noticed that the expectations or  
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Ntokuatoo in other to undertake such as servicing the pontoon, emptying the 
village septic tank for the KVIP and other uncertainties that occur in the 
villages. By relying on the villager‘s own resources to get things done in the 
village the legitimacy of the UC and DA members become undermined 
because they cannot meet the expectations of village members. 
 
 7.4 Rethinking Legitimacy of Authority in Local Governance 
   The power and authority of formal authority structures constituted as 
a result of institutionalised decentralisation to regulate behaviour and enforce 
collective rules within the community are accorded formal recognition 
through legal orders of the state. For Lund (2001: 863), the legal attribution 
of authority to these new institutions is ‗obviously not insignificant in the 
process of local politics and exertion of power‘ but it does not determine the 
actual exercise and maintenance of authority. The argument in this section is 
that state sanctioned recognition of authority through legal registers is 
problematic for decentralisation practice because it presents authority as a 
fixed and static entity concealing the ‗processual‘ nature of authority which 
‗must be continuously re-enacted and claims to legitimacy re-asserted‘ in 
practice (Kyed, 2007: 26).  
   From a relational perspective, I argue for a wider understanding of 
authority through the various processes in which authority is constructed in 
the everyday encounters with ordinary people. My focus is to demonstrate 
the ‗processual‘ and relational nature of authority in governance which is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
concerns of community members had not been addressed. Notable development concerns to 
ordinary citizens—roads, electrification, sanitary and water supplies—had virtually no funds 
allocated to them during the first three years of the Assembly. 
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often but problematically conceived as ‗static‘ in decentralisation approach 
(Moore, 2000). According to Cleaver (2000: 374), ―whilst individual political 
and administrative authority figures are interesting we need to look more 
carefully at authority,… as expressed through everyday social relations‖. In 
doing so, I first demonstrate that even with their legal register of legitimacy 
the appointed and elected UC and DA members struggle to anchor their 
positions within the villages. To legitimise their authority in practice, they 
attempt to draw on symbols of authority from the state to strengthen the 
recognition of their authority. Even by drawing on such symbols of authority 
they still have to struggle to negotiate their authority and power day by day 
within the villages some are successful while others are not successful. 
 
 7.4.1 Symbols of Public Authority  
    My intention here is to illuminate the conscious attempts made by 
UC and DA members to find legitimising symbols to enable them to 
cognitively anchor their authority within the villages. The search for and use 
of the title „honourable‟ as a symbol of authority drawn from the state was to 
reinforce the authority and power of the UC and DA members who are 
positioned alongside different registers of competing and overlapping 
authority structures at the local level. In Ghana, the title „honourable‟ is 
bestowed on members of parliament and ministers of state, termed the ‗big 
men‘62 of the society by Lentz, (1998: 48). According to Lund (2006) ‗people 
                                                          
62
 Lentz  (1998) uses the term ‗big men‘ in a heuristic sense to connote both ascribed and  
achieved status but mostly for wealthy, influential individuals and persons in government. The 
title ‗honourable‘ in Ghana is reserved for august members of the house of parliament or 
ministers of state or other  individuals who are in positions of authority within the state‘s 
higher echelons of power. The title ‗honourable‘ evokes dignity, prestige and power. 
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discursively draw on legitimising symbols or discourses to cognitively anchor 
new institutional arrangements‘ (ibid, 691). The local representatives have 
adopted this title as a symbolic form of authority to express their status within 
the governance of the district. 
   When power and authority are, in fact, transferred to local 
government structures, these usually involve responsibility without authority 
The use of the title „honourable‟ by both DA and UC members shows the 
extent to which people will draw on legitimising symbols from the state to 
‗bestow the signs of official government recognition‘ to their authority. The 
aim is to connect their authority to higher levels of government and decision 
making. The use of the title honourable was to reinforce the legitimising 
authority of the members of the sub-district structure to strengthen their 
acquired roles which was a formal local institution of a ‗humbler pedigree‘ 
(Lund, 2006: 691).  
   Drawing on the analogy of honourable also highlights the extent to 
which appointed members of the district assembly try to combine their 
appointment of office with the ‗languages of stateness‘ (Hansen and 
Stepputat, 2001: 8). To be able to anchor their positions and also enroll fully 
into the overlapping web of authority within the locale, the appointed 
members whose authority to govern was stymied by village members 
claimed authority through ‗symbols of public authority‘ and ‗exercising the 
practical task of governance‘ (Ibid, 691). However, utilising symbols of 
authority to bolster ones authority or influence within the community is by no 
way a smooth or linear process, it involves competition and negotiation 
among the various human authority figures. This suggests that drawing on 
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legitimising symbols to anchor ones position is not a static but a conflict 
ridden process. 
   The legitimacy of appointed members of the DA in Ntonaboma was 
continuously questioned and challenged by village actors in their attempt to 
interpret or enforce village rule or manage community infrastructure (Please 
read Appendix III). Whilst some appointed members were referred to as 
honourable others were not. The elected and appointed members of the sub-
district structures constitute two ‗politico-legal‘ institutions with two different 
bases of legitimacy. Whilst the appointed members draw their legitimacy 
from the political-administrative hierarchy, the elected members look to the 
population for their legitimacy. However, the ability to wield power is not 
dependent on the source of legitimacy but rather as a result of a struggles 
and negotiations. This also illustrates the partial nature of the authority of 
appointed members of the decentralisation framework. 
   I observed that there was an imaginary boundary between the 
elected members and the appointed members especially the district 
assembly members but that did not determine who was a referred to as 
‗honourable‘ by a village member (Diary notes). The authority of elected and 
appointed members were constantly been negotiated in practice. Some 
village members preferred to use the symbolic title honourable when 
referring to either the elected or appointed depending on the nature of 
relationship and the influence of that individual within village affairs. For 
example, I noticed on several occasions that Mr. E. Y. Mensah was referred 
to as honourable but I never heard Mrs. Acheampong being referred to with 
that title.  This suggest that the title  ‗honourable‘ was not a static attribute 
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but had to be enacted in practice  much depending on the individual rather 
than in the position.  
   Whilst some village members referred to Mr. Mensah as honourable 
others did not. My speculation was that those who called him honourable 
were either his party members or those who stood to benefit from his 
patronage activities. By politicising the appointment of government 
appointees to the DA and the UC, the legitimacy of these appointed 
members was continuously been challenged especially at the village level by 
other individuals who belonged to other political parties. 
   Also among the appointed and elected representatives, the latter felt 
superior to the former because they thought that they constituted legitimate 
representatives of the villages. Within the villages both the appointed DA and 
UC members were perceived as political functionaries and hence had to 
draw on the analogy of how the Presidents constituted his cabinet to provide 
meaning to the legitimacy of their authority within the community. For 
Douglas, the shared analogy is a device for legitimising a set of fragile 
institutions (Douglas, 1987: 49). 
  
 According to E. Y. Mensah an appointed DA member draws on the analogy of an Article in 
the 1992 Constitution of Ghana that requires the President‘s to appoint at least seventy 
percent of his ministers from members of parliament, who are elected and therefore 
constitute representatives of the citizenry, to explain to those who questioned the legitimacy 
of his authority. He explains further that his appointment is synonymous to what occurs at 
the national level (Mr.  E. Y. Mensah appointed DA member) 
 
   However, the reality was that the appointment and further 
legitimisation of that position by the state does little to anchor the position or 
authority of the person within the village. The extent to which the appointed 
or elected members were able to exercise power in the affairs of the village 
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or to accumulate political capital depended more on the characteristics or the 
agency of that individual than in the position or mode of appointment. 
Accumulating power through influence or political capital depended on the 
ability of the individuals to strategically compete among other individuals in 
authority positions both state sanctioned and non- state within the village. In 
the next section I demonstrate that authority structures in Ntonaboma are 
complex. 
 
 7.5 Multiple and overlapping channels of authority  
   In Ghana, the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462) established 
the current UCs and DAs as formal authority structures for local government. 
This runs parallel to institutional design principles that advocate for the 
setting up of robust authority with clearly defined roles to define, enforce and 
sanction collective decisions (Ostrom, 2005; 1992). The decision to invest 
absolute authority in a single formal institutional source to regulate village 
decisions and rules can be queried for narrowly conceptualising authority as 
static and fixed. It fails to recognise the multiple sources of authority in 
everyday social relations (Maganga, 2002; Lund, 2006; 2001; Cleaver, 
2000). Public authority, according to Lund, is not acquired once and for all 
but it is ‗being constructed in the imagination, expectation and everyday 
practices and conflicts of ordinary people and their organisations‘ (Lund, 
2006).  
   At the village level a variety of institutions of different shades of 
formality and visibility are at play defining and enforcing collectively binding 
decisions on members of society. Public authority then becomes ‗the 
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amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of local institutions‘ 
(Lund, 2006: 686; Cleaver, 2000). I take this further to argue that in 
Ntonaboma, authority structures were complex and often overlapping in the 
performance of their functions which suggest negotiation and contestation 
occur about which authority figure has the right to interpret rules and mediate 
conflicts. 
   Community members eclectically chose from both formal and 
socially embedded authority structures to mediate their interactions 
especially in times of conflict63 (Maganga, 2002). My argument is that when 
social actors continuously draw on particular institutions to mediate their 
problem, solve conflict or claim access to resources, the authority of that 
institution becomes recognised in village affairs particularly when the 
decisions and interpretation of the rules are respected and accepted within 
the village (Sikor and Lund 2009; Lund, 2006a, 2001). However, the decision 
on which authority structure to use was both consciously and unconsciously 
done. For example during an interview with Nana Akuamoah Boateng the 
Mankrado of Akroso village, a village member, Mr. Tieku came to lodge a 
complaint that some cattle had trespassed on his farm destroying most of his 
crops. Though the DA had a bye-law that prohibits individuals from letting 
loose their animals to destroy people‘s farm Mr. Tieku failed to report the 
incident to the local UC or any other authority structure. Mr. Tieku mentioned 
that ‗immediately he got to the farm and saw the animals, I just rushed to 
                                                          
63
 The conscious search for authority figures to mediate problem or access to resources is  
termed as ‗forum shopping‘ (Lund 2001; Biershnick and Oliver de Saedan, 2003). 
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nana‘s place to inform him…from here I will go to inform Iddrisu, the owner 
of the animals‘ (interview with Mr. Tieku, 03/02/2007).  
 The decision on which authority structure to draw to settle this dispute was 
unconsciously done since he had routinely relied on the traditional 
authorities to mediate his disputes. He drew my attention to the fact that 
Nana Akumoah Boateng was the Mankrado as well as the DA member for 
Akroso village. The dual position of Nana Akuamoah Boateng as a traditional 
leader and a DA representative highlights the blurring of the boundary 
between traditional and modern human authority figures.  
   Nana Akuamoah Boateng stated that he will later send an emissary 
to call Iddrisu to enable him listen to his part of the story, after which he will 
meet both parties to the conflict to solve the problem. Later, when I enquired 
about the status of the case, Nana Akuamoah Boateng mentioned that 
Iddrisu had agreed in principle to compensate Mr. Tieku but the exact 
amount to be paid as compensation was yet to be agreed upon as Mr, Tieku 
was yet to furnish him with the total amount of crops destroyed. Once 
Iddrissu finally pays for the crops destroyed then the authority and power of 
the chief becomes further enhanced.  
   Since the interpretation of local norms and settling of disputes were 
normally mediated by the traditional authorities and other family heads, the 
normal practice within Ntonaboma was for disputes bothering on ownership 
and entitlements rights to resources sent to them. As social actors send their 
disputes to the traditional authorities and simultaneously accepts and 
observes their judgments, then the power of the traditional authorities within 
the village is reproduced and further legitimated. Maganga (2007) draws our 
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attention to the importance and effectiveness of traditional authority 
structures in settling disputes. However what is important was for individuals 
to send their cases or disputes to them for resolution and at the same also 
adhere to their verdict (Lund, 2006). 
   The existing practices of the locality in which we are embedded 
shape how we consciously or non-reflexively draw on authority figures to 
govern our daily interaction. Douglas (1987) illustrates how some institutions 
are so embedded in our way of doing things that they are hardly put into any 
conscious scrutiny. The importance of routine in reproducing certain actions 
is manifested in the example of Mr. Tieku regarding where to take his cases. 
Mr. Tieku did not put the decision on which authority to report into any 
conscious scrutiny. He explained that ever since he came to settle in the 
town in 1997 he had routinely addressed all his cases that have to do with 
land issues including ownership and trespassing to the Mankrado, Nana 
Akuamoah Boateng. According to Mr. Tieku he had trust that Nana 
Akuamoah and his elders were capable of solving the problem. The example 
of Mr. Tieku also raises questions about the extent to which the conscious 
crafting of institutions to alter individual incentives to consciously draw on 
formal institutions to govern their interaction occurs in real life. The multiple 
identities and diverse subjective values of individuals suggest that people 
draw on multiple authority structures in their daily lives. Individuals looked 
out for the appropriate authority structure among the complex authority 
structure within the village to send their disputes to be addressed.  
   Sending cases or conflicts to one authority does not render 
alternative authority structures within that particular locality invalid or 
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abandoned. The co-existence and the interaction among multiple institutions 
in Ntonaboma suggests that individuals will undergo ‗forum shopping‘ on 
which authority to rely on to address certain specific issues.  Drawing on a 
particular mode of authority whether state or non-state has little to do with 
the source of the legitimacy of that institution but has more to do with that 
authority providing an effective avenue for the specific situation. Therefore in 
deciding on which ‗forum to shop‘, a lot factors are taking into account such 
as ‗the nature of the problem, the perceived effectiveness of the human 
authority figure in being able to deal with it and perceptions of the proper 
way of going about things‘(Cleaver 2000: 374)  
   Interviews revealed diverse human authority figures that were called 
upon to address a variety of issues or disputes. An example is the case of a 
young girl who was accused of stealing a piece of cloth belonging to a 
neighbour in Supom village. She was sent to the local shrine to swear an 
oath to substantiate her claim that she was not the one who stole the cloth. 
She confessed to stealing the cloth when she was going through some 
rituals at the shrine. Her acceptance of the offence provided the scope for 
her to negotiate the return of the stolen cloth for an amicable settlement of 
the issue at the shrine. Once she accepted the offence and pleaded guilty 
she was not reported to any other authority figure within the village, although 
other members of the village got to know of it.  
   I was told of another case in which the culprit continuously denied 
stealing the item till he got struck by a strange disease after which he 
confessed to having stolen the money. He had to publicly walk through the 
four villages in Ntonaboma to acknowledge to the entire community the 
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acceptance of his guilt. This practice was also meant to deter others from 
stealing. When the item was refunded he underwent certain rituals for the 
strange disease to go (Diary notes 13/02/06).  
   We can also see the super natural world through the authority of the 
priestess to the local shrine being called upon by some village members to 
address their problems since it was believed that she had the capacity to see 
into the unknown to reveal the identity of the culprit and solve everyday 
problems in the village. However, interviews suggested that some village 
members will neither accept the authority of the priestess nor ‗shop from her 
forum‘, but will also not contest her decisions nor challenge the legitimacy of 
her authority.  
   In other instances when conflicts or disputes had to do with people 
located within a certain social relationship, such as attending the same 
church or belonging to the same family, certain authority figures that were 
located at the interface of such relationship were called upon. Instances 
were cites when pastors, family elders and chiefly authorities were mostly 
mentioned as the human authority figures called upon to intervene in 
disputes or problems within the village. Though Lund (2006b; 2009) explains 
that public authorities go ‗shopping forum‘ to find disputes or issues to 
address in order to further enhance their authority, on this occasion the 
religious priests and the chiefs were not intervening in disputes to enhance 
their authority, but were informed of these disputes by third parties. 
   As I have shown in chapter four, though the UCs as modern 
organisations are formally accountable to the district assembly based on 
their institutional arrangements, it was evidenced in the study area that they 
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also responded to the authority of the traditional chiefs in order to avoid 
encountering any difficulties from the traditional authorities. During my 
interview with Nana Osei-Afram, the Nifahene of Akroso, he stated that 
“dawuro be to abaa, na ye fa duwuro wo ahenefie,” literally meaning the stick 
used for hitting the gong-gong64 to call village meetings existed before the 
invention of the gong-gong. Also, the gong-gong is taken from the chief‘s 
palace. In this instance he was using the proverb to illustrate the authority 
and power of the village chief. In this analogy „abaa‟ that is the stick‘ referred 
to the existing authority of the chiefly institution which predates the „dawuro‟ 
in this case the UC and DAs. The use of the other analogy that duwuro 
(gong-gong) was taken from ahenefie (the chief‘s palace) was to assert the 
need to keep the chief informed on all community decisions because it was 
from his palace that the instrument for convening village meeting was 
collected. All these analogies were to reinforce the authority of the traditional 
authorities within the village and also to demonstrate the scope for 
negotiation and interaction with new authorities if only they recognised his 
authority. Though the district assembly bye-law states that;  
  
 ‗No Assembly member, Area Council, or Unit Committee shall order the beating of the gong-
gong without authority of the recognised traditional Head in any town or village... Where in 
the relevant town/village community the Traditional Authority stands in the way of the 
Organizing Authority in the beating of the gong-gong the Organizing Authority may appeal to 
the (Executive Committee of the Assembly) for a written permission enabling that 
Organising Authority to be responsible for the custody and the beating of the gong-gong in 
the community. 
  
   Even though the portions on the bye-law above acknowledged the 
role and authority of the traditional authorities, it still assumes that if the chief 
                                                          
64 A flat metal, with the rim turned over that produces a loud sound when struck with a     
wooden mallet. 
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was not cooperative the Executive Committee of the District Assembly could 
intervene and issue a letter that overrides the authority of the chief. Such 
tendencies have the potential of resulting in contestations and conflicts 
between the traditional authorities and the sub-district structures in 
community management. But, as I have stated in Chapter Four, the role of 
traditional elites in getting their own people to get into these bureaucratic 
positions within Ntonaboma lessened the occurrence of such conflicts 
between the traditional authorities and the UCs or DA member. Also the 
proverbs used by Nana Osei-Afram suggested the possibilities of working 
together once the authority of the traditional authority in managing or 
intervening in community activities was recognised by the UCs and the DA 
members.  
   The use of this proverb by Nana Osei Afram was to illustrate the 
authority of the traditional chief over the sub-district structures be it the 
Assembly Member or Unit Committees. He reinforced his argument that the 
UC members were inaugurated with no power to call for village meetings 
and that before they can do so they have to seek his permission to do so. 
Also for every village meeting to be called, the town members had to discuss 
the agenda with the chief or the Amankrado of the specific village for his 
thoughts both before and after the public meeting.  
  
 7.7 Conclusion 
   The analysis in this chapter r explored public authority from below to 
understand how it actually works in the daily social encounters within the 
contingencies of a particular context. Decentralisation law ostensibly gives 
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the elected and appointed members of the DA the legal mandate to manage 
the affairs of the village that had to do with the state. However, there were 
various institutions that shaped interactions and exercise authority within the 
locality. This makes the exercise of authority complex. The exercise of 
authority within the context of Ntonaboma was not clear and consistent, but 
was contingent on practical interactions occurring between those in authority 
positions and village members. The legitimacy of human authority figures 
was derived from diverse sources and not only from the state. Granting 
authority through the legal instruments of the state failed to provide the 
appointed and elected members with the exclusive power to shape village 
interactions. They had to draw on other sources of legitimacy to bolster their 
authority that was positioned alongside other powerful authority figures 
within the community.  Depending on the particular issue at stake social 
actors knew which authority figure to go to but that did not prevent them from 
eclectically depending on multiple authority figures within the community in 
their daily interactions. Therefore, to understand the recursive relationship 
between authority and power we do not need to narrowly focus on a specific 
institution but at the broader processes through which authority is asserted, 
enacted and legitimised by various authorities within a specific locality. The 
chapter further highlighted the political nature of decentralisation that is 
mostly de-politicised in policy documents. The ongoing negotiations, 
accommodations and struggles taking place among the four village chiefs 
highlight the political nature of the decentralisation process.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
 8.1 Introduction 
   This thesis questioned the scope for transformation for 
institutionalised decentralisation by specifically focusing on individual 
agency, dynamics of institutions and complexity of authority to understand 
how decentralisation manifests itself at the village level. The intention of this 
study was to position the actual practice of decentralisation within a 
particular context to offer a deeper understanding into the processes and 
outcomes of institutional decentralisation, especially the extent to which it 
shapes local organisation and community participation. From such a 
perspective, this thesis has argued that institutionalising decentralisation 
through local government structures to promote participation and enhance 
equity in local governance does not automatically lead transformation in 
community participation and local governance. 
   The study has shown that, understanding the practice of 
decentralisation is essential if the current thinking and practice of the 
concept is to adequately embrace complexity and heterogeneity of context. 
The study revealed that at the local level there is a diversity of actors with 
different values and interests involved in decentralisation. Similarly, the study 
has shown that individual participation in communal activities occurred 
through multiple institutions and not only through local government 
structures implemented by the state to promote participation and inclusion in 
development. The diversity of actors involved in local governance and the 
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plurality of channels through which interactions took place within local 
communities makes decentralisation a complex and dynamic process. 
However, the policy framework for decentralisation discussed in Chapter 
Four revealed that decentralisation and local government in Ghana were 
institutionalised based on legal reforms and bureaucratic procedures shaped 
by external conditionalities. The method of decentralisation sahaped by the 
World Bank and the IMF placed much value on increasing efficiency and 
reducing the economic decline rather than on enhancing social equity 
(Mohan, 1996).  
  However, there is a growing assertion in the development literature 
that, the failure of development interventions that are grounded in citizenship 
rights to manifest in pro-poor outcomes lies in its neglect of complexity and 
heterogeneity of context (Geiser and Rist, 2009; Mitlin and Hickey, 2009). 
This thesis has contributed to such debates by placing a strong emphasis on 
the specificities of context to demonstrate that decentralisation is complex 
and dynamic endeavour and not a ‗technocratic‘ process that can simply and 
universally be implemented to achieve the liberal agenda of participation, 
democratisation and empowerment.  
  The study, applying an ethnographic approach, argued that 
institutional decentralisation needs to pay adequate attention to the nature 
and dynamics of individual participation, the different motivations that shape 
action and existing socially embedded principles and practices that shape 
individual actions. The chapter begins by summarising the theoretical 
arguments made for the study before highlighting the nuances of the actual 
practice of institutionalised decentralisation. This is aimed at highlighting the 
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existing gaps between the policy ideals and reality of the actual practice of 
decentralisation. The chapter ends by recommending an alternative 
approach to decentralisation aimed at illuminating wider issues that shape 
the concept of decentralisation in practice and what needs to be considered 
in policy circles if decentralisation is to be transformative in practice.  
  Chapter two explored the literature with the aim of searching for a 
theory that underpinned institutional decentralisation. The chapter 
demonstrated the significant attention that mainstream views on 
decentralisation place on the agency of local people and formal 
organisations. However, exploring the literature revealed that the concept of 
agency and institutions are naively applied in the theory and practice of 
decentralisation. The chapter also highlighted how decentralisation 
discourse oversimplifies and standardises local complexity, allowing for the 
superimposition of standardised development blue prints without recognising 
power and difference, and the underlying structural inequalities that shape 
human action. The prevalence and increasing relevance of new 
institutionalism in decentralisation thinking and practice at both policy and 
implementation levels was also illuminated in the chapter. 
  The new institutionalism literature of both ‗normative‘ and a ‗rational 
choice‘ persuasion places emphasis on ‗getting incentives and institutions 
right‘ to shape the complex interactions occurring among the state, market 
and community. The new institutionalist approach advocates for ‗right‘ 
institutional arrangements to positively shape the opportunistic behaviour of 
individuals and deter free-riding through the application of strictly enforced 
sanctions, contracts and authority systems that monitor and enforce these 
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sanctions. They apply economic concepts of rationality to the analysis of 
institutions for collective action aimed at reducing the cost of transaction and 
providing incentives for cooperation among rational individuals.  
  The inadequacies of institutional approaches to decentralisation as a 
governance reform lie in its problematic and narrow conceptualisation of 
human agency and institutions, and an inadequate understanding of the 
dynamic relationship between the two concepts.  The emphasis they place 
on the autonomous individual leads to a conception of individuals as 
detached from society and disembedded from social relations (Cleaver, 
2004). The emphasis placed on the ‗community‘ as a homogenous unit and 
a site appropriate for empowerment masks issues of power, difference and 
complexity of context (Mohan and Stoke, 2000). The focus on rational 
factors at the expense of contextual factors manifests in a false dichotomy 
that seeks to separate private from public action and interest and, 
bureaucratic institutional arrangements from socially embedded institutions 
(Metha et al., 1999).  
 I used ideas from Cleaver (2000, 2002), and Wong (2008; 2004), to 
show that an addition of the emerging post institutional arguments to the 
understanding of human behavior and institutions can provide a deeper 
understanding about ‗complexities, the continuities and uncertainties‘ that 
shape much of rural life (Cleaver, 2000: 281). Giddens (1984) and Long 
(1992) ideas on the recursive relationship between agency and structure 
shaped the discussions on the variations in agency among diverse 
individuals. In discussing the interplay between formal and socially 
embedded institutions, I used ideas from Benjaminsen and Lund (2002) and 
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Metha et. al., (1999) to support my arguments on the dynamic nature of 
institutions in governance at the micro-level. Douglas‘ (1987) arguments on 
the relationship between individual actions and perceptions, and institutions 
informed the discussions in the thesis. Now, let us move on to identify how I 
have used these elements of social theory and post-institutional thinking in 
this thesis to explore institutionalised decentralisation in Ghana, especially 
the application of the dynamic and complex relationship between individuals 
and institutions. 
 
 8.2 The partial and intermittent nature of agency in Local Governance 
  The first objective of this study focused on individual participation in 
new local governance structures. The main areas explored to gain deeper 
insights on participation centered on the ideals of good governance - 
representation, decision-making and accountability. However, this is not to 
suggest that actions towards any one of them was separate and distinct from 
one another but rather they overlapped and together shaped the outcomes 
of institutionalised decentralisation within the locality.  
  The new local government structures technically crafted as a result 
of decentralisation in Ghana through the local Government Act 462 in 1993 
is claimed to offer sufficient agency for people to undertake a host of 
‗sociopolitical practices‘ to negotiate in decision-making and participate in 
numerous village activities as equal citizens. The extent to which these new 
governance spaces offer scope for purposeful action, the resources on 
which to draw to substantiate such agency, and the variable nature of the 
outcomes of agency are little elucidated in policy documents. Little 
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consideration is given to the relational nature of agency and the societal 
practice of the concept.  
   This study explored the motivations for action, the effects of 
individual agency and the structural factors that shaped agency within a 
particular context to gain deeper insights into how the concept shapes the 
action of ‗citizen participants' in local governance. The thesis argued that 
investing social actors with contextual identity and positioning them within a 
complex life world in which they engage with diverse and multiple actors in 
plural spaces illuminates the complex motivations and the structural 
constraints shaping their action (Cleaver, 2000; Giddens, 1984).  
   This study has shown that institutionalised decentralisation over-
romanticises the agency of individuals to undertake certain actions to shape 
local governance. The analysis has shown that such optimistic expectations of 
active agency, epitomised in strategic and rational action, is difficult to achieve 
in reality and seems a risky endeavour especially taking into account the role 
of social relations, difference and social structures in shaping human action. 
The discussions and the narratives of respondents revealed a link between 
people‘s subjective values, interaction and action. This reinforces Agrawal‘s 
argument that ‗‖attempts to change the way people behave through 
hierarchical organisations is impractical. Much depends on the subjectivities 
of those undergoing regulation‖ (Agrawal, 2005: 17).  
 The functional understanding of human actions in main stream views 
of decentralisation assumes that individuals are strategic, active and rational 
and motivated mainly by self-interest. However, the study revealed that 
individuals are not always rational but their actions are shaped by social 
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relations, taking into consideration what is suitable and acceptable in 
particular circumstances. The study revealed that, direct participation through 
public meetings does not ensure equity for all.  Drawing on the example of the 
market women revealed the undesirable nature of publicly negotiating final 
decisions in the presence of traditional village leadership. Rather, they 
preferred to negotiate or make known any dissenting view outside the arenas 
of public decision-making through existing channels of interaction. To these 
women, contacting the village leadership outside the public arena was the 
‗right thing to do‘ if they had to voice alternative concerns regarding village 
final decisions. These same women who will not want to publicly challenge 
the village leadership were able to contest the collection of the market toll at 
the point of collection. The different actions undertaken by the same women in 
each interaction and at a different location revealed how individuals work out 
what is appropriate to do in different contexts taking into consideration the 
wider perspectives and effects of their actions. How does such thinking about 
the particular context, right way to behave and in whose present compatible 
with contemporary optimistic thinking about agency in decentralisation 
approaches as a rational and purposeful? These findings resonate with 
arguments in the development literature that, development approaches such 
as decentralisation, that emphasises on agency, need to have a better 
understanding of what it means to be an acting subject in particular 
circumstances (Agrawal, 2005: Cleaver, 2002; Mamdani, 1996). 
   I also demonstrated that decentralisation has opened up new public 
spaces for traditional leaders, on which they skillfully capitalise to shape 
village affairs. The history of the resettlement process had given the traditional 
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leaders the ‗moral right‘ to be responsible for the public affairs of the village. 
This has permeated the mechanisms for access to the new local government 
structures, reproducing the dominant role of village traditional leadership in 
the collective affairs of the locality. The support for village traditional leaders 
as this study found out was not really based on high satisfaction with their 
activities; rather this support was rooted in culture and reinforced by certain 
structural factors at play within the locality. This suggests that historical 
factors and culture are scarcely ever brushed aside in social interactions as 
they guide moral understandings of action.  
   The little enthusiasm of village members to become representatives 
on the local government structures was attributed to the village way of life and 
expectations on existing traditional leadership to attend to village uncertainties 
and other communal problems that even permeated the individual level. 
People were not shy in approaching or petitioning traditional village leadership 
when they perceived a village problem or identified issues that needed to be 
addressed, thus reproducing the dominant role of village leadership. 
Traditional leadership and the DA representatives seemed to have good 
knowledge about whom they need to contact in order to acquire resources – 
finacila or technical to solve local problems. Tradtional authorities did not only 
petition the state but they also provided resources and committed their time 
and energy to village problem solving, they also donated land and other 
financial resources in order to partner with local government for development. 
However, this should not be interpreted as lack of participation in local 
government structures but as an expression of ‗the right thing to do‘ which 
was the outcome of cultural, historical experiences and context. Hence village 
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traditional leadership despite governance reforms still continued to play 
important roles in the everyday affairs of village life. 
    The study observed that certain individuals within Ntonaboma 
deliberately did not challenge the predominant role of the traditional 
leadership in village activities limiting the possibilities for them to become 
village representatives. Yet, other individuals also consciously excluded 
themselves from accessing these new political spaces to become formal 
representatives accusing the village traditional leadership of monopolising 
village public affairs and consciously recruiting their favorites to become DA 
and UC members. The important issue is that such people, though they were 
aware of the dominant role of traditional leadership in the affairs of the village 
will not consciously act to challenge their dominant role. This may be seen as 
a risky endeavour because certain actions could be interpreted to mean 
insolence to the chiefs that may have its own repercussions. However, Others 
such as the youth had their agency located elsewhere and were more 
interested in securing their livelihood concerns than exercising agency to 
shape existing state of affairs in the locality. 
   Not only has my analysis revealed how certain individuals will not 
participate in local government structures in Ntonaboma because they see the 
role of the chiefs as natural and reinforced by custom, but it has also shown 
that people who purposively wanted to become local government 
representatives had their ambitions curtailed by inequitable structural factors 
such as age, gender, knowledge and wealth. This accounts for the 
asymmetrical representation in decision-making bodies within the four 
villages. The UC and DA membership was dominated by influential and 
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village members who were up the village hierarchy or had certain forms of 
knowledge or skills. Other individuals who acquired these knowledge and 
skills through education left Ntonaboma to seek work in more developed 
areas of the country. This dearth of educated and highly skilled individuals 
within Ntonaboma reinforced the dominance of certain few individuals in the 
new local government structures.  
   We see the varied outcomes for different individuals in their attempts 
to become DA representatives. Whiles some were successful in achieving 
their intentions others were not. The study revealed that despite the legal 
provision in the Local Government Act 462 (7[1]) for nominal equality in 
access to the new governance spaces, people with thin allocative and 
authoritative resources ‗had little room to manoeuvre‘ to access these new 
political spaces. Younger members of the village had to defer their ambitions 
to become village representatives due to the influence of other actors on 
them. This illustrates the effects of power relations, conflict avoidance and 
respect for elders simultaneously shaping the actions and choices of 
individuals. In some instances certain people considered not only their self-
interest but the stability of the social relations in which they were embedded in 
order to achieve cooperation. The examples of Eric Agyepong and Raymond 
Suele in Chapter Five support this finding. 
   The above findings suggest that exercising purposeful agency is a 
much more complex and dynamic endeavor occurring in overlapping arenas 
involving multiple and diverse social actors with different intentionalities 
influenced by certain ‗styles of thinking‘. All these perspectives had wider 
implications for understanding the agency of the poor within new interventions 
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if decentralisation is to be pro-poor in orientation. I will elucidate on the 
assumptions made about motivations and action, and the constraints to 
purposeful human action which are often either over romanticised or glossed 
over in institutional approaches to decentralisation to illuminate some 
conceptual flaws therein. 
   Much theorising of agency in local governance depicts the individual 
as active, rational and strategic, conscious of his or her intentions to 
purposively act to transform existing inequalities. Discussions of agency also 
raise the issues of the capacity to exercise agency and the resources on 
which the individual can draw. Linking such abstract conceptions of agency to 
citizenship rights and the reality of participation can generate ambivalence 
because governance is not an individualistic endeavor but is rather socially-
shaped in practice (Wong, 2009; Cleaver, 2004, Engberg-Pedersen and 
Webster, 2002). 
   My argument is that the relative differences in power within social 
relations reinforced by the existing social practices may render the exercise of 
agency ineffectual because individuals may act or make choices within 
existing unequal relationships. A clear example was the desire by the settler 
farmers to exercise agency within their subordinate positions to halt the 
payment of royalties to the Agyaade Traditional council after the 
institutionalisation of decentralised local government structures. But 
employing such agency to alter the existing unequal relationship proved 
unsuccessful. Certain occurrences like the boat disaster on the Volta Lake in 
the area that had consequences on their livelihood made the settler farmers 
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abandon their initial intention to draw on the new LG arrangements to contest 
the payment of royalties.  
   The study also revealed that cosmology and existing social practices 
shaped the interactions between the settler farmers and the two Traditional 
Councils. The settler farmers had to renegotiate within socially acceptable 
norms alongside formal conflict resolution mechanisms to both stabilise their 
livelihood and also forestall any boat disasters on the Volta Lake. 
   People thought profoundly about the implications of the outcomes of 
their actions and how beneficial such actions would be to them in terms of 
existing social relations. Maintaining good neighbourliness, avoiding conflict, 
respecting village traditional leadership and acquiescing to their right to lead 
in village activities suggest some form of ‗moral rationalities‘ shaping agency. 
This suggest that social actors are not always ‗utility maximisers‘ aimed at 
‗getting out‘ to achieve their intentions aimed at transforming wider relations of 
structural inequality but consider the appropriate action given the situation and 
the context contradicting the ideals of active participation espoused in 
decentralised governance literature. Maintaining their existing social networks, 
especially relationship with existing traditional elite, was more important to 
village members because it had consequences on their livelihood and other 
benefits to be accrued from maintain such relationship. Individuals take 
actions by considering the demands of everyday social life and how to secure 
their immediate livelihood. 
   Therefore, if local government structures through decentralisation 
bring limited or no benefits to the livelihoods of the poor they will make no 
conscious effort to access these spaces to become representative or contest 
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decisions made. The focus will rather be on the more important aspect of their 
live - their day-to-day survival - much of which is mediated through existing 
institutions. Contesting elections to become a village representative was not 
as important as being in the ‗good books‘ of the traditional leadership or other 
individuals up the village hierarchy. This demonstrates that social actors were 
motivated by conceptions of what they believe to be appropriate than 
conceptions of what is effective and efficient. The study revealed that even 
with the introduction of a new local government structures, the public power of 
certain people remained intact, providing them with the resources and 
legitimacy necessary for them to become DA representatives. 
  This thesis has revealed that agency is rarely achieved through 
normative political reforms of the state but is shaped through societal practice 
and supported by social relations. The study also revealed how 
decentralisation reforms pay inadequate attention to the role of social norms, 
cultural values, and complex motivations in shaping individual behaviour in 
local governance. For example, placing an emphasis on purposive action 
plays down the structural constraints which people face in exercising agency. 
In the absence of the social, physical and material assets required to actively 
engage with the political spaces of the state, the poor will acquiesce or self 
‗discipline‘ themselves and let existing traditional elites shape the selection 
and decision-making structures. The opportunities offered by decentralisation 
vary for different individuals. Whilst social relations may be constraining for 
some people and rid them of any opportunities to become a village 
representative it also enabled others to become village representatives.  
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   Bringing the characteristics of village representatives on the DA and 
UC into perspective reveals the facilitating features of social relations. The 
enabling role of social relations, manifested in the notion of linking social 
capital, explains the existence of a ‗powerful minority‘ who were 
disproportionately involved in multiple governance spaces. Though incentives 
are used to enlist the participation of actors in collective action, the literature is 
silent on the resources needed to participate in governance. Individuals are 
assumed to invest in social relations to participate in local governance. 
However, resources acquired through formal organisations, kinship or other 
socially embedded relations facilitated access for some few individuals. Such 
influential village DA and UC representatives were retired public servants, 
teachers and individuals with access to locus of power and wider networks.  
   The asymmetry of power relations and access to resources within 
Ntonaboma manifested in multiple leadership roles. Multiple networks 
reproduce and reinforce locally specific power relations, leading to village 
dependency on the same individuals such as Nana Akuamoah Boateng and 
Mr. Nketiah of Akroso village. Therefore, introducing local government 
structures without critically engaging with the exiting power relations at work 
may lead to outcomes that reinforce prevailing power differentials. 
   The above finding also leads to another implication whereby those 
without power or who are positioned down the village hierarchy bear the 
burden of the LG work. The devolution of uniform power to heterogeneous 
individuals at local levels masks differences in status and power in structure of 
relations. Within the structure of authority relations some UC or town 
committee members had to go to the home of Mr. Nketiah (the town 
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committee chairman for Akroso village) every morning to receive instructions 
on what to do for the day. They had to go and summon people who have 
gone contrary to village rules and if possible collected the fines, an activity 
they received lots of chastisement. These same individuals had to also beat 
the gong to call for village meetings. However, the power devolved from the 
state to the local institution was intended to be equitably applied by all 
members. However, the devolution of power did not elaborate on how this 
power should be redistributed and applied among the various members who 
constituted the UC. 
   Fulfilling these roles within the new structure of authority, that is the 
UCs, placed heavy time demands on the members who had inadequate 
resources within the committee.  The call by certain members of the UC on 
the state to pay them for the services they rendered to the village shows the 
negative effects of participation in governance on the livelihood for certain 
members. However, these same individuals sought to differentiate between 
community roles that were socially motivated and as such voluntary from 
those roles that needed remuneration from the state. Thus, local governance 
approaches that place emphasis on citizenship rights and responsibilities 
need to embrace the fluid identities and mixed motivations of community 
representatives. 
 
8.3 The socially embedded nature of local governance 
   The second objective of the thesis explored the relationship between 
bureaucratic local government structures and socially embedded institutions 
and how the two institutions overlapped to shape village governance. The role 
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of traditional leadership in the affairs of the village, especially in demanding 
accountability from DA and UC representatives and consciously recruiting 
village representatives revealed how existing institutional arrangements 
continued to endure despite the implementation of new institutions within the 
community.  
   In Chapter Six, I questioned the ‗institutional design principles‘ 
inherent in decentralisation policy and practice to illuminate the inadequacies 
of the institutional arrangements for decentralisation. The claim according to 
Olowu and Wunsch (2004: 13) is that ―institutions in local governance are 
valuable because they provide organisational infrastructure that helps people 
to solve their problems, gather information they need to make and implement 
decisions‖ to reduce fragmentation in public action. The thinking is that the 
realisation of a pro-poor decentralisation framework lies in the conscious 
design of robust organisational structures to involve and represent the needs 
of the poor. The institutional solutions to decentralised governance broaden 
the understanding and analysis of the factors shaping the economic and the 
social content of decentralisation. The concern is that the instrumental 
utilisation of social institutions to make local governance functional underplays 
the ‗messiness‘ and ‗complexity‘ of institutional formation (Wong, 2009; 
Cleaver and Franks, 2005; Mehta et. al, 1999). The processes through which 
local actors draw on history, socially embedded principles to solve numerous 
problems and achieve cooperation is sidestepped (Mosse, 2003). 
   The main argument in Chapter Six was that the current policy 
framework enshrined in the Local Government Act 642, 1993 takes a 
functional and instrumental perspective on local government structures. The 
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approach adopted in Ghana‘s framework relied heavily on formalised 
arrangements in meeting its local governance objectives making it 
incompatible with diversity and context. Just focusing on crafting robust local 
organisations based on standard principles to make local governance optimal 
makes the socially embedded institutions at play within the locality opaque. 
Such an approach also inadequately caters for issues of ‗uncertainty and 
complexity‘ (Mehta et. al, 2001:1). 
   Drawing on Douglas (1987), Cleaver (2000, 2002), Cleaver and 
Franks (2005), Wong (2004) and other emerging post-institutionalists theorists 
such as Benjaminsen and Lund (2002) and Mehta et al (1999), I interrogated 
the institutional approach to decentralisation by exploring how bureaucratic 
and socially embedded institutions shaped local governance. My claim was 
that bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions interplayed to shape 
outcomes of community level interactions.  
   In Ntonaboma, we see a collage of local practices and arrangements 
that shaped village management and responded to village uncertainties. 
Institutions that shaped community interactions were ‗less functional‘ and 
underpinned by a host of socially embedded principles. The study revealed 
that, the flexibility of governance arrangements resulted in greater 
effectiveness in solving village needs. An example was the use of several 
institutional channels to mobiles resources to get the local school building re-
roofed after a heavy rainstorm ripped the roof off.  
   The findings of the study has drawn attention to the imaginary 
distinction between new bureaucratic and existing socially embedded 
institutions by arguing that they are interrelated and often overlapping in their 
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mundane functions within the locality. In Chapter Six, attention was drawn to 
the existing solidarity in the village embedded in associational life making it 
possible for the town committee to respond to a host of unexpected village 
problems. A clear example of such socially embedded principles was reflected 
in some women going to see village members who could not attend communal 
labour because her daughter was poorly. Though a neighbour informed the 
chairman of the town committee on behalf of the woman whose daughter was 
poorly, she had to personally go to inform him. This suggests a pattern of social 
embedded principles underpinned governance practices within the village 
making it effective. Similarly, such socially embedded principles enabled the 
town committees to respond spontaneously to a host of uncertainties and other 
mundane problems occurring in the village. Therefore, explicitly designing 
formal organisations and instrumentally drawing on socially embedded 
institutions as a ‗resource bank‘ oversimplifies village life which is more often 
than not complex, fluid and spontaneous than institutionalists assume.  
   Focusing on how village governance occurs in practice reveals the 
significant and numerous village actives that occurred outside the local 
government structures. For example, sanctioning people who did not attend 
communal labour were shaped by socially embedded principles and occurred 
outside the main formal structures of village governance. However, sanctioning 
village members outside the purview of all village members may be applied 
unevenly among village members by the town committee. Some village 
members were unable to negotiate to do their part of communal labour at a 
later date or even get their children to do their part for them. This illuminates 
the constraints that certain village members faced in negotiating issues in their 
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favour. For example, the subjective nature of rule application fell unevenly on 
different members of the village reinforcing the argument that socially 
embedded institutions may not necessarily be equitable for all (Wong, 2007; 
Cleaver, 2002). 
   The study also illustrated the extent to which pre-existing institutions 
took on new roles prescribed for new formal organisations, thus blurring the 
distinction between bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions. Yet, within 
mainstream decentralisation policy and practice, local government structures 
are specifically crafted to enlist and formalise community participation 
suggesting an institutional vacuum or ‗a community waiting to be mobilised‘ by 
the new intervention (Williams et. al, 2003). Existing modes of participation 
were spontaneous and ad hoc in nature. Such modes of participation were 
embedded in existing social relationships drawn upon to shape village 
collective and individual activities. The multiple functions of the ‗town 
committee‟ were identified to be resilient in the face of social change which 
illuminates the extent to which it could be adapted or drawn upon to undertake 
numerous roles within the village.  
   The role of the „town committee‟ in the affairs of the village reflected 
in the ad hoc, spontaneous and multiple and overlapping functions undertaken 
brings to the fore the extent to which historical factors and social practices 
shape local level organisations. This also illustrates notion of institutional 
bricolage where old and new institutions could be combined and reinterpreted 
to solve community problems (Cleaver, 2002). 
  Drawing on the concept of ‗institutional bricolage‘, the chapter 
demonstrated that local actors subjectively reinvented new institutions to suit 
329 
 
their own local context maintaining some elements of the new bureaucratic 
institutions whiles certain aspects were discarded. This reveals the interplay 
between actors‘ subjectivities and institutional arrangements. Combining new 
and existing elements enabled the town committee to undertake multiple and 
ad hoc functions within the village, confirming the constraining as well as the 
enabling role of local institutions. This shows that social actors as ‗knowing 
active subjects‘ call on numerous collective arrangements, some less 
regularised and others more structured, to solve numerous problems within the 
village which is at variance to what pertains in development intervention where 
specific local organisations are crafted purposively to perform certain functions. 
  Though local government structures have played important role in 
formalising local level arrangements for governance my query is on the 
homogenisation and standardisation of local level arrangements through an 
emphasis on ‗conscious crafting‘ disregarding the complexity and diversity of 
context. Focusing on the heterogeneous nature of the lowest politico-
administrative units of Ghana‘s decentralisation framework, this thesis has 
shown the messy and contested nature of institutional crafting highlighting the 
constant process of negotiation among conflicting interest within communities, 
and between their members and other actors (Metha et. al, 2001). The internal 
struggles over village decisions, the variations in outcomes of decision among 
the four villages, and the contestations and struggles over ownership rights and 
entitlement to resources revealed the political nature of decentralisation. 
   My findings also illuminate a lack of congruence between attempts to 
make society legible by consciously crafting clear and fixed boundaries without 
concern to the existing social arrangements which may result in unintended 
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consequences. Attempts to clarify boundaries as fixed and static purely for 
administrative and development purposes misses the dynamic and fluid nature 
of boundaries and the different meanings that people associated with the 
practice of territorial delimitation. The unintended consequences of institutional 
formation requires that development approaches need to examine the existing 
patterns of interactions and complex form of rights within a particular locality 
before transplanting any new institutions based on bureaucratic ideals. 
  The chapter also re-echoed the argument that inadequate attention 
is paid to people‘s culture beliefs and life-worlds in the process of translating 
development into practice. The process of institutionalising decentralisation at 
the behest of external donors, such as the Ghana example, placed much 
emphasis on local government structures to enlist participation thereby 
depoliticising the concept. The practice of decentralisation the study revealed 
was not a technical activity implanted in a ‗homogenous‘ community but rather 
a political process the outcome of which reflected in the ongoing contestations 
struggles and conflicts that arise as a result of differences and tensions among 
social actors with different interests and vlaues. Placing much emphasis on 
community organising practices, on how decisions are made and implemented 
within the locality, reveals that public participation is not separate from other 
spheres of people‘s social life. The reality is that in rural life individuals are 
positioned in multiple ways to one another making the separation of public 
processes of governance from the everyday lives of village members 
problematic. Though Individual life worlds are complex, my argument is that, 
there are generality in these different life worlds. Therefore, decentralisation 
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policy and practice should focus on addressing the inequitable arrangements 
that keep certain group of people outside the institutions of local governance. 
  Decentralisation policies sometimes call for establishing new 
structures, participatory mechanisms and accountability systems. However, the 
option of strengthening existing traditional structures should not be totally 
discounted. The study has shown that certain contextual factors are central in 
shaping the outcomes of decentralisation reforms. Therefore, decentralisation 
policy practice need to focus on the longue durée in order to understand what is 
feasible for particular localities at particular points in time. Plateau and 
Abraham (2002: 119), writes that development approaches that draw on 
particpation may fail to transform the way things are done within the community 
due to the underlying socially embedded institutions that are ―informed by 
values, beliefs and practices that have to do with the mode of social relations‖. 
This suggests that these socially embedded principles that shape collective 
action and other community practices have historical and cultural roots that 
have endured over time. If institutionalised decentralisation is to achieve its 
intended goals and purposes, it needs to embrace the positive aspects of these 
‗deep-rooted‘ institutions that have consequences for political authority and 
governance arrangements.  
  Furthermore, local government structures should be made more 
flexible and context specific to enable them weave into the fabric of local 
community organising practices and embrace the complexity of rural life. 
Flexibility in local government structures means that local representatives can 
respond to the wishes of community members and adapt new ways of involving 
them in decision-making. My argument is that, certain elements of the local 
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government structure needs to be selected and combined with indigenous 
strengths to create workable hybrids of local government structures that are 
flexible, adaptive and receptive to the needs of the locality. These sentiments 
resonate with theoretical arguments to the effect that, a society‘s formal 
institutions must resonate with its shared habits and widely understood 
practices if they are to promote stability and development (Shivakumar, 2005) 
However, exclusive dependence of local government structures on local norms 
may have negative consequences for transparency and accountability, thereby 
affecting the democratic potential of decentralisation. 
 
 8.4 The complexity of authority in local governance  
  The last objective of the thesis questioned the manner in which 
power is devolved to local communities in decentralisation approaches. The 
study also sought to find out how the devolution of power to a particular locality 
through the legal instruments of the state transformed power relations 
manifesting in egalitarian structure of relations among diverse social actors 
   In Chapter Two, the study illustrated how authority structures lie at 
the heart of the mainstream approach to decentralisation. Ideas in mainstream 
views on decentralisation claim that devolving power and authority to local 
government structures results in ―reversing existing power relations in a manner 
that crates agency and voice for the poor‖ (Mansuri and Rao, 2003: 2). 
However, as this study has shown, such a conceptualisation of authority is 
problematic and narrow as it fails to recognise the multiple authority structures 
at play within the locality and how authority needs to be legitimated and 
enacted through practice. The use of the symbolic title ‗honourable‘ by 
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appointed members of the DA reveals the practical and relational nature of 
authority. It also illustrates the conscious attempts made by authority figures to 
locate and legitimise their authority in the village through diverse mechanisms. 
However, drawing on such legitimising symbols to exercising authority does not 
make such authority to be accepted by others.  
    The arguments in Chapters Six and Seven further questions the 
technocratic approach to decentralisation by arguing that authority is complex 
and that legitimating and institutionalising authority through legal instruments of 
the state fails to acknowledge the existing authority structures within the 
locality. The study revealed that the authority of a particular institution needs to 
be enacted in practice and much depends on the village members drawing on 
that authority structure to mediate their interactions. However, the decision of 
the authority structure also needs to be accepted in practice through some form 
of compliance further reinforcing the legitimacy of that institution. 
    The study highlighted the diverse authority structures that individuals 
consciously or unconsciously eclectically draw from in their daily interactions. 
The authority that an individual uses to mediate his /her interactions depends 
on the expectations and the belief that the individual has in that particular 
authority. The study has shown that people consciously or non-reflexively relied 
on diverse authority structures to solve their disputes. An example is the role of 
the priestess as an ‗informal‘ authority figure drawing on certain attributes to 
solve mundane problems in the village, which made her authority to be 
accepted in practice. Her authority was accepted because certain individuals 
went to her whilst others also accepted her judgment on issues. This reinforces 
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the argument that decentralisation reforms need to consider how authority is 
diversely located and highly contextualised in reality (Wong, 2007: 187). 
    The discussion revealed the complexity of authority structures within 
the locality and how authority needed to be legitimated through social relations 
and enacted in practice. Rather than viewing individuals as solely drawing on 
the state to derive their legitimacy, this study revealed that individuals within the 
village hierarchy had multiple attributes and relied on diverse registers of 
legitimacy to anchor their power and authority. The example of Nana 
Akuamoah Boateng, a traditional chief and at the same time the formal 
representative to the DA for Akroso village, and Mr. E. Y. Mensah, the 
appointed DA representative, illustrates the multiple registers that people draw 
on to consolidate their authority within the community. Also, within the town 
committee we see how age, wealth and social position enabled the ‗powerful 
minority‘ within the committee to shape the affairs of the committee. These 
individuals combined status with skills and technical knowledge to consolidate 
their position and authority within the group. Despite the new forms of authority 
structures in the villages the powerful members of the committee still relied on 
their human attributes to reinforce their authority. These attributes also enabled 
the other members of the group to acquiesce to the power of those in authority. 
   Therefore, technically designing new institutional arrangements 
through decentralisation to devolve power and authority to new authority 
structures to regulate behaviour and organisation within the locality fail to 
transform the existing power within the structure of relations. Such a process of 
legitimation also fails to embrace the practical nature of authority which is 
partially reliant on some subtle form of power to attain compliance and partly 
335 
 
dependent on the belief in that authority to meet the expectations of village 
members. 
 
 
8.5 Widening the narrow gaze on institutionalised decentralisation-  
       Recommendations 
 
  This thesis has identified the limitations of institutional approaches to 
decentralisation but acknowledges it‘s potential to promote participation and 
enhance social equity. An example is the introduction of new players onto the 
political landscape and the role of village members in inputting into the 
selections of village formal village representatives to the DA structures. At least 
this deviates from the traditional practice of a few king makers deciding on who 
becomes the new leader and village representatives. The role of these new 
governance institutions in service delivery was also noticed in the study. 
Furthermore, the example of the women refusing to pay market dues shows the 
positive effects of decentralisation. The women‘s actions were experienced 
directly by members of the local government unit which could then respond with 
good information signifying the presence and ability of local level institutions to 
intervene in the affairs of the locality. However, this study identified some of the 
shortcomings of institutionalised decentralisation based on its underlying 
elements that placed ‗strong‘ emphasis on efficiency, rationalilty and 
bureaucratic factors over social and contextual factors.  
   Therefore, the study recommends that decentralisation policy should 
be based on a deeper understanding of the wider processes that shape local 
governance within the specificities of a particular context. Thus, widening the 
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gaze on decentralisation has the propensity to make decentralisation have 
positive outcomes for both individuals and their comunity. Specifically, this 
section focuses on recommendations for policy by raising some important 
issues that will have positive consequences for decentralisation policy and 
practice. The Recommendations include more active role for the state in 
decentralisation approaches, finding the possibilities and potential for 
participation in the places that they occur and strengthening existing 
governance arrangements.  
 
8.5.1 Rethinking the state-society relations in institutionalised      
         Decentralisation 
   There is an ongoing debate in policy circles on the appropriate role of 
the state in development in this case decentralisation (Corbridge, 2008; 
Johnson and Start, 2001; Evans, 1995). Based on the findings of this research, 
this study recommends that decentralisation policy should put more emphasis 
on an active role for the state. The prevalent role of traditional leadership, of 
structure in shaping individual acts and the plurality of overlapping institutions 
at play at the local level call for a more vibrant role for the state in 
decentralisation and local governance. The active role for the state 
recommended is at variance with the neo-liberal thinking of a ‗re-emerging 
active state‘ within a good governance perspective (World Bank, 2000). The 
comment of one of the respondents Fredrick, ―that the state should hold village 
leaders to account‖ rather than village members coupled with the reliance on 
the same state for the provision of services such as the re-roofing of the school 
building and the micro-credit funds, illuminate the ―ineradicable‘ necessity of the 
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state in contemporary rural life‖ (Evans 1995: 2). Yet, the current approach to 
decentralisation shift focus to the individual and away from the state.  
   This is not to advocate for a state that is repressive and ―powerful as 
those of the gods‖ (Desai, 1991:3 quoted in Evans, 1995), but one that is more 
committed to and goes beyond decentralisation as a wider radical political 
project where much attention is paid to the ‗participation of marginal and 
subordinate groups‘ aimed towards a process of pro-poor social change 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2005: Evans, 1995). Specifically, an approach that goes 
beyond the technical and managerial aspects of decentralisation to a more 
radical political process in which the state gets more marginal actors into 
governance. Then, decentralisation policy and practice may have to engage 
with Hickey and Mohan‘s (2005: 256) ‗critical modernist project‘. 
   However, Giddens (1994) asked that ―if even there should be an 
agenda for radical politics in development who is to implement such an agenda‖ 
and ―whose values is to shape such an agenda of radical politics‖. Giddens‘ 
assertion is that the plurality of values makes the context very important in 
shaping the radical political agenda. This study has shown that contextualising 
decentralisation will manifest in a deeper understanding of how underlying 
structural factors, power and ‗politics‘ keep certain people out of governance 
and which processes reproduce and perpetuate inequity and exclusion. 
However, my concern is on how such an enhanced and active role for the state 
towards ‗a pro-poor minority action‘ can be realised when historical and 
contextual factors and ‗hegemonic elites‘ interplay to shape social organisation 
and the actions of several individuals. Such a project will be beneficial to the 
poor if it adequately considers the complex and dynamic relationship between 
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individual agency, institutional dynamics and structural constraints surrounding 
the poor within the locality. This calls for the introduction of politics, social 
relations and context into the discussions on a ‗radical political citizenship 
approach. 
   Decentralisation as a governance reform will then be able to fully 
comprehend people‘s subjectivities, how and why they undertake certain 
choices, through which institutional mechanisms, with what resources, and the 
underlying structures and processes that shape their participation in 
governance. The power relations at play within a particular locality, especially 
existing relations with the diverse agents that constitute the state, need to be 
adequately considered. Decentralisation done this way may positively shape 
marginalisation and exclusion thereby transforming the enduring patterns of 
power and inequality. The dilemma is whether the African nation state such as 
Ghana operating within the imperatives and logics of globalisation, the neo-
liberal challenge and the ever present discourse of inadequate public resources 
will be more inclined towards such a perspective. 
 In all these, the profundity of the state‘s presence in the affairs of the 
local arena that is deemed sufficient is little explored. This thesis recommends 
further studies into the perception of what the state means to local actors, the 
depth of the states presence in the locality and the nature of the role that the 
state should play in the texture of village life. 
 
 8.5.2 Exploring the possibilities and potential for participation 
  Specifically, the study has shown the diverse and mixed motivations 
that shape human actions, especially, what drives people to participate in local 
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governance arrangements. The study has also demonstrated the importance of 
understanding the subjective meaning that individuals attach to their decisions 
and the different ways in which individuals take advantage of and also respond 
to the effects of structure. The subjective nature of action goes beyond the 
economic incentives for action to understand people‘s subjective values and 
goals. The differences in culture between particular contexts suggest that 
individual values informing action will be context specific and will differ from 
place to place. Therefore, development approaches that rely on participation 
should consider human agency in the places that they occur.  The emphasis 
should be on how people undertake certain actions taking into consideration 
their social location within the society and their relationship with others. 
Therefore, this study suggests that local governance approaches need to 
adequately consider the relational and contextual characteristic of agency and 
to consider the impacts of existing institutions that shape interactions among 
interdependent individuals.  
   Significantly related to the above recommendation is the need for 
development policy interventions to engage with the underlying factors that 
prevent certain people within the community from exercising agency to shape 
the affairs of the community. The analysis in Chapter Five revealed how the 
history of cooperation enabled the traditional leadership to play an active role in 
the affairs of the village though they are not part of the official institutional 
arrangement for decentralisation. The elite capture problem suggests that 
central intervention is always needed to ensure progressive outcomes for 
decentralisation. Analysing the relationship between local social structure and 
which particular individuals shape decentralisation revealed that 
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decentralisation reforms do not benefit the disadvantaged in the community 
who are normally incapable of using the structures provided by 
decentralisation.  
   Similarly, local cultures  do not necessarily accept or facilitate 
democratic procedures which give equal weight to each individual (Crook and 
Sverrison, 2001: 8).This suggests that consciously providing new local 
government structures may not result in altering the existing power relationship 
and institutions within the community but rather reinforce their power and 
position. That was why existing institutions continued to shape who became a 
DA representative and village interactions. Therefore understanding the 
resources, endowments and opportunities that facilitated the role of existing 
elites, in this case traditional leadership, in the community will broaden 
strategies that are required to bring marginalised individuals into development.  
   The material and livelihood concerns of the poor also need to be 
considered for them have an effective social life. In the study we noticed how 
the agency of certain individuals was focused outside the new spaces and even 
beyond the community in search of more ordinary livelihood concerns.  
 
8.5.3 Understanding existing institutions 
   The literature on decentralised governance suggests the centrality of 
formal local government structures in promoting participation in community 
based initiatives. Institutional theory focuses on robust formal organisations to 
make good the deficiencies of old or weak institutions. Within such an approach 
people are seen as rational and their actions informed by conscious reasoning. 
Purposively crafting institutions to shape the behaviour of people and their 
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social organisation implies severing their ties to existing institutions. For several 
people the cost of mediating their interactions within such specific institutions 
may be high. 
   However, the study revealed that in everyday social life people 
consciously and unconsciously relied on diverse institutions arrangements to 
shape their interactions. Therefore, institutions arising as a result of 
interventions served to create additional channels of institutional membership 
and access to resources (Berry, 1993) and not to determine which particular 
institutions that individuals should use to shape particular interactions. People 
based on their subjective values had the agency to decide on which institutions 
to use to shape their everyday interactions.  
  The reality is that new institutions and existing ones interact in many 
ways within a particular locality to shape outcomes of local governance. These 
interactions that are either for instrumental or functional reasons or due to the 
unintended outcomes of policy may result in conflict between these institutions. 
Therefore, it is important for decentralisation policy to emphasise an 
understanding of the depth of existing institutions that shape interactions within 
a particular locality prior to the intervention. Building clear linkages between 
customary and modern governance institutions through effective nesting can 
contribute to creating synergy between the state and local populations, 
improving the effectiveness of local government structure and redressing 
inequities based on gender, ethnicity, and social status.  
  This is also important for policy makers since people really do not 
attach democratisation to the affairs of the village chief but rather saw their role 
in the community as role founded in culture and the right to lead. This argument 
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does not suggest the uncritical acceptance of the role of chiefs in 
decentralisation but rather access the role of chiefs in local government 
structures and identify their existing roles that fit with various local government 
activities in their area whiles taking into consideration other various actors in 
the field of local government. It may also be desirable for the state to blend the 
formalise local government structures with the activities of local chiefs. 
  Related to this point is the idea that social actors do not subscribe 
solely to formal institutions or new interventions to mediate their mundane 
interactions. Hence, existing socially embedded institutions need to be 
adequately understood and considered in approaches to decentralisation. This 
reinforces Cleaver (2002) argument of the importance of ‗understanding of the 
content, underlying principles and social effects of institutions, not merely their 
visible forms‘ (2002: 28). Thus, having an in-depth knowledge on the content 
and form of the varied institutions at play within the locality will give an idea of 
which blend of institutions, both bureaucratic and socially embedded will result 
in greater effectiveness. This supports the assertion that there is no one ‗right‘ 
institutional fix, rather as Rhodes (1997: 47) puts it, ‗it‘s the mix that matters‘ for 
effective governance. This requires designing new local governance structures 
in such a way that they are compatible with existing local organisations, 
organising practices and norms that are beneficial to the locality. 
  Therefore, incorporating individual subjective values and the social 
context into the process of institutionalising decentralisation will result in greater 
understanding of the complexity and heterogeneity of the local context. By 
considering in particular the history of existing social relationship, the ongoing 
struggles and contestations over power and resources within the locality and 
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among diverse individuals, the diverse institutional channels that shape agency 
for different people, then, the dynamics of the social context will become 
explicit. The consequence is that decentralisation through local governance 
arrangements will be able to adequately engage with the situations and 
relationships which shape local governance. Otherwise, institutional 
approaches to decentralisation will continue to benefit a few individuals while 
failing a large number of people in their quest to be involved in the governance 
of their locality. 
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Appendix I 
The generous nature of rule interpretation 
 The district assembly  bye-law allowed village leaders to fine individuals who 
do not pay notkuatoo, continuously absented themselves from communal labour 
or even send them to court but that was not done due to the time and cost 
involved in prosecuting cases at courts in the district capital. Application of rules 
was not instant but involved a process of negotiation to get the individuals 
conforming to rules.  
 For individuals who did not attend communal labour emphasis was placed on 
dialogue so that they change their behaviour. Such individuals were allowed to 
do their part of the communal work at a later period if they showed remorse. For 
others who continue to be difficult we report them to the chief.  Some get go 
away free instead of being fined or sanctioned to do their bit of the communal 
labour. This practice is encouraging some people to stay away from communal 
work. 
 For those who do not pay fines we report them to the village chief. But you 
see the chief and elders have their own way of getting these individuals to pay 
the fines or do their bit of communal labour. If the chiefs invited individuals and 
they fail to honour the invitation they are not compelled to use force but leave the 
person alone. Instances occur in village life that the chiefs will get such 
individuals to live up to their responsibilities. This can even delay till death of the 
individual. For example, when you die, your family will never be issued with a 
permit to bury you if you have been in contravention of any rules or are in areas 
of Ntokuatoo. The chief owns the land so without him giving you a land at the 
cemetery your grave can never be dug for you to be buried. A funeral date 
cannot even be fixed without your family paying all outstanding levies and fines. 
So it‘s the responsibility of your family to make sure that you do the right thing by 
paying participating in communal labour and respecting village elders. Village 
elders intercede on your behalf when you are in trouble, so you have to make 
sure you are in their good books. 
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Appendix II 
Contestation among the four village chiefs over claims to land 
 ‗When the idea of the creation of the lake was mooted by Osagyefo Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah, the four Akan speaking villages were located in the midst of 
other Guan and Ewe tribes met and had consultation that manifested in their 
decision to relocate together. Before being resettled the towns were not too far 
away from each other and had intermarriages over the years. So the decision to 
resettle together was collective. When the lake was formed we lived peacefully 
with each other in Notnaboma, meaning „we have met the plateau‟. The four 
villages had one Town Development Committee (TDC) which later became the 
town committees for each village. Initially we thought we are brothers for good 
but the generation of today is trying to make cracks in the bond of brotherhood. 
About 46 years ago, those who brought us here to re-settle, most of whom are 
dead now, loved themselves and worked together for the common good of all. 
The lust for money and lust for power among the current generation is destroying 
the good neighborliness that existed among us.  
 There were three different ethnic divisions each with its own land. Initially 
there was no friction concerning ownership of the land. But these days, those of 
us (the chiefs) who had our farming lands near the Digya area submerged by the 
lake have no land to farm. When we farm on Agyaade stool lands, the elders 
demand rent from us claiming that the land belongs to them. If you cut a timber 
here or in any part of the forest they will not allow you to cut it because they 
claim it belongs to them (Akroso or Agyaade stool).  If you step on Agyaade land 
to cut timber they will not allow you to cut it away, even though you might have 
the permit from the Forestry Department to fell a tree for a domestic use. My 
subjects went to farm at Agyaase forest about 3 miles away from here, they were 
asked to pay ground rents even though the government has acquired the land for 
the state and paid compensation to them. Moreso, we are one people with 
different ancestral lineage. 
 I have petitioned the government over a year now and nothing has been 
heard about it.  I am very sure that people of Akroso had collected their 
compensation. Because of these agitation majority of Supuom people left to 
settle at Bridgeano about 20 years ago.  They were the second highest 
populated settlers but they were not prepared to tolerate such cheating and 
disregard for the needs of other members of the villages forming Ntonaboma. 
Until a government official comes to interpret the government acquisition to the 
chiefs for them to understand that A is A and B is B they will continue to 
suppress other people.  One day it will escalate into serious violence.  It is like 
‗cow dung the surface is hard but the under is soft and hot‟.  I am sorry I have left 
my files at Accra else I would have given you a copy of the instrument‘. This is 
the beginning of a potential conflict which needs to be settled before it escalates 
into violence (unedited interview with the chief of Yamuoso, Nana Adade 
Bekoe II on 12/05/2007 who gave me the permission to reproduce the 
transcript). 
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Appendix III 
The contested nature of the authority of appointed DA members 
 The attempt by the appointed members to mange amenities emanating from 
the district was challenged and this had to be done by the elected members or other 
community members in consultation with the chiefs. An example was the decision 
by the appointed assembly man living in Supom, Mr. E. Y. Mensah to take over the 
management of the only public toilet in Ntonaboma. The toilet was previously 
managed by a village member who was always accused of embezzling the money 
collected and not using it to buy detergents for cleaning the facility. Reason given 
was that the position of the appointed members was transient and that their 
authority could be revoked at any time by the appointing authority or if there was a 
change in government. Such a change in roles at the village level may come with its 
own accountability challenges. Also the role of the appointed members of the 
assembly was at the back stages and did not involve activities that brought them 
into mainstream communal activities.  
 For example during the renovation of the community clinic the appointed 
member of the DA, Mr. E. Y. Mensah who was also the chairman of the Area 
council was given the responsibility to oversee the project by the district assembly 
by virtue of his position. What the appointed assemblyman did was to bring in the 
elected member for Agyaade/Yamuoso, Mr Apreku Nkansah to act as his link 
between him and the communities due to the fragile nature of his authority within 
the community. So within the official spaces of the district assembly Mr E. Y. 
Mensah was in charge of the project but at the community level Mr Apreku Nkansah 
was responsible for the day-to-day management of the project.  
 During the project period his authority was continuously contested and he had 
to negotiate with other community actors and other authority systems in trying to re-
assert his public authority and control over the project. He was also accused of not 
collaborating with the other elected DA member from Akroso, Nana Akuamoah 
Boateng who felt the AC chairman had monopolised the whole project and was not 
been transparent in the utilisation of the funds released for the project. Nana 
Akuamoah Boateng used his position as a traditional chief to get the other chiefs to 
request Mr. E. Y. Mensah to render accounts to them and keep them involved in the 
financial management of the project. This resulted in the artisans withdrawing their 
voluntary labour and requesting that they should be paid for the services they 
rendered. However, community members mentioned that in earlier community 
projects the services of these artisans were provided freely. Mr. E. Y. Mensah had 
to bring in other authority structures to negotiate and settle the issue. 
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Appendix IV 
Sources  (key informants) 
Name  Date 
Nana Asumadu, Gyasehene of Aygaade  10/02/2007,  
26/03/2007 
Nana Akuamoah Boateng, Mankrado of Akroso, DA member 
for Akroso). 
03/02/2007 
04/02/2007 
12/04/2007 
Interview with Foyoo ,27 years and a Village  Influential  
Youth 
24/02/2007 
GD with the Akroso Traditional Council 26/03/2007 
GD with the Yamuoso Traditional Council 29/03/2007 
GD with the Agyaade Traditional Council 21/02/2007 
GD for women in Yamuoso village 26/03/2007 
GD for men in Yamuoso village 26/03/2007 
GD – mixed members of the various bureaucratic 
committees in Akroso Village 
20/03/2007 
interview with the chief of Yamuoso, Nana Adade Bekoe II 
on  
12/05/2007 
GD with UC and Assembly members 29/03/2007 
Interview with UC member 18/04/2007 
Mary Addae Konadu,  15/04/2007 
Interview with Appointed DA member 12/02/2007 
Diary notes during the Ntonaboma  Easter Harvest 08/04/2007 
Interview with Adwoah Serwaa  21/05/2007) 
Mr. Nketia, UC Chairman,  03/02/2007). 
Interview with Opayin Addae 14/02/2007 
20/05/2007 
Interview separately for three village members in Akroso 
village after communal labour  
26/04/2007 
Interview with Mr. Nkansah, Agyaade/Yamuoso DA member 14/03/2007 
Interview with a Ntow, a village youth on the tractor 
committee 
12/03/2007 
Interview with Mr. E. Y. Mensah 17/01/2007 
Interview with Nana Akuamoah Boateng, DA member for 
Akroso). 
04/02/2007 
Interview with water Committee member 03/05/2007 
Interview with Sammy; 35, Unsuccessful District Assembly 
Contestant for Agyaade/Yamuoso 
 
22/03/2007 
23/03/2007 
 
Interview with Asare, ordinary village member,  
 
23/05/2007 
Field notes, village meeting). 13/02/07 
Interview with Anane Gyansah Ado, former DA Member 03/05/2007 
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Table 2.1: Modes of participation in development theory and practice 
Forms of 
participation 
What participation 
means to the 
implemented 
agency 
What 
‘participation’ 
means for 
those on the 
receiving end 
Approach Participants 
viewed as  
Why invite/involve? 
Nominal Legitimation – to 
show they are 
doing 
something 
Inclusion – to 
retain some 
access to 
potential 
benefits 
Community 
Development 
Objects 
narrow form of 
citizenship 
 
To enlist people in projects or 
processes, so as to secure 
compliance, minimize 
dissent, lend legitimacy 
Instrumental 
 
Efficiency – to limit 
funders’ input, draw 
on community 
contributions and 
make projects more 
cost-effective 
Cost – of time 
spent on 
project-related 
labour 
and other 
activities 
Political 
participation  
Instruments 
 
To make projects or 
interventions run more 
efficiently, by 
enlisting contributions, 
delegating responsibilities 
Representative 
 
Sustainability – to 
avoid 
creating 
dependency 
Leverage – to 
influence 
the shape the 
project 
takes and its 
management 
Populist or 
participation 
in 
development 
Actors 
 
To get in tune with public 
views and values, to garner 
good ideas, to defuse 
opposition, to enhance 
responsiveness 
Transformative 
 
Empowerment – to 
enable people to 
make their own 
decisions, work out 
what to do and take 
action 
Empowerment – 
to be 
able to decide 
and act 
for themselves 
Alternative 
development, 
Social 
capital, 
Participatory 
governance 
Agents 
 
To build political capabilities, 
critical consciousness and 
confidence; to enable to 
demand rights; to enhance 
accountability 
Adopted from White (1996 : 7–9 ) cited in Cornwall (2008: 273) and Hickey and Mohan (2004: 9). 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Data Collection Method and Respondents for the study 
 
Who/domains objectives  Data Generation Methods
Akroso, 
Supom, 
Yamuso and 
Agyaade  
To understand the participation or non-participation of various actors in village 
governance, their motivation for doing so and the factors enabling and constraining 
their participation Specifically;  
• to understand how new institutional spaces are accessed, by who and with what 
resources and the nature of the selection process  
• 2.to explore how village decisions and rules are negotiated and in which spaces, who 
makes the final decisions and interprets the rules with what resources  
• 3.How are leaders held to account and through what means, formal or informal  
Informal interviews of key informants and unstructured 
observations  
• 13 members from Akroso  (5 women)  
• 6 members from Supom (3 women)  
• 8 members from Yamuoso (4 woman)  
• 10 members from Agyaade (4 woman)  
• 5 formal UC and DA representatives 
• For other informants selection was purposively done 
based on age, (18- 30years), gender and ethnicity and 
well-being (poor, 27 (12, women) and non-poor, 8(3 
women)  
• Group Discussion separately for men and women  
• Selected 2 youth members in informal discussions  
• Observed two village meetings one at Akroso and the 
other at Agyaade  
• Observed 3 town committee meetings in Akroso, 
Yamuoso and Agyadde 
• Observed 2 communal labour one in Akroso, and another 
in Agyaade 
• Observed tractor committee  and School management 
committee meeting 
Akroso, and 
Agyaade  
• To understand the dynamics of  village governance and the nature of interactions 
occurring between existing institutions and new ones and how this shapes village 
governance  
• To understand how  social relationships, values and beliefs are brought to bear on 
participation in village activities  
• To understand the nature of interaction occurring among the four villages and how 
this affected co-operation and governance  
Traditional 
leaders, 
Assembly and 
Unit, 
Committee 
Members and 
the town 
committee  
• To understand their role in village management and how their authority is enacted in 
practiced and legitimated?  
• To understand who has power and authority within the village and through what 
processes  
 
Informal interviews - Selection was purposively done  
• All 4 assembly members (2 appointed and 2 elected, 
•  8 UC members from Akroso (5 from Sukuumu and 3 
from Ahenbono UC (3 appointed 5 elected)  
• 6  UC members from Ayaade/Yamuso (2 appointed 4 
elected; 2  women)  
• 6  UC members from JSS UC ((3  appointed, 3 elected;  
• All four chiefs for were interviewed.  
• 3 sub chiefs from Akroso, 2 from Supom 1 each from 
Agyaade  
• Group discussions one each for the Akroso and Agyaade 
Traditional councils  
103 
 
Table 4.1 A summary of Ghana’s history of decentralisation  
Phase Period Characteristics 
 
Phase One 1878 -1951 Colonial period provided a statutory basis for local government through chiefs referred 
to as the NA. The main strategy was to modify the traditional systems of organising to 
suit modern conditions through indirect rule. No provision for opportunities for the 
development of local democracy or democratic local government in the rural areas. 
Phase Two 1951 – 1957 Attempts at decolonisation resulted in local government reforms aimed at effectively 
designing institutions that would be responsive to the needs of the local population 
opining a window for community participation in local governance.  
Phase 
Three 
1957-1988 Placed emphasis on administrative decentralisation rather than devolution of political 
authority. Rationales for decentralisation during this period were economic and 
centralisation of state power stifling participation. The outcome of the local 
government reforms during this period was a dual hierarchy structure in which the 
local government and the central government institutions operated in parallel.  
Phase Four 1988 to 
present 
Placed emphasis on political liberalisation and democratisation that were shaped by 
external conditionalities. Combination of administrative and democratic 
decentralisation. Introduction of local level institutions that was genuinely participatory 
and responsible to the local community.  
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Table 5.1 Dynamic structure/agency framework for understanding differential participation in local government structures 
 Agency 
Structure  Local norms Personal motivations Resources 
Age  
 
Majority of the villagers expected village traditional 
leadership to solve village problems and take the 
leading role in village governance 
 
Forms of power inequality that shaped social 
relations in the family, kin and community 
permeated the local government structures 
privileging older men and returnee retired civil 
servants to run the affairs of the village 
 
The youth are to behave appropriately  towards 
village elders  and report any problems  and 
uncertainties to them 
Village elders think that they had the social obligation 
to ensure that village affairs are well managed as 
was done by their ancestors. 
 
Majority of the youth thought that the elders had the 
right to lead. 
 
The youth felt that society expects them to migrate to 
the cities to look for paid jobs and send remittances 
to cater for their family members 
 
 Respect and Social status within the village 
Links to traditional authorities/lineage 
provided the resource for the elderly 
to become representatives on local 
government structures 
 
 
Skill and knowledge/education 
 
Social positioning  
Wealth 
 
The norm that the wealthy must be accorded 
privileged position in the community still prevails. 
This was evident in the daily life of Ntonaboma 
where wealthy individuals occupied front pews at 
church and other important village functions.  
Poverty was a challenge to participation in local 
governance.  
 
Attending village meetings was time consuming. 
 
Majority of village members gave little priority to 
anything that does not impinge upon their livelihoods. 
Party Politics provided the politically 
connected and powerful  to be 
appointed DA and UC members if 
even they lacked the qualities to 
become a representative 
 
Skill and knowledge/education 
Gender 
 
Cultural norms of women undertaking a passive 
role in the management of community affairs still 
prevail.  
 
Women have to always negotiate and seek 
consent from the male dominated village 
traditional leadership to undertake any activity in 
the village 
Majority of women had low self esteem.  
 
Those who were married depended on their 
husbands for their livelihood survival. Other women 
depended on their family members for their livelihood   
 
Low education made some of the women think that 
they could manage the affairs of the village 
Kin networks, religion, wealth, and 
education facilitated access for some 
women to the local government 
structures 
 
